Integrating Electronic Reverse Auctions into Defense Procurement: Exploratory Research on Opportunities, Issues, Processes, Risks, and Cultural Implications by Coyne, Adam V. & Collins, Michael J.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
Integrating Electronic Reverse Auctions into Defense
Procurement: Exploratory Research on
Opportunities, Issues, Processes, Risks, and
Cultural Implications
Coyne, Adam V.









MBA PROFESSIONAL REPORT 
 
 
Integrating Electronic Reverse Auctions into  
Defense Procurement: Exploratory Research 
on Opportunities, Issues, Processes, Risks,  




By:   Adam V. Coyne, and 
 Michael J. Collins  
December 2009 
 
Advisors: Timothy G. Hawkins 







Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 i 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE  
December 2009 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
MBA Professional Report 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Integrating Electronic Reverse Auctions into Defense 
Procurement: Exploratory Research on Opportunities, Issues, Processes, Risks, and 
Cultural Implications 
6. AUTHOR(S) Adam V. Coyne; Michael J. Collins  
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER  
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
 AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
This case study explores the first and only electronic reverse auction (e-RA) conducted by the United States Air Force 
(USAF) in Kuwait and addresses both theoretical gaps in e-RA knowledge and practitioner gaps within the 
Department of Defense (DoD). Qualitative research based on a single case study explored 1) cultural implications of 
conducting an e-RA in the Middle East and 2) procedures DoD contracting officers could follow to use e-RAs for 
stateside and contingency procurements—and expected savings from doing so. Findings suggest that Middle Eastern 
sellers with a cultural disposition to avoid risky technology-based acquisition participated in the USAF auction 
because they trusted the USAF more than buyers in the local market. Sellers also felt increased satisfaction with the e-
RA even when they did not win because the process increased fairness, transparency and reduced the negative effects 
of wasta and the general Arab business climate of distrust, unfairness, and favoritism. Secondly, a detailed spend 
analysis of FY07–-08 USAF spend data, extrapolated across DoD, suggests the DoD is leaving billions of dollars on 
the table by not using e-RAs. Drawing on the results, implications for theory and practice are explicated. Finally, 
study limitations are disclosed, and opportunities for future research are identified. 
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
204 
14. SUBJECT TERMS Electronic Reverse Auctions, e-RA, National Culture, Technology Adoption, 
Procurement Policy, Strategic Sourcing Strategy 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 iii 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
INTEGRATING ELECTRONIC REVERSE AUCTIONS INTO DEFENSE 
PROCUREMENT: EXPLORATORY RESEARCH ON OPPORTUNITIES, 
ISSUES, PROCESSES, RISKS, AND CULTURAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
Adam V. Coyne, Captain, United States Air Force 
Michael J. Collins, Lieutenant Junior Grade, United States Navy 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
 









Authors:  _____________________________________ 
Adam V. Coyne 
 
 
   _____________________________________ 
Michael J. Collins  
 
 
Approved by:  _____________________________________ 
Dr. Timothy G. Hawkins, Lead Advisor 
 
 
   _____________________________________ 
   Bryan J. Hudgens, Support Advisor 
 
 
   _____________________________________ 
   Dr. William Gates, Dean 
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
 iv 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v 
INTEGRATING ELECTRONIC REVERSE AUCTIONS INTO 
DEFENSE PROCUREMENT: EXPLORATORY RESEARCH ON 








This case study explores the first and only electronic reverse auction (e-RA) 
conducted by the United States Air Force (USAF) in Kuwait and addresses both 
theoretical gaps in e-RA knowledge and practitioner gaps within the Department of 
Defense (DoD). Qualitative research based on a single case study explored 1) cultural 
implications of conducting an e-RA in the Middle East and 2) procedures DoD 
contracting officers could follow to use e-RAs for stateside and contingency 
procurements—and expected savings from doing so. Findings suggest that Middle 
Eastern sellers with a cultural disposition to avoid risky technology-based acquisition 
participated in the USAF auction because they trusted the USAF more than buyers in the 
local market. Sellers also felt increased satisfaction with the e-RA even when they did not 
win because the process increased fairness, transparency and reduced the negative effects 
of wasta and the general Arab business climate of distrust, unfairness, and favoritism. 
Secondly, a detailed spend analysis of FY07–08 USAF spend data, extrapolated across 
DoD, suggests the DoD is leaving billions of dollars on the table by not using e-RAs. 
Drawing on the results, implications for theory and practice are explicated. Finally, study 
limitations are disclosed, and opportunities for future research are identified. 
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A.  BACKGROUND  
Over the past decade, the growth of information technology—specifically the 
internet—has fundamentally changed how consumers communicate and conduct business 
on a global scale (Friedman, 2007). Some historians believe the spread of e-commerce is 
comparable to innovation along the lines of the steam engine, telephone, and television 
(Turley, 2002). Moreover, while this shift to e-commerce continues to spread to 
undeveloped areas of the world, the impact of technology’s footprint remains unclear. 
What we do know is that e-commerce has changed, and will continue to change B2B and 
B2C interactions fundamentally. Perhaps nowhere is this transformation more 
pronounced than in the manufacturing industry, where companies like General Electric 
have turned to innovative e-commerce strategies to reduce the cost of goods and services 
they procure (Trent & Monczka, 2003). One sourcing tool, an online electronic reverse 
auction (e-RA), has received both academic and practitioner attention over the past 
decade.  
B.  HOW E-RAS WORK AND WHY THEY MATTER... 
Generally defined, an e-RA is “an online, real-time dynamic auction between a 
[single] buying organization and a group of suppliers who compete against each other to 
win the [buyer’s] business” (Beall et al., 2003). E-RA essentially works “like eBay in 
reverse” (FedBid, 2009), with multiple suppliers simultaneously bidding down the 
amount they will charge a buyer for providing a good or service. This differs from the 
traditional “forward” auction, like eBay, in which multiple buyers bid the price up until a 
winner is determined. E-RAs differ from traditional auctions because they allow 
“immediate bidder feedback and enable geographic and temporal conveniences” (Jap, 
2002). In layman’s terms, this means that e-RAs allow bidders the convenience of 
placing orders over the internet from anywhere in the world, with added benefits of 
immediate feedback through real-time, transparent bidding. For a discussion on formats, 
types, and differences between e-RAs and theoretical auctions, see Jap (2002).  
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The business case for e-RAs is compelling. Studies show buyers can typically 
save 5–40% (Tully, 2000)—with an average of 20% (Cohn, 2000)—on the cost of goods 
and services they procure by allowing multiple bids per offeror, versus the typical one-
shot (or limited exchanges) currently used in government contracting. This mechanism 
creates significant savings because vendors are able to respond with successive 
downward bids until the lowest-cost vendor prevails. Other benefits include the reduction 
of award cycle-time by up to 40% (Beall et al., 2003), increased bidding transparency, 
and higher price visibility (Kaufman & Carter, 2004; Schrader, Schrader & Eller, 2004; 
Smart & Harrison, 2002). Given these savings, it is no surprise that 31% of firms reported 
using e-RAs as one tool in their mix of strategic sourcing strategies1 (Amelinckx, Muylle 
& Lievens, 2008), and the trend is growing (Sorcity, personal correspondence, March 26, 
2009; Hawkins, forthcoming). The data in Table 1 indicates a recent growth trend in the 
e-RA industry.2  
 
Table 1.   2009 e-RA Growth Trends (Sorcity, personal correspondence, March 26, 
2009) 
CATEGORY CHANGE 
Unsolicited Interest in E-bidding from Organizations Up 440% 
Change in Average e-RFQ Dollar Value Up 150% 
Solicited Interest in E-bidding from Organizations Up 20% 
Change in Average Savings Achieved to 23% Up 5% 
 
Some researchers, however, suggest e-RAs might damage the buyer-supplier 
relationship (Jap, 2002, 2003, 2007, 2008; Emiliani, 2004; Carter, Kaufmann, Beale, 
Carter, Hendrick et al., 2004). This could include the erosion of trust through perceived 
opportunistic buying behavior (Smeltzer & Car, 2002; Jap, 2002, 2003; Nair, 2005; 
Gattiker, Huang & Schwarz, 2006; Tassabehji et al., 2006). Such erosion of trust may 
outweigh the monetary benefits associated with e-RAs and invite retaliatory pricing or 
                                                 
1 Data current as of 2006. 
2 Details of the growth data did not include market segments or areas of growth.  
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poor supplier performance (Jap, 2002; Carter et al., 2004). These criticisms, to an extent, 
remain largely speculative because researchers who have studied relational impact have 
not found supporting evidence that e-RAs negatively impact the buyer-supplier 
relationship (Jap, 2008). Other researchers point out that not all transactions are suitable, 
desirable, or efficient for establishing relational exchange (Kraljic, 1983; Smart & 
Harrison, 2002). Companies often employ a portfolio approach towards strategic sourcing 
in which companies adjust their procurement strategy based on the criticality of the item 
or service and its supply risk (e.g., availability of suppliers). Under Kraljic’s framework 
(1983), companies’ relational exchange becomes more important as the criticality of the 
item increases and the availability of capable suppliers decreases. When the end item is 
of low value and when many capable suppliers are willing to compete, efficient, non-
relational mechanisms are appropriate (Kraljic, 1983). Regardless of their stance on e-
RAs, many academicians feel e-RAs are here to stay (Jap, 2002; Sashi & O’Leary, 2002; 
Schoenherr & Mabert, 2007). 
C.  FEDERAL APPLICATION OF E-RAS 
In early 2000, the DoD took note of e-RA savings and conducted research and 
pilot programs to determine whether e-RAs conflict with the regulations and laws 
governing Federal Acquisitions (SAF/AQC, 2001; Turley, 2002; Brown & Ray, 2007). 
Initial success prompted the Navy and Army to develop e-RA applications and policy in 
order to leverage industry for commercially available, low-dollar commodities. The Air 
Force, however, took a different approach in 2001 by: 1) acknowledging e-RAs as a 
pricing tool and 2) decentralizing its use as a judgment call by individual contracting 
officers (CO) in the field without providing training (SAF/AQC, 2001; Turley, 2002). As 
a result, United States Air Force (USAF) COs, already burdened by operational tempo in 
Iraq and Afghanistan and downsizing (Commission, 2007), rarely used-e-RAs in 
procurements, while other Federal agencies more readily employed e-RAs and saved 
millions while exceeding socioeconomic goals (FedBid, 2009). One exception involves 
the USAF’s use of an e-RA to procure generators in Kuwait.  
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On March 17, 2008, members of a USAF expeditionary contracting unit 
(ECONS) stationed in Kuwait ventured into uncharted territory by being the first military 
unit to conduct an e-RA in the Middle East. Using a two-step, lowest-price-technically-
acceptable (LPTA) source selection methodology, local firms were first prequalified 
based on technical acceptability, then were invited to compete based on price during an e-
RA to determine the winner. The result was a 19.9% savings totaling $395,000. 
Subsequently, the media praised contracting personnel for their “innovative” approach 
(McCree, 2008),3 and military commanders lauded the effort in performance reports.  
D.  PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 
The purpose of this work is twofold. First, the research addresses a gap in the 
knowledge base centered on the cultural implications associated with e-RA usage (Jap, 
2002) in the Middle East, specifically Kuwait. This is an important area of e-RA research 
because “as business markets become more global, procurement strategies will also 
become more global” (Jap, 2002, p. 521). Furthermore, researchers point to the rapid 
diffusion of e-RA use through Europe, Asia, and Latin America as an important trend 
(Jap, 2002); e-RA managers need to better understand sourcing across a variety of 
cultural contexts (Jap, 2003). According to Jap (2003), each country brings its own set of 
unique (national) characteristics that affect e-RA management. Since an increasing rate of 
internet diffusion and Western influence is spreading across the Middle East, an e-RA 
held in Kuwait brings a myriad of cultural, political, technical, and economic 
implications to the table. Furthermore, the success of this event—given Kuwaiti’s high 
Uncertainty Avoidance (UA) and high Power Distance (PD)—suggests an innovative 
technology-based procurement (a risky venture) should not have been possible 
(Parboteeah et al., 2005). Yet for some reason, in this particular event, the Kuwaiti 
vendors overcame their natural aversion to risk to participate. Armed with insight from 
this study, more buying activities across the DoD may be able to reproduce the 19.9% 
savings obtained during the focal e-RA of this case study.  
                                                 
3 To our knowledge, a B2B e-RA has not been attempted yet, which indicates a void in both 
practitioner data and academic application to this region. 
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The second purpose of this study addresses a practical need centering on e-RA 
use within the DoD as a strategic sourcing tool. We use the USAF’s application of an e-
RA to procure generators as a case study (i.e., the unit of analysis) to explore how the 
DoD can incorporate e-RAs into its increasing efforts to strategically source goods and 
services as a matter of policy—thereby: (1) easing the learning curve for individual COs, 
(2) maximizing e-RA use where appropriate, and (3) saving substantial taxpayer dollars. 
In recent years, Congressional and Executive agencies criticized the DoD for failing to 
take a strategic approach to improve DoD Acquisition (GAO, 2002). In 2003, the Office 
of Government Accountability and Oversight (GAO) called for “high level attention” to 
transform DoD’s acquisition of commercial goods and services. According to the report, 
the broad scope of this effort should reduce purchasing costs through a more strategic 
approach using commercial best practices (GAO, 2003). The Office of Federal 
Procurement Policy (OFPP) also weighed in, citing e-RAs as an industry “best practice” 
that maximizes competition and serves as a model to maximize DoD’s return on 
investment (OFPP, 2008). This call for reform echoed earlier guidance from the Office of 
the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD/AT&L, 
2006) to improve acquisition by “apply[ing] appropriate commercial best practices, [the] 
use of appropriate contracting techniques and approaches, and enhanced training” in 
order to “improve the effectiveness of DoD contract management” (USD/AT&L, 2006). 
Given the backdrop of business transformation and strategic sourcing, the memo suggests 
e-RA is one “commercial best practice” that can answer these calls for action 
(USD/AT&L, 2006). This research facilitates agencies’ meeting these calls for action by 
providing the following.  
• A Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)-compliant process explaining 
how to integrate e-RAs into source selections—both globally and 
domestically.  
• A spend analysis of USAF FY07/08 data that highlights potential savings 
from e-RA use—both domestically and globally. 
• A comprehensive model for contracting officers to use as a decision-
making tool for developing an acquisition strategy. 
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E.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The internet is changing how companies and Federal entities source goods and 
services. Even with new e-commerce tools like e-RAs producing substantial price savings 
and process-efficiency improvements, academicians and practitioners need a better 
understanding of the long-term impact and ability of these e-commerce tools to deliver 
these savings in emerging markets. This work centers on the following six research 
questions. 
• RQ1: What are the cultural implications of e-RA use in the Middle East?  
• RQ2: How should contracting officers identify and implement potential e-
RA candidates? What process would they use?  
• RQ3: How can contracting officers identify and mitigate procurement 
risks specific to e-RAs?  
• RQ4: How can contracting officers identify and overcome structural 
barriers to effect successful e-RA implementation? 
• RQ5: What are the potential cost savings of using e-RAs domestically and 
in the Middle East?  
• RQ6: How do subcontractors in the Middle East perceive e-RAs, and what 
are the possible long-term repercussions for use? 
F.  METHODOLOGY 
We used several qualitative methods to investigate the research questions due to 
the diverse applied and theoretical elements of this research. Understanding and 
explaining the cultural phenomenon necessitated the development of grounded theory 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Charmaz, 2006). Given only one known case of e-RA use in the 
Middle East, we blended the grounded theory method with Yin’s (2009) case study 
methodology. The remaining, more applied research questions were addressed using 
spend analysis (Pandit & Marmanis, 2008) and the case study methodology. The 
theoretical portion of our research addresses the knowledge gap surrounding research 
question number one: “What are the cultural implications of e-RA use in the Middle 
East?” According to Yin (2009), a qualitative case study methodology is appropriate 
when three conditions exist: (1) The type of research question is exploratory in nature and 
takes the form of a “what” question, (2) the researcher has no control of the behavioral 
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events being researched (i.e., cannot manipulate behaviors then measure results as in a 
controlled experiment), and (3) the focus is on contemporary events (p. 8). Our research 
met all three of these criteria because the research question attempts to explain the 
cultural phenomenon of e-RAs using “what” terminology, we had no influence over the 
behavior of e-RA participants or the outcome of the event, and an e-RA is a 
contemporary tool used in B2B transactions. Furthermore, case study research is 
particularly useful when researchers need to provide insight and depth to a “unique 
phenomenon” (Ellram, 1996, p. 98; Yin, 2009). To our knowledge, the USAF 
procurement for generators was unique because it was the only e-RA conducted in the 
Middle East by a DoD buying activity.  
Adding rigor to our claims of new knowledge surrounding national culture and e-
RA use, we followed procedures for developing grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Charmaz, 2006). Theories explain why certain phenomena 
occur. “Theory emphasizes the nature of causal relationships, identifying what comes 
first” (Sutton & Staw, 1995, p. 378). “Strong theory…delves into underlying processes so 
as to understand the systematic reasons for a particular occurrence or nonoccurrence” 
(Sutton & Staw, 1995, p. 378). Simply stated, “a good theory explains, predicts, and 
delights” (Sutton & Staw, 1995, p. 378). 
The case study and grounded theory methodologies may use a combination of 
direct and indirect observation, as well as interviews to collect data (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967; Ellram, 1996). Typical examples cited in methodology literature include semi-
structured interviews, structured surveys with scales, audio recordings, and content 
analysis of historical documents (Miles & Huberman, 1994). One of the strengths of case 
study research is that researchers can examine multiple sources of evidence as a 
“converging line of inquiry” to corroborate stories of participants, ultimately leading to 
more accurate findings (Yin, 2009, p. 116). Yin refers to this process as “triangulation 
from multiple sources of data,” such as observations, transcribed interviews, and archival 
data, (e.g., e-mail correspondence, contractual documents, letters) (p. 116). Triangulation 
is particularly helpful when a single case is used because it is difficult for researchers to 
maintain construct validity due to limited opposing viewpoints (Yin, 2009). To address 
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construct validity, we collected interview data from the entire logistic chain involved in 
the e-RA. This included the e-RA service provider, the USAF buyer, Kuwaiti sellers, a 
first-tier subcontractor, the end-user, and Air Force Central Command (AFCENT) 
leadership. Semi-structured, open-ended questions were developed and approved by the 
NPS Institutional Review Board (IRB) to ensure compliance with laws regarding the 
protection of human subjects.  
To aid data analysis, we used a combination of open and axial coding to organize 
and understand qualitative, textual data collected during face-to-face interviews while 
“safeguarding against tunnel vision, bias, and self delusion” (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 
56). Leading case study researchers recommend qualitative data analysis software (Yin, 
2009); therefore, we used MAXQDA version 2007 R200809-ENG. MAXQDA software 
is a qualitative data analysis tool that enables researchers to combine interview and 
archival data within one master file, then analyze the data with built-in coding and 
pattern-matching tools designed to help uncover causal relationships.  
In addressing the applied research questions, we first reviewed relevant Federal 
rules, policy, history and guidance regarding source selection, strategic sourcing, and e-
RAs in order to better understand the dynamics at play within the Federal government. 
Next, we gathered and analyzed Air Force FY07–08 and AFCENT spend data to 
determine how much spend is appropriate for e-RA sourcing. Using commercial 
benchmarking and DoD spend data as a guide, we then estimated potential savings and 
created a FAR-compliant process for contracting officers to use both for simplified (i.e., 
FAR Part 13) and formal procurements (FAR Part 15). Sample instructions to offerors 
and evaluation factors for award are attached as Appendices F and G. We also examined 
prescribed source selection processes, industry best practices surrounding e-RA use, and 
bid protest decisions in order to address the applied research questions. 
G.  THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
Most of what we know about e-RAs comes from qualitative and quantitative 
research based on transactions in the U.S., Europe, Asia, or Latin America (Jap, 2002). 
Therefore, we do not fully understand how e-RA adoption, use, and outcomes are 
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affected by national culture in regions with high cultural differences from western 
cultures, such as the Middle East. Our goal is to provide insight into cultural implications 
of e-RA by refining e-RA and technology adoption theories in, (1) explaining 
idiosyncratic cultural differences, and (2) facilitating wise decisions regarding e-RA 
application. Therefore, this study will advance the frontier of knowledge regarding the e-
RA phenomenon. Ultimately, we enhance existing e-RA theory—specifically with 
respect to the effects of national culture on e-RA use. 
H.  MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS 
As industry members and Federal agencies expand their sourcing efforts globally, 
success will likely depend on how well firms recognize, identify, and execute appropriate 
sourcing strategies. What works in one country may not work well in another due to 
cultural differences. For example, when exchange partners come from countries with a 
national culture that values group behavior (or collective behavior) and have a low risk 
tolerance, relationship building is crucial (Elahee, Kirby & Nasif, 2002). Managers who 
fail to recognize these dynamics may raise levels of distrust and suspicion of opportunism, 
ultimately souring the buyer-supplier relationship.  
From a practitioner’s perspective, in order to capitalize on potential savings and 
efficiencies, the DoD will need to create policy and guidance supporting the use of e-RA 
as part of both simplified and formal, negotiated procurements. Focus areas should 
include: (1) a pre-award process, (2) identification of e-RA service providers and their 
business models, (3) development of sample instructions to offerors and evaluation 
criteria provisions, (4) identification of e-RA-peculiar protest risks, and (5) hands-on 
training for contract specialists and contingency contracting officers.  
The USAF and the DoD clearly need to provide leadership and training in order to 
maximize e-RA usage given appropriate circumstances. A failure to implement the 
reforms listed above will result in contract awards that continue to exceed true market 
prices for goods and services (a particularly acute problem in contingency operations, 
with which supporting market research, procurement lead time, and buyer competence  
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are limited). Given that e-RA-derived prices substantially beat those resulting from 
traditional procurement processes (McCree, 2008), the fairness and reasonableness of 
non-e-RA derived prices to the buyer are questionable. 
I.  SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
The scope of this effort was limited to the breadth and substance of data available 
to the members of the Federal government. Hence, commercial applications of e-RAs 
were not explored; therefore, the cultural considerations and practical guidance for use 
revealed by this research may be limited to governmental use of e-RAs. Furthermore, 
although every effort was taken not to advertise the researchers’ military association, 
suppliers we interviewed were aware of our status as military members and were, 
therefore, less likely to provide completely unguarded answers to our questions. To 
counter this conundrum, we interviewed multiple sources across a broad social, political, 
and economic spectrum. When possible, we also conducted face-to-face interviews to 
systematically observe non-verbal cues that otherwise would go unnoticed. Furthermore, 
because conclusions are derived from a single case, further research is needed to validate 
the findings across a spectrum of transactions of varying dollar values, goods and 
services, complexities, procurement risks, buyer-supplier relationships, and balances of 
bargaining power.  
Finally, we recognize that Kuwait is a melting pot of cultures; a Kuwaiti company 
representative who is a third country national may not represent Kuwaiti national values. 
We addressed this problem by interviewing a cross-section of both Kuwaiti-owned and 
multi-national corporations and collected demographic information on participants (Table 
5, Chapter III).  
This work is organized in accordance with standard academic thesis structure but 
adds practitioner elements addressed in the research questions and objectives. The 
literature review covers relevant academic and practitioner sources, to include DoD and 
Air Force procurement, legal, strategic sourcing, and contract management policy. 
Chapter V incorporates a practitioner guide and decision-making tools, and includes a 
discussion of relevant military contracting issues facing contracting officers. Finally, 
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Chapter VI provides answers to our research questions, as well as the theoretical and 
managerial implications of increased e-RA use in the DoD and Middle East. Areas for 
future research are identified and limitations of our research are addressed. In the next 
chapter, we explore existing literature surrounding auction theory, e-RAs, national 
culture, and technology adoption and the government rules and regulations surrounding 
federal procurement.  
 12 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
This section provides background information pertinent to both the academic and 
practitioner research questions listed in Chapter I. Accordingly; we have structured this 
section along those lines. We start with a discussion of auction theory and e-RA 
appropriateness, then move to a broader discussion of national culture, social norms, 
technology acceptance, and relational exchange—all relevant theories that are key to 
understanding the e-RA phenomenon. Together, this spectrum allows us a holistic picture 
of the issues surrounding e-RA use both at home and abroad.  
The second half of this chapter discuses the DoD’s use of e-RAs and includes the 
regulatory, structural, policy, training, and legal issues impacting the government’s 
policies toward e-RA use. We also include a review and discussion of GAO protests and 
USAF lessons learned in source selection that, together, help identify known issues and 
flag potential issues peculiar to e-RA use in Federal procurement. Finally, this section 
helps identify the gaps in practitioner knowledge and barriers to implementation within 
the DoD. We start with an overview of what e-RAs are and why they continue to receive 
attention.  
B.  AUCTION THEORY 
Reverse auctions have taken off because of internet connectivity, the availability 
of user-friendly e-RA software, their track record of substantial savings, and their ability 
to “level the playing field” though real-time, open bidding events (Beale et al., 2003). In 
addition, while e-RAs are—by name and function—a type of auction, they differ from 
traditional forward auctions in a number of ways from both practitioner and economic 
theorist perspectives (Jap, 2002).  
The difference between forward auctions and reverse auctions is the relationship 
between buyers and sellers. In theory, an auction is defined as “a market institution with 
an explicit set of rules determining resource allocation and prices on the basis of bids 
from market participants” (Jap, 2002, p. 507). In a forward auction, multiple bidders 
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(buyers) place consecutive bids for a good or service offered by a single seller. An 
example of an online forward auction is eBay, in which a bidder wins by placing the 
highest bid in a set amount of time. A reverse auction, in contrast, differs in that bidders 
(suppliers) compete to win a contract to provide a good or service to a single buyer—in 
this case, the government. Since all participants can see each other’s bid in an online e-
RA,4 fierce competition results in a downward bidding frenzy; suppliers lower their costs 
and profit margins in order to beat their competitor’s bid prices.  
Auction types vary both in theory and practice. For an overview of the most 
common types found in economic literature (English/Japanese, Dutch, first-price sealed 
bid, second price sealed bid, etc.), see Kaufman and Carter (2004), Milgrom (1989), 
McMillan and McAfee (1987), Kagel (1995) and Brown and Ray (2007). Unlike physical 
auctions, e-RAs are unique because they 1) allow bidding from geographically separate 
locations—a benefit referred to by Jap (2002, p. 512) as “geographic and temporal 
conveniences,” and 2) they provide immediate bidder feedback, all over the medium of 
the internet (Jap, 2002). This difference implies that traditional auction theories may not 
apply generally to e-RA and that more exploratory research is needed (Jap, 2002). 
Some researchers limit the use of e-RAs to commodities and commodity-like 
items—suggesting that e-RAs are limited and should be used sparingly, if at all, due to 
their coercive nature and long-term relational impacts (Emiliani, 2007). Others, however, 
point to the supply complexity and criticality of the item or service itself and suggest 
using e-RAs for items whose supply complexity is low (i.e., ample supply) and whose 
criticality (i.e., dollar value or importance to organizational performance) is either low or 
high, such as leverage spend (Beall et al., 2003). They also point out that some 
companies who used e-RAs initially for direct and indirect goods later expanded their use 
to professional services, capital goods, and even construction. Other empirical research of 
146 Fortune 500 firms’ use of e-RAs (Hawkins et al., 2009) showed a wide variety of 
goods and services sourced via e-RA (Table 2).  
 
                                                 
4 Also referred to as “ORA” in e-RA Literature. 
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Table 2.   Variety of Products and Services Procured with e-RAs (From: Hawkins et al., 
forthcoming) 
Description Description
Magnetic stripe readers Ingredients 
4-oz developer bottles Janitorial paper supplies
Airbag Leasing equipment
Aircraft batteries Life insurance/accidental death
Armored car services Macromedia software 
Autos Meeting and events
Beef Multifunction devices – managed print
Blisters Office supplies
Cable assemblies Personal computers 
Cafeteria/employee breakroom equipment Plastic credit cards
Casework/built-ins for store Plastic cups
Chemicals - caustic Plastic injection molding
Collections agencies Plastic resins
Compact V2 out door cabinet Point of sale authorization terminals
Corrugate packaging Printing paper
Corrugate shippers Professional  services
Cut-sheet paper Retail air conditioners
Data processing Retail boxes
Direct mail components (envelopes, etc.) Security guard services
Direct services to meet customer needs Security guards
Displays Server tapes
Drilling service Sheetmetal chasis
Electricity meters Soft packaging
Energy - electricity Software upgrade
Frozen strage Specialty millwork
Gasoline Supermarket shelving system
Harnessing Temp labor, recruitment, etc
HDPE pipe Trade show services
IBM P. series servers Transportation  
C.  USE AND APPROPRIATENESS OF E-RAS  
The appropriateness of e-RA use is defined as “the degree to which a sourcing 
professional views the use of an e-RA as a fit between the attributes of the tool, the 
specific requirement being sourced, and the supply market” (Hawkins et al., 2009, p. 56). 
Increasingly, both academicians and practitioners across a diverse section of international 
markets (to include the federal government) have focused on e-RA appropriateness 
because not all studied e-RAs achieved desired results. Thus, by assessing e-RA 
appropriateness, researchers can identify the contextual circumstances where e-RA use is 
more likely to lead to success of the auction (increased total savings and procurement 
lead-time reduction) (Hawkins et al., 2009).  
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A review of 27 peer-reviewed publications on e-RAs identified 48 different 
antecedents (or motivational factors) for e-RA use (Hawkins et al., forthcoming). 
Through empirical testing, research has shown statistical significance in how 
procurement managers decide which requirements are appropriate for sourcing via e-RA. 
The antecedents were identified as follows (Hawkins et al., 2009). 
• The specifiability of the requirement 
• The expected level of competition  
• Leadership influence, and 
• A price-based selection criteria. 
Regarding price-based selection criteria, other researchers point out that while 
price is an important factor e-RA appropriateness, buyers who feel that non-price factors 
(e.g., delivery lead time, quality, and warranty) are also important can include non-price 
evaluation factors into what academicians refer to as a multi-attribute auction (Hawkins, 
2009). The ability to use both price-only and multi-attribute evaluation strategies allows 
firms to use e-RA for three of four types of spend (Kraljic, 1983)—excluding strategic 
spend, where the high value and high complexity of the requirement make partnerships 
and alliances more appropriate (Beall et al., 2003). The other three spend categories that 
are appropriate for e-RA use include non-critical (low spend, low criticality), leverage 
(high spend, low criticality), and bottleneck (low spend, high complexity) (Kraljic, 1983). 
Beall et al. concluded that:  
For a growing number of buying firms, e-RAs have found an appropriate 
niche in their strategic sourcing toolkit, allowing them to efficiently source 
goods and services that are highly standardized, have sufficient spend 
volume, can be replicated by a reasonable number of qualified 
competitors, and have insignificant switching costs. In contrast, the 
research indicates that those suppliers of strategic items, where alliance-
level supplier relationships are critical, are usually not subjected to e-RA 
sourcing. (Beall et al., 2003, p. 60) 
Another reason for the recent interest in e-RA appropriateness is that 
academicians disagree on when e-RA use is appropriate and how improper e-RA use may 
impact the buyer-seller relationship. The concern is whether short-term savings outweigh 
potential long-term consequences. Some view e-RAs as technology-assisted “power-
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based bargaining” techniques that create distrust and invite retaliatory pricing or fail to 
account for the total ownership cost (Emiliani, 2004). Others fear long-term supplier-
buyer relationship erosion (Jap, 2002, 2003, 2007, 2008) because, regardless of design 
and execution, some suppliers feel buyers use the tool opportunistically (Jap, 2003) to 
squeeze supplier profit margins and overhead to a breaking point (Wagner & Schwab, 
2004). Regardless of their stance, most researchers agree that e-RAs will remain as one 
tool in a strategic sourcing toolbox (Jap, 2002; Kaufman & Carter, 2004; Sashi & 
O’Leary, 2002) but disagree on how and to what extent e-RAs should be used. Moreover, 
while pro and con arguments are compelling, it is worth noting that very little empirical 
research finds evidence to support a causal link to relationship degradation (Jap, 2007).  
Regardless, a well-planned and executed event meeting the criteria above can 
return costs savings of 5–40% (Tully, 2000) and can reduce cycle-time up to 40% by 
eliminating time-consuming marketing efforts, time in negotiations, and processing time 
for proposals (Beale et al., 2003; Smeltzer & Carr, 2002). This is important because, on 
average, manufacturing firms spend 55% of their revenue on goods and services 
(Monczka, Trent & Handfield, 2002). Double-digit, bottom-line cost savings suggest that 
a properly structured and executed e-RA may help a company gain a competitive 
advantage over competitors who use traditional procurement strategies (Mabert & Skeels, 
2002). Because of these savings and efficiencies, e-RAs have begun to replace traditional 
procurements for some goods and services (FedBid, 2009). 
D.  NATIONAL CULTURE  
Academics disagree on the definition of national culture (Srite, 2000). In fact, 
Kroeber and Klunckhon (1952) found over 150 different definitions during a classic 
study of culture. For the purpose of this study, we use a basic definition derived from 
Hofstede’s (1980) famous cross-cultural study because it is 1) relevant to the e-RA 
discussion, and 2) widely cited by academics (Srite, 2000). According to Hofstede, 
culture is “the programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one human 
group from another” (Hofstede, 1980, p. 43). Culture is further broken down into four  
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distinct dimensions: Individualism/collectivism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, 
and masculinity/femininity (1980). Much of our research incorporates these dimensions; 
thus, a brief description of each is warranted.  
Individualism/Collectivism (IC) describes how individuals in a society define 
themselves (Hofstede, 1980). Kuwait scored low, with a score of 38 in individualism, 
(Hofstede, 1980; At-Twaijri & Al-Muhaiza, 1996), suggesting that an individual’s ability 
to succeed on merit is less important than succeeding as a collective unit, team or group. 
It also means that individuals (or cultures) who value collectivism, value the relationship 
building aspect of becoming of succeeding as a group. (Elahee et al., 2002; Kersten, 
Koeszegi & Vetschera, 2002). One downside of this collective trait is that collective 
groups are trusting and empathetic to each other but will do whatever they can get away 
with to outsiders (Triandis & Vassiliou, 1972).  
Power distance (PD) is “the extent that large differentials of power, and therefore 
inequity, are accepted in a culture” (Srite, 2000, p. 34) and can be due, in part, to 
birthright. In some cultures, men are entitled to more power than women. Kuwait’s score 
of 80 was high in this category, which implies that employees will follow a supervisor’s 
directive simply because he or she is the boss (Hofstede, 1980; At-Twaijri & Al-Muhaiza, 
1996). As with collective societies, relationship building is also important because high-
PD cultures often have higher rates of coercion and opportunism than countries with 
small PD (Elahee et al., 2002).  
Uncertainty Avoidance (UA) is defined as” the level of risk accepted by a culture, 
which can be gleaned by emphasis on rule obedience, ritual behavior, and labor mobility” 
(Srite, 2000). With a score of 68, Kuwait ranks relatively high in UA (Hofstede, 1980; 
Twaijri & Al-Muhaiza, 1996; Parboteeah, Cullen & Basu, 2005), suggesting that Kuwaiti 
businessmen place a high value on formal rules to overcome risk. Since e-RA sourcing is 
new, uncertainty surrounds its use—uncertainty about procedures, technology, identity 
protection, and process integrity—to include procedural fairness. Since Kuwait scores 
high in uncertainty avoidance, we would expect Kuwaiti businessman to reject e-RA 
adoption in favor of more traditional negotiations.  
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Masculinity/femininity (M/F) “refers to culture differentiation on the basis of 
gender and activity” (Srite, 2000, p. 34). Kuwait scores in the middle of this category 
with a score of 52, (Hofstede, 1980; At Twaijri & Al-Muhaiza, 1996) suggesting that 
men and women are equally likely to share similar categories of employment (Srite, 
2000). According to Srite, low masculinity (high femininity) cultures value a pleasant, 
non-threatening work environment.  
In 1996, a second study of Gulf Coast Countries was conducted to test (and 
update) Hoftede’s findings (At-Twaijri & Al-Muhaiza, 1996). A side-by-side comparison 
of scores (see Table 3) indicates that UA has increased significantly, while PD, MF, and 
IC all decreased. Implications of these findings are discussed under Section E.  
 
Table 3.   Cross-Cultural Comparison of National Culture Dimensions (After: At-








UA 68 103 46 
PD 80 51 40 
IC 38 31 91 
MF 53 43 62 
 
Given the cultural distance between the U.S. and Kuwait, one would expect to 
encounter difficulties implementing e-RAs where the buyer is from the former and the 
suppliers are from the latter. Some researchers believe that greater cultural difference 
increases opportunism from the trading partner (Lee, 1998), which, in turn, decreases the 
level of trust and relational exchange between partners (Jap, 2003; Morgan & Hunt, 
1994). In research centering on international negotiations, researchers find that managers 
who deal with High-PD and High-UA cultures need to pay attention to culture and 
engage in trust-building measures (Volkema, 1997; 1999) and build relationships 
(Volkema, 1997, 1999; Elahee et al., 2002).  
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The research cited above suggests that Arabs would choose not to participate in 
an e-RA, but—at least in one case—they did. Clearly, more research is required, and 
academics agree that theoretical models are needed that include national culture variables 
to explain technology adoption (Parboteeah et al., 2005).  
E.  TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION MODEL (TAM)  
Over the past 25 years, numerous models and theories have been widely used to 
study and explain technology adoption across a variety of different national cultures. 
Three of the most cited theories include the Technology Adoption Model (TAM) (Davis, 
1989), the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980), and the Theory 
of Planned Behavior (TPB) (Ajzen, 1991). Of the three, TAM is cited over 1,500 times 
by researchers because of its flexibility, reliability, and proven validity (McCoy, Galleta 
& King, 2007). We elected to use TAM for two reasons. First, TAM is an “adaption” of 
the TRA that focuses on information technology (IT) adoption to the user level (Davis, 
Bagozzi & Warshaw, 1989). Secondly, a growing number of researchers have already 
used TAM in conjunction with Hofstede’s dimensions to explore cross-cultural IT 
adoption. Figure 1 is a snapshot of this model and is followed by a discussion describing 
its central tenets and e-RA applicability. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Technology Adoption Model (TAM) (After: Davis et al., 1989) 
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TAM centers on two constructs: 1) Perceived Usefulness (PU) and 2) Perceived 
Ease of Use (PEOU). Davis et al. (1989) define PU as “the prospective user’s subjective 
probability that using a specific application [like e-RA] will increase his or her job 
performance within an organizational context” (p. 320). PEOU, on the other hand, is 
defined as “the degree to which the prospective user expects the target system to be free 
of effort” (Davis et al., 1989, p. 320). As depicted above, external variables affect both 
PU and PEOU. In turn, PEOU influences an individual’s expectation of implementation 
effort. Together, PU and PEOU affect an individual’s attitude toward technology 
adoption and ultimately, his/her behavior and actual use (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). With 
e-RA use in the Middle East lagging the U.S., Europe, and Asia (Jap, 2003) and a current 
internet diffusion rate of 30% (Kuwait, 2008), we wonder just how feasible e-commerce 
is in the Middle East.  
Over the years, a number of studies have incorporated elements of TAM and 
Hofstede’s National Culture components (1989) to try to understand e-
commerce/technology diffusion in the Middle East. A discussion of key study findings in 
three key studies is provided in Figure 2 and is presented visually for a clearer picture of 
the points of each model.  
 
Figure 2.   Cross-model Comparison 
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In 2000, in his empirical study of the influence of national culture on the 
acceptance and use of information technologies, Srite discovered that as PD increases, an 
individual’s willingness to innovate and trust in technology decrease. Using the TAM 
framework, Srite also found that a high willingness to innovate increased PEOU, and that 
a high trust in technology increased an individual’s behavioral intent to use technology. 
These findings suggest that nations with high PD will resist innovative technology 
because they do not trust it and because, intrinsically, they are not willing to innovate. 
However, Srite (2000) found a positive relationship between trust in technology and an 
individual’s behavioral intent to use technology. Finally, Srite found that high PD 
negatively impacted an individual’s subjective norms, which directly impacts how that 
individual perceives the usefulness of new technology.  
Other studies illustrated in Figure 2 found that high UA scores decrease how 
individuals perceive the usefulness of technology (Parboteeah et al., 2005). Since Kuwait 
scored high in UA, we would expect suppliers to perceive e-RA as a risky venture and 
avoid it in favor of traditional procurement processes. Parboteeah et al. (2005) also found 
that: 1) countries with high Individualism scores also were likely to not perceive 
innovative technology as useful, and 2) high Masculity scores increased PU. Since 
Kuwait scored low in Individualism (31 points) and average in Masculinity (43 points), 
we would expect Arab suppliers not to view e-RA as useful. Absent this sentiment, use is 
unlikely. 
In 1999, researchers again added an additional construct, psychological 
attachment, in order to try to explain how a person’s psychological connection to 
technology would affect his/her attitude towards use. Their results indicate a negative 
relationship between forced compliance and an individual’s attitude towards using 
technology. This suggests that forcing Kuwaitis into an e-RA could negatively impact 
their attitude towards participation in the future (Galleta & Malhotra 1999). Taken one 
step further, a negative attitude could then discourage behavioral intent to use, and 
prevent actual use.  
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F.  RELATIONAL EXCHANGE 
In 1980, MacNeil introduced relational contract theory (RCT), which highlights a 
need for relationship building as a matter of contracting methodology. At the center of his 
theory are 10 norms, which help define business contracts in terms of solidarity (trust), 
reciprocity, and cooperation (MacNeil, 1980). Berry (1983) expanded on RCT by 
introducing relationship marketing, which he defined as attracting, maintaining, and 
enhancing customer relationships. 
In 1994, a new relational theory—the Commitment-Trust Theory (CTT)—was 
introduced. This model placed “commitment” and “trust” as key mediator variables for 
relationship building (Morgan & Hunt, 1994). Trust was defined as “when one party has 
confidence in an exchange partner’s reliability and integrity” and commitment as “an 
enduring desire to maintain a valued relationship (Morgan & Hunt, 1994, p. 23).” The 
CTT acknowledges the role of power as a moderating factor, but its theorists claim that 
successful relationships hinge on the basic desire for businesses to reduce vulnerability 
by seeking out trustworthy partners (Morgan & Hunt, 1994). Some academics argue that 
e-RAs deteriorate the level of trust between partners; such trust acts as a non-contractual 
governance mechanism against nefarious or opportunistic behavior (Jap, 2008). 
Opportunistic behavior, according to Jap (2003), is defined as “self-interest seeking with 
guile [...] and is synonymous with misrepresentation, cheating, and deception and 
subsumes a range of misbehavior, such as adverse selection, moral hazard, shirking, sub 
goal pursuit, agency costs, and free riding” (p. 98). According to Jap (2003), e-RA use 
results in the supplier’s perception of increased buyer opportunism and, therefore, may 
poison the buyer-seller relationship (p. 105).  
Given the emphasis relationship marketing places on trust and commitment, it is 
no wonder that e-RA research identifies the potential deterioration of the buyer-seller 
relationship (due to the transactional nature of the e-RA) as a significant barrier to use 
(Beale et al., 2003; Carter et al., 2004; Smeltzer & Carr, 2003; Jap, 2003; Emiliani, 2004; 
2005). Some studies suggest that sellers automatically view a buyer’s decision to use an 
e-RA as opportunistic, which leads to distrust and relationship deterioration (Jap, 2003;  
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Emiliani, 2004; Carter & Stevens, 2007). If the supplier’s relationship orientation is long-
term, and they expect commitment and trust, use of an e-RA most certainly sends mixed 
messages to vendors.  
Academics disagree on just how much e-RAs impact the buyer-seller relationship. 
Emiliani and Stec (2005) argue that e-RAs are incompatible with objectives of improving 
long-term aspects of trade. Indeed, they call for e-RA codes of conduct to stem 
opportunistic buyer behavior (Emiliani, 2005). E-RA proponents disagree and suggest 
that close, collaborative relationships are not always needed—especially when there are a 
high number of competitors, and the complexity of the product or service is low (Smart & 
Harrison, 2002). Increasingly, academicians and practitioners see ways to find a middle 
ground through more complex multi-attribute auctions that allow buyers to evaluate non-
price factors, such as delivery time and warranty (Talluri & Ragatz, 2004; Hawkins et al., 
forthcoming). These auctions allow suppliers to offer a variety of possible bid 
combinations within a predetermined, acceptable range (Bichler & Kalagnanam, 2005).  
G.  DOD’S USE OF E-RAS 
1. History 
Attracted by success in the commercial sector, in May 2000, the U.S. Navy 
launched the first Federal e-RA with the assistance of a third-party, commercial e-RA 
provider. That same month, the Army’s Communication-Electronics Command 
(CECOM) launched two e-RA events of its own. The results were compelling. The Navy 
saved 28%, totaling $830,000, while CECOM netted savings of 20% and 50%, 
respectively (DAU, 2009).  
In September 2000, the Government Service Agency (GSA) launched an e-RA 
platform of its own called Buyers.gov. While only 212 events were conducted over the 
following three months, one buy saved $2.2 million on a procurement valued at $10 
million (based on an independent government cost estimate) (Turley, 2002). Impressed, 
officials decided to cancel Buyers.gov in lieu of long-term e-RA service contracts to 
commercial providers.  
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Around this same time period, the Defense Supply Center-Columbus launched its 
own e-RA application called DIBBS to target acquisitions less than $25,000. Besides the 
typical 10%-15% (Cohn, 2000) cost savings, DSCC officials observed an 84% lead-time 
reduction—from 87 days to just 14 (Turley, 2000). By August 2000, DIBBS awards 
exceeded 4,500 contracts (Turley, 2002). Currently, both CECOM and the Navy offer e-
RA services to their commands.  
CECOM uses a web-based, self-service application called the U.S. Army Auction 
and Valuation Engine, or USAAVE. The reverse auctioning tool developed at CECOM 
provides three formats: simple, multiple line item and best value reverse auctions.  
The simple format is most commonly used and allows the contractor to submit 
one contract price, with the lowest overall bid winning the award. Another technique, the 
multiple line item format allows for multiple awards based on the lowest price per line 
item (also known as cherry picking). The third format, and least used, is the best value 
format, in which non-price parameters are created and given a value and weight. 
According to CECOM e-RA program management, their application, regardless of 
format, allows DoD buyers to save the 1–3% service fee charged to the winning bidder 
by full-service providers. This service is now available to other DoD buyers for no fee 
through a memorandum of understanding (M. Meinert, personal correspondence, July 14, 
2009). Tutorials and information regarding the CECOM platform are available at 
https://abop.monmouth.army.mil/. 
The Navy also offers a self-serve desktop application created and maintained by 
Procuri of Atlanta. Like the Army, the Navy’s use of e-RA is limited to commercial 
commodities under FAR Part 13 procedures, but no regulations mandate use. Non-Navy 
members may use the software for a negotiated fee and the auctioning application is 
managed by the Defense Supply Center, Philadelphia (DSCP).  
In addition to these services, two companies who contributed to this project also 
provide full-service e-RA support. FedBid, Inc. provides full service e-RA capability for 
Federal agencies on a fee-for-service model where the winning supplier pays FedBid’s 
fee. Awards cover 661 different Federal Product and Supply Service Codes (PSCs) 
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(Appendix I), mostly covering simple, low-value commercial commodities and services 
(FedBid, 2009). Sorcity, Inc., the e-RA service provider for the Air Force’s procurement 
of generators in Kuwait, also provides full-service support and specializes in deep 
commodity expertise across many business sectors and across global supply channels. 
Sorcity, Inc. can support complex procurements, and also employs a business model 
where the successful offeror pays Sorcity’s fee—typically between .5–1.95% of the sale 
(Sorcity, personal correspondence, November 21, 2009).  
Despite cost and cycle-time savings available from e-RAs, the DoD has failed to 
set uniform e-RA policy, goals, or metrics despite pressure from executive and 
congressional leadership to reduce costs through strategic sourcing commercial best 
practices (OMB, 2009; OFPP, 2008). This slow adoption/usage rate remains unexplained, 
but may be due to a lack of leadership, a lack of training, a lack of e-RA awareness, 
structural barriers, such as a lack of or unknown access to e-RA service providers and 
their e-RA software applications, and the DoD’s lack of accountability for minimizing 
total ownership costs (GAO, 2000).  
2. Legality 
E-RA use is not contrary to Federal procurement statute and public policy 
(SAF/AQC, 2001; Turley, 2002); however, contracting officers need to be aware of 
critical arguments. All Federal acquisitions are governed by the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR), FAR supplements, statutes, and case law. In 1997, the FAR (Chapter 
15—Negotiate Procurements) was re-written, and language forbidding auctions as a 
pricing tool were removed from FAR 15.602(e)(2). While the re-write did not specifically 
mention Reverse Auctions as an accepted contracting method, language in section FAR 
1.102(d) gave contracting officers more latitude to use emerging technology. It states:  
The role of each member of the Acquisition Team is to exercise personal 
initiative and sound business judgment in providing the best value product 
or service to meet the customer’s needs. In exercising initiative, 
Government members of the Acquisition Team may assume if a specific 




Government and is not addressed in the FAR, nor prohibited by law 
(statute or case law), Executive order or other regulation, that the strategy, 
practice, policy or procedure is a permissible exercise of authority.  
While this section certainly gives contracting officers broad discretion, military 
legal reviews point to section FAR 14 (sealed bidding) as a problematic area in regards to 
e-RAs. According to Turley, the current language regarding bids describes a one-bid-per-
offeror format. Because e-RA involves multiple successive bids, an e-RA issued under 
sealed bidding rules could be considered illegal. For that reason, FedBid and CECOM 
follow FAR 13 and FAR 15 rules for procurement (discussed below in Section D). 
Other skeptics point to language in the Procurement Integrity Act (PIA), which 
“prohibits anyone acting on behalf of the government from knowingly disclosing a 
contractor’s bid or proposal before the contract award” (Turley, 2002, p. 16). In order to 
address this issue, Army contracting officers and third-party e-RA providers require 
prospective bidders to enter a disclosure agreement as part of a pre-qualification process. 
While this step seems prudent, case law discussed below suggests that the contractor’s 
decision to participate is, in itself, an implied agreement to disclose information. Thus, 
according to case law, a written agreement might not actually be necessary in terms of 
protest mitigation (Brown & Ray, 2007). 
In closing, while e-RA does not directly violate any Federal procurement 
regulations or statutes, critics raise valid concerns of which contracting officers need to 
be aware when contemplating e-RA use if they are to mitigate the risk of a protest. One 
way to gauge relevant legal concerns is a historical review of protest literature.   
3.  Regulations 
According to the Defense Acquisition University, other significant FAR changes 
also encourage e-RA use within the Defense Acquisition Framework. A summary of 





Table 4.   FAR rules with e-RA Implications 
FAR 
Section 




“The role of each member of the Acquisition Team is to 
exercise personal initiative and sound business judgment in 
providing the best value product or service to meet the 
customer's needs. In exercising initiative, Government 
members of the Acquisition Team may assume if a specific 
strategy, practice, policy or procedure is in the best interests 
of the Government and is not addressed in the FAR, nor 
prohibited by law (statute or case law), Executive order or 
other regulation, that the strategy, practice, policy or 
procedure is a permissible exercise of authority.” 
 
The FAR does not 
explicitly prohibit the use 
of e-RAs; thus, contracting 
officers are urged to seek 
out procurement strategies 
(including e-RAs) that are 





“The Federal Government shall use electronic commerce 
whenever practicable or cost-effective. The use of terms 
commonly associated with paper transactions (e.g., “copy,” 
“document,” “page,” “printed,” “sealed envelope,” and 
“stamped”) shall not be interpreted to restrict the use of 
electronic commerce. Contracting Officers may supplement 
electronic transactions by using other media to meet the 
requirements of any contract action governed by the FAR.” 
 
 
e-RA falls under the broad 
category of e-commerce 
and should be used if the 
contracting officer 
determines its use will 




“Competitive acquisitions. When contracting in a 
competitive environment, the procedures of this part are 
intended to minimize the complexity of the solicitation, the 
evaluation, and the source selection decision, while 
maintaining a process designed to foster an impartial and 
comprehensive evaluation of offerors’ proposals, leading to 




1.) Simple and multi-
attribute e-RAs provide 
transparent and objective 
evaluation criteria. COs 
award contracts quickly, 
and maintain an electronic 
record of bids maintained 
as part of the contract file.  
 
 2) e-RA minimizes 
complexity in price 
evaluation by allowing 
offerors to determine the 
lowest acceptable price in a 









[The Contracting Officer shall not] “Reveal an offeror’s 
price without that offeror’s permission. However, the 
Contracting Officer may inform an offeror that its price is 
considered by the Government to be too high, or too low, 
and reveal the results of the analysis supporting that 
conclusion. It is also permissible, at the Government’s 
discretion, to indicate to all offerors the cost or price that the 
Government’s price analysis, market research, and other 
reviews have identified as reasonable  
(41 U.S.C.423(h)(1)(2));”  
 
1.) If not using rank-order 
bidding, offerors must 
willingly disclose their 
prices in an e-RA, and 2) 
the e-RA format must not 
disclose the offeror’s 
business name.  
 
2) E-RA minimizes 
complexity in price 
evaluation by allowing 
offerors to determine the 
lowest acceptable price in a 
minimal amount of time. 
 
In February 2001, the Secretary of the Air Force/Acquisition and Contracting 
(SAF/AQC) conducted a detailed analysis of e-RA use and found that 17 sections of the 
FAR (including those listed above) did not conflict with e-RA use as a “viable pricing 
tool” to reach “fair and reasonable” pricing in accordance with FAR 15.402. Furthermore, 
SAF/AQC also noted that no FAR or statutory changes were needed but that a 
“rethinking” of FAR 14 (sealed bidding) was in order to address the need for consecutive 
sealed bids (SAF/AQC, 2001, p. 17).  
In November 2002, a military law review came to many of the same conclusions. 
This review cited an October 2000 Defense Acquisition Regulation (DAR) council 
decision not to add e-RA-specific language based on the following determinations 
(Turley, 2002). 
• FAR 1.102(d) (discussed in Table 4) implies e-RA acceptability 
• Agencies should be allowed to set their own e-RA policies and guidance 
• E-RAs were too new to make sweeping FAR guidance 
In 2001, the DAR Council reviewed 38 requests to incorporate e-RA language 
and decided to “do nothing” because incorporating FAR guidance was: 1) still not needed 
and 2) would inhibit agency-specific guidance and policy already in place (Turley, 2002, 
p. 22).  
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Statutory guidance to include (but not limited to) the Small Business Act, 
Procurement Integrity Act, Competition in Contracting Act, and Buy American Act 
applies to reverse auctions in the same manner as other procurements under Federal 
Acquisition Regulations and supplements.  
4. Structural Barriers to e-RA Use 
Since 2000, the U.S. Army has conducted 10,913 auctions, with a total savings of 
$100.7 million dollars. In comparison, data from FedBid and Sorcity indicates the U.S. 
Air Force has conducted 315,5 with a total savings of $5.4 million. These numbers 
suggest the USAF is leaving considerable money on the table by not using more e-RAs 
(FedBid, 2009a; M. Meinert, personal correspondence, July 14, 2009; McCree, 2008). 
Furthermore, most of the 315 transactions were initiated and conducted by the GSA on 
behalf the USAF. In addition, while the scope of this research does not include an 
explanation of the seemingly low diffusion rate, it is worth pointing out some of the 
probable barriers to implementation.  
a. Operational Tempo 
Air Force contracting officers (both civilian and military) are now 
considered one of the service’s most stressed group of employees, with a 43% manning 
vacancy rate and an unusually high deployment tempo (Rolfsen, 2009). In 2008, the 
“dwell time” for contracting personnel (i.e., time at home station between deployments) 
decreased from 12 months to six—to a 1:1 ratio of time deployed to time at home station 
(Rolfsen, 2009). This policy shift further stressed the career field— focusing critical 
resources towards mission requirements in lieu of adopting innovative practices. Given 
the Air Force’s high priorities of deployment force management and concentration on 
implementing and organizing for strategic sourcing, it is no surprise that innovative best 
practices, such as e-RAs have taken a back seat. However, attention to e-RAs is  
 
 
                                                 
5 Based on data from FedBid and the generator case. Additional auctions, unavailable to researchers, 
may exist.  
 31 
necessary to overcome some structural hurdles, such as a lack of guiding policies, a lack 
of training on appropriate e-RA use, and the presumed lack of an e-RA software 
application. Each of these hurdles is expounded upon below.  
b. Policy Guidance/Leadership Support 
One reason for the Army’s success is a top-down push to use e-RAs for 
commercial items under the simplified acquisition threshold (SAT). In, 2007, the Army 
issued a command-wide policy requiring contracting officers to use e-RAs to source 
requirements valued under the SAT, or, alternatively, to place a determination and 
finding (D&F) in the contract file justifying why e-RA use was not appropriate (HQ/ACA, 
2007). In contrast, the Air Force leadership issued initial guidance regarding e-RAs in 
2001, and left implementation to individual contracting officers’ discretions. Since that 
time, the USAF has not published additional e-RA policy or guidance—despite the 
OMB’s repeated call for the use of commercial practices, electronic commerce, increased 
competition, and cost savings (OFPP, 2004, 2008; OMB 2009; USD(AT&L), 2006). 
With such a significant focus on cost savings, it is puzzling why a commercially mature 
capability like e-RA, with such a substantial potential for tangible results, has not been 
pushed harder at the agency level. One reason, perhaps, is a significant amount of 
institutional barriers—including training employees, funding software and/or acquiring a 
third-party e-RA service provider, and creating an organization to manage e-RA bidding 
events. Another possible reason is a lack of accountability for financial performance in 
regard to reducing total ownership costs. For example, the current 25-page Unit 
Compliance Checklist from SAF/AQC makes no mention of e-RA or auctions in general, 
which seems confusing given such a strong push by OMB for innovation and cost savings 
(SAF/AQC, 2009). Regardless of the reason for this disconnect, without a top-down push 
for use, contracting officers have elected to use more traditional procurement methods, 
and the Air Force has ignored and foregone opportunities for significant savings (Turley, 
2002).  
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c. Federal Acquisition Framework 
Industrial procurement managers use e-RAs as part of a larger strategic 
purchasing portfolio without having to compete every contract or having to technically 
qualify contractors for each acquisition. Federal contracting officers are, on the other 
hand, required to compete all procurements (some exceptions in FAR Part 6) and comply 
with multiple sources of statutory, regulatory, and agency requirements, as well as 
various Federal socioeconomic goals. Given the rigidity of Federal acquisition, an 
attempt to employ an innovative procurement technique, such as e-RA comes with 
perceived added protest risk, additional effort and acquisition lead time, and little reward 
for taking such risks in a compliance-based culture. Some feel a re-write of the FAR 
specifically authorizing e-RA and successive bidding would help motivate cautious COs 
(SAF/AQC, 2001; Turley, 2002).  
d. Training 
Currently, USAF contracting officers do not receive on-the-job or formal 
e-RA training as a part of their certification process. DAU offers one continuous learning 
course (CLC 034), which serves as a good initial introduction to e-RA, but enrollment is 
voluntary. Despite a recommendation from some researchers for a single, web-based e-
RA training site and decision-making tool (Turley, 2002); most of the e-RA knowledge 
remains disparate across agencies (Turley, 2002). Additional information users need in 
order to reap the substantial, potential benefits of e-RAs include: 1) an understanding of 
situations conducive to the appropriate application of e-RAs, 2) e-RA software and 
service-provider availability, 3) a process to follow to integrate e-RAs into FAR Part 13 
and FAR Part 15 source selections, 4) details for the development crafting of instructions 
to offerors and evaluation factors for award, and 5) advice on how to avoid protestable 
events. All of these are incorporated into this research to address this gap. 
This chapter addressed what is known about national culture, technology 
adoption, relational exchange, e-RA structural barriers and the extent of e-RA use in the 
government. Next, we will examine the techniques used to accomplish our research and 
provide the methods utilized to answer our research questions.  
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III. METHODOLOGY 
A.  INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
The purpose of this section is to provide an overview of how we conducted our 
research. In the following sections, we discuss why the nature of our research questions 
led us to use qualitative methodologies, such as case study and grounded theory, to 
expand upon e-RA, TAM, and national culture theories. We then describe the research 
processes in detail. The latter parts describe our spend analysis and efforts made to ensure 
academic rigor.  
Researchers use a variety of techniques to better understand and explain unique 
events. Given only one known case of e-RA use in the Middle East, we blended the 
grounded theory method with Yin’s (2009) case study methodology. The remaining, 
more applied research questions were addressed using spend analysis (Pandit and 
Marmanis, 2008) and the case study method. The theoretical portion of our research 
addresses the knowledge gap surrounding research question number one: “What are the 
cultural implications of e-RA use in the Middle East?” According to Yin (2009), a 
qualitative case study methodology is appropriate when three conditions exist: (1) The 
type of research question is exploratory in nature and takes the form of a “what” question, 
(2) the researcher has no control of the behavioral events being researched (i.e., cannot 
manipulate behaviors then measure results as in a controlled experiment), and (3) the 
focus is on contemporary events (p. 8). Our research met all three of these criteria. 
Furthermore, case study research is particularly useful when researchers need to provide 
insight and depth to a “unique phenomenon” (Ellram, 1996, p. 98; Yin, 2009).  
Adding rigor to our claims of new knowledge surrounding national culture and e-
RA use, we followed procedures for developing grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Charmaz, 2006). Theories explain why certain 
phenomenon occurs. “Theory emphasizes the nature of causal relationships, identifying 
what comes first” (Sutton & Staw, 1995, p. 378). “Strong theory…delves into underlying  
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processes so as to understand the systematic reasons for a particular occurrence or 
nonoccurrence” (Sutton & Staw, 1995, p. 378). Simply stated, “a good theory explains, 
predicts, and delights” (Sutton & Staw, 1995, p. 378). 
This project, therefore, combines elements of case-study methodology adopted 
from the likes of Miles and Huberman (1994), Yin (2009), Eisenhardt (1989), and Ellram 
(1996) with procedures for developing grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1978; Corbin 
& Strauss, 2008; Charmaz, 2006) in order gain insight and help explain the success of the 
USAF’s use of an e-RA to procure generators in Kuwait. More specifically, a qualitative 
research design best answers how dynamics of national culture affect e-RA use and what 
lessons from this case may be leveraged for further e-RA use by the DoD. The generator 
e-RA case was ideal because it was 1) the only known case of e-RA use in the Middle 
East and 2) it entailed an unexplained phenomenon (Ellram, 1996; Yin, 2009). 
Researching two diverse gaps—national culture and DoD implementation 
issues—required the researchers to take two slightly different approaches. The theoretical 
portion investigating the effects of national culture follows the case study and grounded 
theory methodologies, where we used a constant comparison of participants within one 
unique event to add to existing e-RA, TAM, and national culture theory. The practitioner 
portion, however, required us to conduct interviews with USAF and Army procurement 
officials outside the event, gather and analyze spend data from the Middle East and 
CONUS operations, and gather regulatory, policy, and procedural information 
surrounding Federal procurement and e-RA use and training throughout the DoD. This 
section details the step-by-step methodology we used in order to answer all research 
questions with the utmost rigor and validity.  
B.  METHODS OF ANSWERING RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
According to case-study experts, researchers must find sources of evidence to 
support the overall case study (Eisenhardt, 1989). Usually, quality qualitative research 




questionnaires, and surveys (Eisenhardt, 1989). In the tradition of classic case-study 
methodology, our research employed three tests to reduce bias and maintain the highest 
levels of objectivity (Yin, 2009). 
1. Test #1: Construct Validity 
This requires “identifying correct operational measures for the concepts being 
studied” and is important to address because researchers use subjective judgments during 
analysis (Yin, 2009, pp. 40–41). In order to maintain construct validity, we used multiple 
sources: interviews, surveys, and an analysis of archival data. During composition, we 
allowed key informants to review interview transcripts prior to analysis (Yin, 2009). 
Miles and Huberman (1994) describe this process as using “member checks” to maintain 
accuracy (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 48).  
2. Test #2: Internal Validity 
Internal validity is defined as “establish[ing] a causal relationship, whereby 
certain conditions are believed to lead to other conditions, as distinguished from spurious 
relationships” (Yin, 2009, p. 40). According to Yin (2009), we triangulated data from 
interviews, surveys, correspondence and archival data to minimize bias and explore the 
different perspectives surround the e-RA event. Additionally, this research employed a 
constant comparison methodology within a single case to: 1) identify concepts (codes) 2) 
discover patterns between concepts, 3) address rival explanations, and 4) to generate 
logic models that fully explain the phenomenon. These processes are discussed step-by-
step as findings are explained in the “Results and Findings” section, Chapter IV.  
3. Test #3: Reliability 
Reliability is defined as “demonstrating that the operations of a study, such as the 
data collection procedures, can be repeated, with the same result” (Yin, 2009, p. 40). We 
used a number of techniques to maintain reliability. First, we built a Share Point site 
[referred to by Yin (2009) as database development] to collect all relevant literature, 
source documents, transcripts, and interviews. This allowed us to store, share, and track 
key data with all project members and reduced the chance of losing or misplacing files. 
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Secondly, we built a database using MAXQDA software to manage and analyze all case 
documentation. MAXQDA, a qualitative software package, was used to assist with data 
management and analysis. Using the software, the data collected through interviews, 
surveys, and archives was coded into manageable categories. The software is able to 
extract possible relationships developed through the created codes, which allows the 
researcher insight into previously unknown causal linkages among constructs (categories). 
C. CASE DESCRIPTION 
On March 17, 2008, members of an Expeditionary Contracting Squadron 
(ECONS) in Kuwait conducted an e-RA for the procurement and installation of 29 
standby power generators at a forward operating location in Kuwait. Over the course of 
278 bids, five vendors competed for nearly four hours before the final price of 
$1,588,000 USD was reached. Shortly thereafter, the offeror submitting the lowest-priced, 
technically acceptable (LPTA) offer received the award in accordance with streamlined 
LPTA procedures pursuant to FAR Parts 12 and 13 and the stated evaluation criteria in 
the RFQ (Appendix G). Savings totaled $395,000—a 19.9% savings from the lowest 
proposed price received prior to the start of the auction.  
The decision to use an e-RA came from the ECONS squadron commander after a 
review of the requirement, initial market research, and numerous discussions with the 
civil engineering customer (referred to as ECES). Essentially, the requirement met the 
following criteria (outlined in the e-RA Appropriateness Model, Figure 11, Chapter V). 
First, the number of generators (29) and initial government estimate (over $3M) made the 
tender attractive to suppliers. A sufficient number of attracted suppliers ensured adequate 
competition—a necessity for a successful e-RA. Second, only five brands were 
determined to meet the government’s requirements, which made the requirement highly 
specifiable. Finally, a review of early market research indicated a high level of interest 
within the Kuwait market (adequate competition). On February 10, 2008, the ECONS 
squadron commander sent a notification of the impending event to 13 potential suppliers, 
along with a description of the e-RA process as a condition of participation. Ten vendors 
responded with an interest to participate, with nine ultimately submitting initial proposals 
 37 
to the government. Once the requirement passed initial appropriateness checks, the 
ECONS commander engaged a third-party e-RA provider, Sorcity, Inc., to facilitate the 
e-RA for a flat fee of approximately 3% of the pre-bid estimate—to be paid by the 
successful offeror after contract award. Sorcity, Inc. provided the web-based auctioning 
software application, auctioning expertise, and commodity and market expertise to help 
craft the optimal e-RA event. 
Proposals (technically, quotes), in accordance with the instructions to offerors and 
evaluation criteria of the solicitation, had to first meet “acceptable” technical standards 
defined as “passes (or meets) minimum standard requirements” in order to compete in the 
pricing event (e-RA) (Gambrel, 2008, p. 31). In order for an offeror to get an overall 
“acceptable” rating, it had to meet the minimum standards of each subfactor below.  
• (1)—Technical Approach  
• (2)—Management/Technical Support 
• (3)—Contractor’s Quality Control 
• (4)—Project Schedule 
• (5)—Past Performance 
The second factor, total price, was defined as “the overall price to the 
Government and determines if the proposed price is reasonable and complete” (Gambrel, 
2008, p. 33).  
After final proposal evaluation, the award would go to the lowest-priced, 
technically acceptable offer whose price is determined to be reasonable and complete, 
based on the above criteria, and will be determined the best value to the Government for 
award (Gambrel, 2008, p. 33).  
On March 5, 2008, the contingency contracting officer determined five offerors to 
be technically acceptable and, therefore, eligible to participate in the auction. On March 
17, 2008, the five offerors deemed technically acceptable competed in the e-RA. The 
lowest price received with initial proposals (outside of and prior to the e-RA) was 
approximately $2 million and the final bid placed during the e-RA was $1,588,000 USD. 
The contract was awarded on March 18, and notices to unsuccessful offerors were 
subsequently issued. Debriefings were held with all participants.  
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On April 5, 2008, the contractor, engineers, and contracting officer held a pre-
construction meeting and a site visit to discuss the timeline and logistics of the 
installation. On April 22, the government accepted the first delivery of initial generators, 
accepting all but one, which had minor damage to an exterior panel. On May 18, the 
contracting officer held a meeting to discuss progress. During the course of this meeting, 
a number of problems were identified to include government delays surrounding the 
contractor’s access to the air base, numerous changes to generator locations, and 
additional trenching and cabling needed. Additionally, the government felt that a 
previously-agreed upon price of 1,750 KD to remove an existing generator was 
unreasonably low; thus, the installation was suspended until the government could find a 
vendor willing to pay at least 3,000 KD. As a result of these delays, modification P00001 
was executed extending the completion date from July 18, 2008 to August 20, 2008.  
On May 29, 2008, the last generator was delivered and accepted by the 
government. Due to a number of generator location changes and site coordination issues, 
the government issued a second modification, P00002, on August 20, 2008 to extend the 
period of performance from August 20, 2008 to November 6, 2008. This modification, 
unlike the first, de-scoped some concrete pads, switches and a fuel tank. It also added 
additional switches, cables, trenching, and weatherproof enclosures. These changes were 
signed as a bi-lateral, no-cost modification.  
On November 17, 2008, the contractor officially completed the project, signing a 
release of claims for $447,180.80 KD—the exact amount of the original e-RA award 
price. Subsequent interviews with the contracting officer and ECES customers indicated 
that, overall, the contractor’s performance was satisfactory.  
D.  DATA COLLECTION 
1. Interviews 
Interviews provide a valuable source of data for case study research (Yin, 2009). 
Typically, researchers use in-depth interviews (crossing multiple sessions), focused 
interviews (lasting a short period), and/or surveys (Yin, 2009). Given time and travel 
constraints, focused interviews were most appropriate and effective. We used semi-
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structured, open-ended questions in an interview protocol—a structured questionnaire 
that bolsters reliability by using the same questions and their sequence (Yin, 2009)—to 
guide each interview. From April 12–16, 2009, in-person interviews with Kuwaiti 
vendors were conducted in Kuwait in order to: 1) observe non-verbal cues, 2) maintain a 
conversational tone, and 3) probe deeper into answers requiring more detail. Due to the 
relational nature of Middle Eastern businessmen (cite), in-person interviews were most 
appropriate in order to build the relations and trust necessary to permit open dialogue 
necessary for research of a sensitive nature (e.g., ethics). A second round of questions 
designed to clarify emergent themes was also conducted by telephone in mid-October, 
2009. 
Interviews of military members, the end-users, and the third-party e-RA provider 
were also conducted by phone. Regardless of media, every effort was made to avoid 
leading questions so as to avoid bias (Yin, 2009). Finally, all interviews were transcribed 
verbatim and sent back to subjects for an accuracy check. Each informant verified the 
accuracy of the transcribed interviews, thereby enhancing construct validity (Yin, 2009). 
As a condition for participation, we promised research participants anonymity to 
1) obtain complete and uncensored data and 2) to protect their business identity from 
those who might not appreciate their candor. Table 5 provides basic demographic 
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2.  Surveys 
The second interview technique we used was survey deployment (Yin, 2009). A 
survey (Appendix B) was created and delivered to the Kuwaiti contractors in person 
during the interview sessions so we could triangulate written answers to specific 
moderating effects that emerged during our literature review. Surveys added value to our 
research by: (1) adding an additional source of data for analysis to triangulate effects, (2) 
enabling us to hone in on specific themes that might not emerge from the interviews, and 
(3) providing us numeric scores based on Likert-type scales to measure latent constructs 
(e.g., trust). The survey (Appendix B) focused on the following three key areas. 
• Antecedents for supplier participation—Recent research regarding 
antecedents for e-RA use suggested 48 different motivating factors for 
supplier participation (Hawkins et al., forthcoming). We used the survey 
to efficiently investigate whether the antecedent conditions for use were 
the same or different in a Middle Eastern culture.  
• The survey was used to determine whether—and if so, how—trust in the 
CCO, the buying organization, and/or trust in the e-RA service provider 
affected the suppliers’ decision to participate in the e-RA. To ensure 
reliability, we used an existing scales for trust derived from Crosby, 
Evans, and Cowles (1990) due to its demonstrated reliability (Chronbach 
Alpha of .89). The scale was Likert-type, ranging from one (strongly 
agree) to seven (strongly disagree). Answers to survey questions were 
verified with the informants, and clarifications and explanations were 
captured in field notes for later analysis. 
• There has not been a substantiated effect between e-RA use and decreased 
long-term relational exchange (Jap, 2007). Therefore, the survey was used 
to explore whether this also held true in a Middle Eastern culture by 
assessing levels of relational exchange before and after the e-RA. Again, 
concerned with reliability, we used an existing scales for relational 
exchange (Chronbach Alpha of .91) derived from Lee, 1998, p. 22). The 
scale was Likert-type, ranging from one (strongly agree) to seven 
(strongly disagree). 
Glaser and Strauss (1967) note that during theoretical sampling and/or constant 
comparison, the data may warrant a return to the field for additional data collection. In 
mid-October, we deployed a second questionnaire (Appendix C) and conducted 
additional interviews with the same informants to explore emergent themes derived from 
the initial data analysis. This technique gave us a second source of data to pursue 
emergent themes from the first interviews.  
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3. Identification and Selection of Informants 
Since our unit of analysis was the single e-RA bidding event, we broadened our 
selection of informants to include all parties (i.e., roles) involved in the tender. All 
participants in the e-RA were extended an invitation to participate; however, some 
offerors chose not to participate in the research for unknown reasons. Nevertheless, our 
sample included three of the six bidding companies, one interested offeror who elected 
not to compete, and one subcontractor. Additional participants included the U.S. 
government buying activity, the end users (civil engineers), and the e-RA service 
provider who hosted with the event. Informants included managers from three of the e-
RA competitors (vendors), one subcontractor (first-tier), the USAF contracting officer, 
two end-users, AFCENT leadership, and a Sorcity (e-RA service provider) executive(See 
Table 5 for demographic information). By selecting data from numerous informants 
within the entire logistic chain, the researchers were better able to understand the event 
from a holistic perspective through a triangulation of data sources (Corbin & Strauss, 
2008; Glasser & Strauss, 1967). 
4. Institutional Review Board (IRB)  
Corbin and Strauss (2008) recommended that researchers have initial questions 
derived during the literature review approved by an IRB committee and provide them a 
theoretical framework under which the study will fall. Accordingly, interview questions 
were reviewed and approved by the Naval Postgraduate School IRB in order to ensure the 
protection of human subjects and to ensure compliance with institutional protocol 
surrounding interviews with subjects located outside the United States.  
5. Archival Data Collection 
Archival data is one source of valuable information researchers use because it 
helps to corroborate other forms of data, to include surveys and interviews (Yin, 2009). 
This data typically consists of “memos, e-mail correspondence, notes, letters, internal 
records, proposals, [and] news clippings” (p. 103). 
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During our research, we collected archival data to include e-mail correspondence, 
contractual documents, AFCENT fiscal year 2008 (FY08) spend data, detailed USAF 
FY07/08 spend data, top-level FY01–06 USAF spend data, policy memos, Army, Navy 
and USAF e-RA spend data and relevant e-RA provider trend data on e-RA use. All data 
was filed in our Share Point database to maintain construct validity and reliability (Yin, 
2009). All of these sources were imported and stored in MAXQDA for consolidation and 
analysis, pattern matching, coding, and memo writing.  
E.  DATA ANALYSIS 
1. Coding and Pattern Matching 
Once interviews were conducted and recorded, we transcribed the data and 
imported it into MAXQDA for data analysis—including the techniques of coding 
[“naming the segments of data with a label that simultaneously categorizes, summarizes, 
and accounts for each piece of data (Charmaz, 2006, p. 43”)], memo writing [capturing 
“the comparisons and connections you make, and crystallize questions and directions for 
you to pursue” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 72)], and pattern matching (Yin, 2009; Corbin & 
Strauss, 2008). MAXQDA was helpful because it provided us the ability to analyze large 
amounts of textual data by coding and creating memos captured and organized within a 
single case file. Figure 3 shows how MAX QDA enabled us to create a master code list, 
and shows the master file list of interviews, correspondence, and archival data. The right-
hand side of the figure shows a sample of coded incidents within the interview and 
memos created to highlight important points that tie constructs together.  
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Figure 3.   MAXQDA Screenshot 
Throughout data analysis, we use a technique grounded theorists call constant 
comparison. “At first, you compare data with data to find similarities…[then] “compared 
interview statements within the same interview and compared statements and incidents in 
different interviews [then] compare data in earlier and later interviews of the same 
individual” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 54). We did this in a number of ways using MAXQDA. 
First, we coded all interview and correspondence to highlight emergent constructs. We 
then compared interview transcripts to the informants’ responses to the surveys. Finally, 
we used the lexical search engine in Figure 4 to cross-reference codes from multiple 
interviews with the same informant. In the example below, we keyed in on the constructs 
of wasta and transparency to find relationships in the data.  
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Figure 4.   Lexical Search Engine Snapshot 
2. Addressing Rival Theories  
While attempting to explain our case study, we noted the value of examining rival 
theories in relation to what we observed at each stage of analysis. Yin (2009) 
recommends addressing rival theories as a necessary step to eliminate explanations that 
we may have not considered. During the analysis section (Chapter IV), we discuss 
findings through a process of identifying a new theory, interpreting its significance, 
discussing potential rival theories, then summarizing the impact to academic theory.  
3. Spend Analysis  
Research questions number #5 asks: “What are the potential cost savings of using 
e-RAs domestically and in the Middle East?” This question required us to use a separate 
methodology to gather spend data, filter out spend incompatible with e-RAs, then analyze 
the remaining spend data for e-RA implications.  
The DoD is the world’s largest purchasing agency, spending over $500 billion for 
goods and services in 2008 (OMB, 2009). Recently, the Office of Management and 
Budget released guidance requiring all Federal agencies to increase the use of strategic 
sourcing and re-engineer ineffective business practices to reduce spending by 7% in the 
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next two years (OMB, 2009). Following industry’s phenomenal success in strategic 
sourcing (Pandit and Marmanis, 2008), the GAO identified spend analysis as one tool to 
identify categories of spend in which the DoD can better leverage its procurements (GAO, 
2004).  
The next step is to conduct a spend analysis to identify areas of spend that are 
appropriate for sourcing via e-RA, then to forecast potential savings based on current, 
average e-RA savings rates. Our methodology is presented in the steps below.  
• Obtained USAF and AFCENT transaction-level spend data for Fiscal 
Years 2007–2008 (FY07/08).  
• Conducted a literature review to determine average savings through e-RAs 
and appropriate categories of spend for e-RA use. 
• Sort USAF spend data to remove categories that are not appropriate for e-
RA use. These included all research and development efforts; all contract 
types other than firm-fixed price, fixed price with economic price 
adjustment, and fixed price award fee; construction; and all contracts not 
awarded under full and open competition.  
• Applied an average 20% e-RA savings (Cohn, 2005) to the remaining, 
“auctionable” USAF spend. We then estimated the percentage of total 
spend that is appropriate for e-RA sourcing and projected it to spend data 
obtained (described below).  
• Applied an average 20% savings to the same percentage of e-RA 
appropriate AFCENT spend based on USAF analysis in step #4. Note: 
AFCENT spend was rolled up, so we were unable to delete all of the 
categories in paragraph four. However, contingency contracting rarely 
source research and development and rarely uses cost-type contracts. The 
percentage of AFCENT OCONUS was available as was the percentage 
spent on construction and services. Since we assumed construction is not 
appropriate for e-RA sourcing, we looked only at services and commodity 
spend OCONUS.  
• Obtained FY01–09 USAF and DoD procurement spend from FPDS-NG 
with the help of Monterey Consultants Incorporated (MCI).  
• Applied an average 20% savings to the e-RA-appropriate portion of 
FY01–09 USAF spend data.  
• Finally, we applied an average 20% savings (Cohn, 2005) to “auctionable 
spend” each year to obtain estimated savings using both Method 1 and 
Method 2. 
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In order to be as objective as possible, we used two very different approaches to 
identify a range of potential savings the DoD could expect. Method one (above) uses a 
theoretical approach by filtering out inappropriate e-RA requirements, and method two 
involved applying an industry benchmark of total spend that is typically sourced via e-
RA (Monczka et al., 2008). According to Monzcka et al. (CAPS, 2008), industry sources 
2.58 percent of its total purchases using e-RAs. A weakness of this report, however, is 
that it based on a small sample size of 17 firms. Given the four percent response rate to 
their survey, its external validity—or generlizability—is questionable. Using the two 
methods, the DoD’s probable usage of e-RAs can be expected to fall within our estimated 
a range.  
By taking a strategic approach using spend analysis, the DoD is able to gain 
knowledge of how much is being spent for what goods and services, who the buyers are, 
and who are the suppliers, thereby identifying opportunities to leverage buying, save 
money, and improve performance (GAO, 2002, 2004; Pandit & Marmanis, 2008). Not 
only is it important to conduct the spend analysis, but the DoD should be comparing itself 
to industry to understand where money may be saved and where savings opportunities are 
being ceded.  
4. Protest Risk Analysis 
While e-RAs are not new to the DoD, using them in the contingency environment 
or as a pricing component of FAR Part 15 full-trade-off procurements is novel and, 
therefore, a potential added protest risk. Contracting officers who elect to use e-RAs in 
either of these capacities must understand what the risks are and how to plan accordingly 
to mitigate those risks. Research question #3 asks, “How can contracting officers identify 
and mitigate procurement risks specific to e-RAs?” This section addresses the 
methodology we used to find answers.  
First, we reviewed relevant legal, regulatory, and policy literature regarding 
federal procurement and auctions (see Chapter II). From these documents, we looked for 
common themes among sustained GAO protests, as well as e-RA-specific cases. 
Additionally, we incorporated questions about protests into each of our interviews with 
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DoD leaders, e-RA providers, and government contracting personnel to capture their 
perspectives. Secondly, from these findings, we identified additional steps necessary for 
incorporating e-RAs into source selections. We then mapped them out in five process 
flowcharts (Figure 8 and Appendices J, K, L and M) for contracting officers to use during 
a variety of different acquisition methods, including FAR Part 15 trade-offs. Finally, we 
conducted an analysis of interview responses, case law, and e-RA literature to identify 
areas of high risk in order to develop strategies to avoid protests. These strategies are 




IV. FINDINGS—NATIONAL CULTURE 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this section is to report findings associated with RQ1, which 
investigates the cultural implications of e-RA use in the Middle East. We used techniques 
for developing grounded theory, such as theoretical sampling and constant comparison of 
participants within a single case study (Yin, 2009). The purpose was to explore and 
explain the unique business environment in Kuwait and, more importantly, how the e-RA 
affected offerors’ decisions to participate in the tender and how the e-RA helped offeror’s 
cope with the Middle Eastern business climate (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Charmaz, 2006).  
Section “B” begins with a general description of the Middle Eastern business 
climate based on interviews with five local contractors who were directly or indirectly 
involved with the e-RA event. It is important to frame the environment in which the event 
occurred because our findings indicate that the USAF is uniquely positioned to leverage 
e-RAs based on the high level of trust vendors place in the USAF and in the processes 
and rules governing USAF acquisitions. In short, the trust, fairness, and transparency, 
which form the foundation for U.S. Federal acquisition, are missing in the Middle Eastern 
market. Instead, themes of favoritism, distrust, corruption, collusion and “wasta” (i.e., 
using connections or influence) (El-Said & Harrigan, 2009, p. 1238) result in a business 
climate that favors companies with powerful owners and well-connected managers. 
These themes emerged from our initial interviews and were explored more fully during a 
second round of interviews (See Appendix C).  
As is customary with theory-building research, RQ1 was necessarily broad. As 
relationships within the data became apparent during our literature review, field work, 
and initial data analysis, we developed additional, specific questions surrounding national 
culture and e-RA use.  
• Sub-research question #1: Why do firms in an Arab country favor 
competing in e-RAs—even when they “lost” the tender?  
• Sub-research question #2: How does wasta affect e-RA usage?  
• Sub-research question #3: How does e-RA use affect wasta usage?  
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• Sub-research question #4: Why are e-RAs peculiarly useful in an Arab 
business climate of power, wasta, favoritism, collusion, corruption, 
opportunism, and distrust? 
• Sub-research question #5: For B2B exchange, how can the transparency 
and fairness of e-RAs substitute for wasta (influence and work-arounds) in 
achieving desired outcomes (fair competition; odds of winning a tender; 
offeror satisfaction)? 
• Sub-research question #6: Why do firms operating in an Arab country 
decide to compete in e-RAs? Do the reasons differ from those of U.S.-
based businesses? Hence, is perceived usefulness determined by the same 
or different factors? 
• Sub-research question #7: Why are e-RAs not practical among some Arab 
business buyers, but are practical for U.S. Government buyers?  
• Sub-research question #7a: How do e-RAs uniquely affect the 
offeror’s bidding strategy in Middle Eastern firms?  
• Sub-research question #8: Why does e-RA use increase the buyer’s 
confidence in achieving a fair and reasonable price in the Middle Eastern 
market? 
In order to answer these questions, we used the systematic approach described 
below. First, upon reading (and re-reading) 14 transcribed interviews, 17 contractual 
documents, and 58 emails, we identified 178 distinct codes representing concepts (i.e., 
constructs). (For more detailed information regarding our data attributes, refer to 
Appendix E) While this may seem like excessive rigor, we followed Whetten’s guidance, 
which states, “When [researchers] begin to map out the conceptual landscape of a topic 
they should err in favor of including too many factors, recognizing that over time their 
ideas will be refined (Whetten, 1989, p. 490).” Accordingly, we then coded 1,633 
different occurrences of emergent and relevant constructs within the text of the 
documents. Finally, using the memo feature in MAXQDA, we created 183 memos to 
capture what Corbin and Strauss call “aha moments, or sudden insights into the possible 
meaning of the data” (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 109). 
Secondly, we used the code relations browser and lexical search engine functions 
of MAXQDA to find co-occurrences of codes within five lines of text. This allowed us to 
identify patterns among codes within hundreds of pages of transcript, memos, 
correspondence, and archival data for reoccurring themes. Coding every relationship-
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while interesting and helpful-created a massive matrix of coded events. We solved this 
problem by filtering the matrix to sieve out codes co-occurring 10 times or more using a 
color-coded scheme to identify frequent intersections of codes quickly (see Table 6). 
Where codes co-occur suggested that the two concepts might be causally related. The 
cluster chart at Appendix N is a tool we used to analyze our data and show relationships 
between codes (Charmaz, 2006). This process was iterative and evolving and resulted in 
numerous revisions. Arrows indicate a relationship between codes and are marked as 
either positive or negative, meaning the as one construct increased (the originating 
construct), it caused the other construct to increase or decrease, respectively. For example, 
an arrow from e-RA use to transparency with a positive sign means that increased e-RA 
use increases transparency. We used propositions (labeled P1, P2, etc.) to show 
relationships in the conceptual model (Figure 9) at the end of this chapter.  
Throughout the following discussion, we refer to two separate instances of coding. 
The first instance is the number of times a concept (i.e., construct) occurred during 
interviews and data analysis. Appendix D (Frequency of Codes) displays all codes that 
occurred five times or more and are shown as an italicized number within brackets (e.g., 
competition. (17)) in the following sections. Constructs coded less than five times were 
excluded from Appendix D in order to highlight the most relevant constructs and to 
reduce the table’s size from 16 to two pages.  
The other set of coded incidents referred to in this section comes from the code 
relations browser function in MAXQDA. This tool shows a relationship between two 
codes and is depicted as a bolded number within brackets (e.g., transparency/fairness 
[20]) during subsequent sections. A summary of the most relevant co-occurrences of 
codes is shown in Table 5 at the end of this chapter. Finally, we address rival theories at 
the end of each set of sub-research questions and include a break-out section of the 
conceptual model to illustrate each.  
B.  THE MIDDLE EASTERN BUSINESS CLIMATE 
In mid-April 2009, after conducting our literature review, we traveled to Kuwait 
to interview local contractors involved, either directly or indirectly, with the generator e-
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RA. Our intent was to explore RQ1—the cultural considerations of e-RA in the Middle 
East. We sought to gain as much information about business in Kuwait by conducting 
face-to-face interviews at the offerors’ establishments. This initial fieldwork enabled us 
to 1) focus in on responses observing non-verbal cues, and 2) experience first-hand the 
offerors’ physical environments. This approach helped us achieve an “intimate 
familiarity” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 182) with the local business climate.  
The first stage for many grounded theorists is a line-by-line coding where 
researchers categorize words or sentences to capture important elements within the data 
(Charmaz, 2006). Since our research question dealt with e-RAs and Middle Eastern 
culture, we created an overarching category of Middle Eastern business climate (to 
describe how contractors perceived their local business climate aside from contracts with 
the U.S. DoD. Our data pointed to five major themes (followed by number of coded 
occurrences): wasta (56), collusion (39), corruption (21), technologically immature (9) 
and distrust (8) (Appendix D). Of the five categories, only wasta emerged as an 
unfamiliar concept; thus, we returned to the literature to understand previous research and 
compare our findings.  
According to researchers, the term wasta literally means ‘‘to employ a middle 
man, a broker, a go-between or an intermediary—usually a person of high social status 
and accepted rank—to achieve one’s ends” (Fathi, 1993, p. 61). “In modern language, 
wasta means a connection or influence” (El-Said & Harrigan, 2009, p. 1238). However, 
among scholars, the definition is not so clear; therefore, we compiled potential meanings 
into the following three groups. Wasta is the following.  
• Influence, power, favoritism (sometimes corruption), and reciprocity or 
self-gain (Hutchings & Weir, 2006; El-Said & Harrigan, 2009) 
• A cultural social norm: solidarity, mutuality, loyalty, and allegiance 
(Loewe et al., 2008) 
• Self worth: status, reputation, and respect (Hutchings & Weir, 2006; 
Palmer et al., 1985) 
One explanation for the variety of definitions is a lack of empirical research on 
the subject of wasta (Whiteoak et al., 2006; Hutchings & Weir, 2006). Given the lack of 
clarity, we created a second interview protocol, which specifically asked how our 
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participants view or define wasta (Appendix C). All three of the managers who 
participated in the interviews identified influence, power, favoritism, corruption, 
allegiance to friends and family, and status as elements of wasta. Two of the managers 
also considered respect and reputation as elements of wasta as well, noting that when 
wasta is used as a social norm to show loyalty, allegiance and mutuality, it may serve a 
good purpose. When used to influence business unduly, it is also seen as bad. Regardless 
of good or bad intent, all three managers agreed that wasta is common in Kuwait. When 
asked if wasta use was common in Kuwait, one manager replied, “Oh yeah, big time!”  
The concept of wasta is a significant factor in all business transactions in the 
Middle East and touches every aspect of Arab life (Cunningham & Sarayrah, 1993). 
Given its influence and negative association with collusion and corruption (Hutchings 
and Weir, 2006), wasta has the potential to impact e-RA use, as well as DoD contracting 
in general. As one author puts it, “In the Arab World, wasta has also effectively been 
used to override established laws and traditions where they existed and are used in place 
of relevant regulations and standards” (Hutchings & Weir, 2006, p. 148). The next 
section addresses the first seven sub-research questions related to e-RA use and how it 
impacts the Middle Eastern business environment.  
C.  HOW E-RA WORKS WITHIN THE MIDDLE EASTERN BUSINESS 
CLIMATE 
During data analysis, we found it necessary to group our codes into what Charmaz 
refers to as theoretical categories in order to explain more abstract ideas that emerged 
from our data (Charmaz, 2006). Our cluster chart (Appendix N) shows these constructs as 
procurement integrity, altering market dynamics, Arab business climate, buyer 
antecedents to e-RA use, and supplier motivational factors. Each is labeled and grouped 
to explain a set of related codes for different areas impacted by or influencing e-RA use. 
Research questions 1–5 and 7 all fall within the broad scope of procurement integrity and 
the Middle Eastern business climate; thus, we grouped all the questions below and 
address them with propositions represented in Figure 3. Research questions 1–5 and 7 are 
as follows. 
 54 
• Sub-research question #1: Why do firms in an Arab country favor 
competing in e-RAs—even when they “lost” the tender?  
• Sub-research question #2: How does wasta affect e-RA usage?  
• Sub-research question #3: How does e-RA affect wasta usage?  
• Sub-research question #4: Why are e-RAs peculiarly useful in an Arab 
business climate of power, wasta, favoritism, collusion, corruption, 
opportunism, and distrust? 
• Sub-research question #5: For B2B exchange, how can the transparency 
and fairness of e-RAs substitute for wasta (influence and work-arounds) in 
achieving desired outcomes (fair competition; odds of winning a tender; 
offeror satisfaction)? 
• Sub-research question #7: Why are e-RAs not practical among some Arab 
business buyers, but are practical for U.S. Government buyers?  
• Sub-research question #7a: How do e-RAs uniquely affect the 
offeror’s bidding strategy in Middle Eastern firms 
Each of the sub-research questions listed above is explained by a complicated 
interconnection of constructs represented in Figure 3. Three central constructs to our 
theory- perceived usefulness, decision to participate in the e-RA and actual e-RA use (See 
Figure 9)—were not coded because we assumed a relational connection based on existing 
theories, which explain technology adoption. Underlying, established theories include the 
theory of reasoned action (TRA) (Azjen & Fishbein, 1980), technology adoption model 
(TAM) (Davis, 1989), and the theory of planned behavior (TPB) (Ajzen, 1991). Together, 
these theories suggest that perceived usefulness affects an individual’s attitude toward 
technology and ultimately, his/her behavior and actual use (Azjen & Fishbien, 1980). 
Furthermore, other studies exploring the effects of national culture on technology 
adoption (Parboteeah et al., 2005; Srite, 2000) support the idea that Hofestede’s (1980) 
elements of national culture impact perceived usefulness and behavioral intent to use, as 
well as subjective norms and cultural nuances we explore in this study. For more 
information regarding these theories, see Chapter II, section E or any of the 
aforementioned studies.  
Our theory, and a significant contribution to e-RA theory, is that e-RA use in the 
Middle East increases procurement integrity, which we define as a higher order construct 
encompassing two dimensions: procedural fairness (72) and transparency (63). In turn, 
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Middle Eastern offerors perceive e-RAs as useful (46), because increased procurement 
integrity reduces the effect of wasta. Hence, decreased wasta might enable competing 
firms to enact strategies that can affect the outcome of the competition rather than the 
outcome being determined by factors beyond their control (e.g., wasta). These 
relationships are supported as follows.  
During our initial coding, constructs of transparency (63), procedural fairness 
(72), wasta (56), and offeror satisfaction (42) emerged as high-coded occurrences with 
numerous memos. This caused us to dig deeper to look for causal relationships using a 
systemic approach, which we use for the remaining cultural questions. First, we 
attempted to find co-occurrences of codes using the code relations browser and lexical 
search engine functions of MAXQDA. We first found that procedural 
fairness/transparency co-occurred [89] times, which turned out to be the most strongly 
supported relationship we discovered during the project. Unfortunately, the constructs of 
e-RA use and perceived usefulness (central to our theory) were coded as overarching 
category headings (with many individually coded sub-constructs) rather than 
individually-coded constructs. To overcome this weakness, we triangulated our coding 
occurrences with direct questions from the questionnaire (Appendix C) and the initial 
survey (Appendix B). Question #4 on part A of the initial survey indicated that the 
transparency of the e-RA bidding process “strongly motivated” all three managers’ 
decisions to participate in the e-RA. During the follow-up interview, we directly asked 
whether e-RA use increased transparency and fairness. Each informant answered yes 
showing a direct causal association between their e-RA use, transparency, and procedural 
fairness. One manager told us, “That’s [e-RA is] even more fair. I mean, that’s even more 
fair and transparent at the same time. I mean, because the e-RA—you can see the bidders, 
what they are bidding, [and] so there’s no cheating—it’s very transparent.” Given this 
data, we posit the following. 





We were surprised to learn how using wasta to gain business can impact a 
company’s bottom line. During one interview, a manager told us, “My company made 
$3.2M KD (Kuwaiti dinar) last year… using wasta, we could have easily increased that 
to $200M KD.” Given the demonstrated lucrative potential of wasta, it is easy to 
understand why companies who rely on wasta will not find e-RAs attractive.  
Two managers who competed during the e-RA were asked to confirm our initial 
findings of increased perceptions of fairness and transparency as a result of the e-RA. 
Both managers indicated that they felt the process was more fair and transparent than the 
DoD’s normal contracting process, which typically entails a one-shot proposal 
submission. Both indicated increased satisfaction as a result of the e-RA, which we 
verified using MAXQDA’s code relations browser. As a result, offeror satisfaction and 
transparency emerged [43] times. Similarly, offeror satisfaction and formal rules and 
procedural fairness co-occurred [37] times. As an example, consider the response 
provided by a manager from Company “B.”  
That’s right, because we knew exactly what went down. Once we 
qualified, you knew that you were qualified or not. Once you knew that 
round two of the process—of the bidding process—we know if we’re the 
lowest bidder, we got the job. At least that’s the way I see it… 
Interestingly, both managers had caveats. Manager “B” was more satisfied 
because he appreciated the objectivity of the process. His comment regarding 
qualification dealt with pre-qualification during step one of a two-step LPTA 
procurement. While this is not unique to e-RA, the ability to see competitors bidding and 
having the flexibility to change his bid in real time was unique and attractive. In sum, we 
posit: 
• P2: There is a positive relationship between e-RA use and procedural 
fairness. 
• P3: There is a positive relationship between e-RA use and transparency. 
As a follow-on question, we wondered how the relationships above impacted the 
manager’s sense of satisfaction, even if they didn’t win the bid. Again, we started with 
the lexical search and code relations browser, which showed co-occurrences between 
procedural fairness and offeror satisfaction [37]. Both techniques also showed a 
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relationship between transparency and offeror satisfaction [43]. Realizing that some 
researchers might question whether co-occurrences substantiate a relationship between 
constructs, we again turned to the follow-up interviews and found that all three managers 
replied “yes” when asked if increased procurement integrity (transparency and procedural 
fairness) increased their level of satisfaction even if they lost the event. This data 
supports the following propositions.  
• P4: There is a positive relationship between transparency and offeror 
satisfaction, even when the offeror loses the bidding event.  
• P5: There is a positive relationship between procedural fairness and 
offeror satisfaction, even when the offeror loses the bidding event. 
Next, we wanted to understand how e-RA use could impact unique cultural 
dynamics of the Middle Eastern business climate (34), specifically wasta (56). However, 
first, we confirmed what literature suggests about the Middle Eastern business climate—
that it includes the elements of wasta, collusion, corruption, distrust, and favoritism. 
Using the code relations browser, we found the following co-occurrences of constructs 
associated with the Middle Eastern business climate. 
• Wasta [50] 
• Collusion [25] 
• Corruption [12] 
• Favoritism [6] 
• Distrust [4]) 
Once the elements of the Middle Eastern business climate were established, we 
returned to the data to look for relationships between wasta and e-RA use. Again, 
because we did not have a stand-alone code for e-RA use, we turned to survey responses 
to support any relationships. According to all three of the managers, the transparency and 
procedural fairness of e-RA could be used as a substitute for wasta (Appendix C, 
question 28) to reduce the effect of work-arounds and undue influence inherent with the 
use of wasta. While their answers do not suggest that e-RA use can actually decrease the 
use of wasta, the data suggests that e-RAs can help firms cope with a business climate of 
wasta by increasing transparency. Thus, firms that rely on wasta as a source of 
competitive advantage to win tenders will find e-RAs unattractive and elect not to 
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compete. The overall effect is that e-RA use can decrease the utility of wasta for firms 
who rely on it. According to one study in Jordan, “tenders are often ‘window dressing.’ 
Decisions are taken before [the publication of the tender] following informal criteria” 
(Loewe et al., 2008, p. 266). On the other hand, our findings suggest that e-RAs could 
provide a coping mechanism for companies who either do not have wasta or do not want 
to use wasta to compete for tenders by providing a transparent and fair bidding process to 
qualified bidders regardless of status or reputation. Thus, we posit the following. 
• P6: e-RAs enable firms not desiring or unable to compete using wasta to 
be successful in competitive tenders.  
• P7: The utility of wasta for those firms that rely on it for a competitive 
advantage will be reduced in tenders using e-RAs. 
Next, we noted that the use of wasta had the potential to impact a number of 
related constructs to include offeror satisfaction, procedural fairness, and transparency. 
Using the code relations browser, we discovered [21] co-occurrences of wasta and 
transparency, [28] occurrences between wasta and procedural fairness and, [15] between 
wasta and offeror satisfaction. Next, we looked at specific co-occurrences within the 
interviews and surveys to understand the direction and strength of these relationships. 
Although the matrix (Table 6) showed a large number of co-occurrences of codes 
between wasta/transparency and wasta/offeror satisfaction, a closer analysis of the 
intersecting segments of text showed that the focus of the offerors was on procedural 
fairness. We found that offerors felt strongly that the use of wasta decreased their 
perception of procedural fairness. Question number 24 on the follow-up survey 
(Appendix C) asked, “In your opinion, does wasta decrease fairness? We asked two 
managers; one said “yes” and the other said, “Of course, 100%!” Clearly, in the e-RA 
transaction, the managers perceived an increase in transparency and procedural fairness 
that were missing from the traditional, wasta-based system.   
• P8: There is a negative relationship between wasta and procedural fairness 
The previous findings and propositions help to explain how e-RA use increases 
procedural fairness and decreases some of the influences of wasta within the Middle 
Eastern business climate. The next section addresses why e-RA use is particularly useful 
for U.S. DoD buyers but may not be suited for Middle Eastern buyers. To start, we first 
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address why our participants decided to participate in an e-RA event that, in theory, 
should have been unattractive due to high power-distance and uncertainty avoidance 
scores associated with Kuwait’s culture (At-Twaijri & Al-Muhaiza, 1996).  
Coding the interview, correspondence, and contractual data revealed a number of 
constructs, which could explain why our participants elected to participate in the USAF 
auction. These constructs included: trust in the buyer (USAF) (36), trust in the e-RA 
service provider (26), trust in the process (28), and the e-RA service provider’s 
membership agreement (4)—all of which were addressed in part “C” of the initial survey. 
Using the code relations browser, we found a number of co-occurrences between these 
constructs and other highly-coded constructs, such as transparency and procedural 
fairness. The following scores indicate that these constructs are related. 
• Transparency/trust in the buyer [43] 
• Transparency/trust in the process [28] 
• Procedural fairness/trust in the process [37] 
• Procedural fairness/trust in the buyer [36] 
• Trust in the process/trust in the buyer [18]  
P1, P2, and P3 propose positive relationships between procurement integrity (i.e., 
transparency and fairness) and e-RA usage. The co-occurrences above suggest a 
relationship between procurement integrity and the amount of trust an offeror places in 
the buyer. This is particularly relevant to e-RA use in the Middle East because high levels 
of trust in the USAF might explain why offerors chose to participate in the e-RA; 
whereas, they would not participate with B2B buyers in the Kuwaiti commercial sector. 
When we asked why the managers felt high levels of trust with the USAF, we were told it 
had to do with the FAR’s rules and procedures. This higher level of trust explains why e-
RAs could be effective sourcing venues for DoD buyers but would make a local, B2B e-
RA a tough sell unless a trustworthy agent (like the DoD or Sorcity) were to host the 
event. Based on the findings, we suggest the following. 
• P9: There is a positive relationship between transparency and trust in the 
buyer 
• P10: There is a positive relationship between transparency and trust in the 
process 
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• P11: There is a positive relationship between trust in the process and trust 
in the buyer 
• P12: There is a positive relationship between procedural fairness and trust 
in the process  
• P13: There is a positive relationship between procedural fairness and trust 
in the buyer 
Using the survey (Appendix B, section C), we asked managers under what 
conditions they would participate in a future e-RA as a seller where the buyer was a 
Kuwaiti-based firm (B2B). Informants were first asked to identify three Kuwaiti firms 
that they could trust, firms that they could not trust, and firms with uncertain trust. Two 
informants completed this portion of the survey. One indicated a strong effect where the 
informant (seller) would participate in an e-RA if the trust with the buying firm were high, 
but would not participate with the firm if the trust were low. The other informant 
indicated a weak effect. It was inclined to participate in an e-RA offered by both 
trustworthy and untrustworthy firms, although to a lesser degree with the untrustworthy 
firm.  
Informants were also asked whether they would participate in another e-RA given 
differing levels of reliability in the: 1) sourcing process, 2) the buyer (as an individual), 
and 3) the e-RA service provider. In general, informants agreed that they would 
participate in an e-RA if they could rely on the process to be fair, but otherwise would not 
participate. However, whether or not informants could rely on the buyer (individual) 
showed mixed results; some informants would participate in an e-RA whereas others 
would not. Finally, all informants strongly agreed that they would not participate if they 
could not rely on the e-RA service provider. Given these findings, we posit the following. 
• P14: Trust in the process moderates the relationship between perceived 
usefulness and a decision to participate such that greater trust increases the 
strength of the relationship 
• P15: Trust in the e-RA service provider moderates the relationship 
between perceived usefulness and a decision to participate such that 
greater trust increases the strength of the relationship 
Finally, since responses to sections “D” of the initial survey indicated trust as a 
moderating factor between perceived usefulness and a decision to participate, we wanted 
to see if there was a direct relationship between trust in the buyer, trust in the process, 
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and trust in the provider and a firm’s decision to participate. Because we did not code 
decision to participate as a stand-alone construct, lexical search and the code relations 
browser in MAXQDA were of no help. Furthermore, questions concerning trust in 
section D of the initial survey were designed to reveal a moderating versus direct effect 
of trust. However, our field notes and memos in MAXDA indicated that offerors did 
discuss trust as an important construct during interviews. For example, during interviews, 
trust in the buyer (36), trust in the process (28), and trust in the provider (26) emerged as 
reoccurring themes. To discover a relationship, we turned to the transcripts for specific 
examples.  
One interesting line of questioning revealed a higher level of trust for the USAF 
definitely influenced at least one manager’s decision to participate. When asked, “Do you 
suspect, or did you suspect, any nefarious behavior by the United States Air Force [in the 
e-RA]? One manager answered, “No. with the USAF, no.” when asked if a Kuwaiti 
businesses would act nefariously, he replied, “Yes, definitely. I think 110% they would 
do that. Because, you see, what I’m trying to say is that e-RA—and I’m very strong in 
saying that because I’m being in this market for the last 20 years—I am considered the 
eyes and years of the market, and that is like USAF as an organization everybody trusts. 
USAF was a different involvement... USAF employees would definitely have all the 
reflections and policies of the USAF. Another manager said, “[The] e-RA was owned by 
USAF, you know what I mean. It was run by USAF. I could never even think that a third 
party would conduct that!” Both of these examples show that their level of trust for the 
USAF as an organization weighed on their decision to participate. We also found that 
managers extended trust to the e-RA process because the USAF sponsored it. The 
following exchange shows both a trust in the USAF and the trust in the process by 
extension. 
Manager: Yeah, I said our relationship and our interest with the Air 
Force—I trust the procedures; I trust the Air Force. So, I thought it of the 
Air Force a very reliable client that I can rely on when I give my bid, I rely 
to get a fair evaluation of our bid. 
Researcher: And then, by extension—the e-RA process? 
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Manager: That’s even more fair. I mean, that’s more even fair and 
transparent at the same time. I mean, because the e-RA—you can see the 
bidders, what they are bidding, so there’s no—it’s very transparent. 
What is not as clear is why the offerors trusted Sorcity enough to participate. 
Perhaps the dollar value was so high that offerors just did not care. Perhaps Sorcity 
benefited from the same extended trust. During our interviews, we found two examples 
that help add insight. First, one manager stated that, “a company that’s coming from 
overseas ... usually I would trust them more because they are doing normal business so 
this organization must be organized and well-established. This would be the reason why I 
would trust them more.” Here, the manager seems to imply that a large international 
company (outside the Middle Eastern business climate) would likely be more reliable. 
Since Sorcity conducted this auction and provided e-RA services globally, we asked them 
if they felt trust in the provider influenced participation. 
We didn’t ask them this question directly, so on a scale from 1-10, we 
don’t know if they trusted us as a 5, a 2, or a 10, but we do know that they 
participated. All suppliers who were invited participated, and so we 
apparently did an effective job in at least giving them enough of a comfort 
level to trust us and the process enough to engage and follow through. 
Numerous conversations happened with these suppliers. Questions that 
came up we provided the appropriate, ethical, honest answers, and that 
built trust and credibility... Everything was as it was stated, and that builds 
confidence, trust, and credibility. 
According to the contracting officer responsible for the event, one reason that 
could explain why these managers trusted a third-party e-RA service provider was that, 
“The Air Force was kind of sponsoring the company, so there was a level of trust with 
them because of their association with the Air Force… if they didn’t trust the bidding 
company, then I don’t think they would have a good chance in the event if, you know, 
they wouldn’t have taken the time and the energy to submit a proposal if they didn’t trust 
Sorcity.” 
Finally, such a high value placed on trust led us to question if there was a 
relationship between trust in the process and offeror satisfaction. Since both of these 
constructs were coded in MAXQDA, we again turned to the code relations browser and 
found co-occurrences of the codes trust in the process and offeror satisfaction [10]. These 
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co-occurrences, combined with all the previous testimony and support for P4 and P5, 
suggest that managers value a trustworthy process and consider the trustworthiness of the 
buyer, their processes and the third-party provider when deciding to participate in a new 
and potentially risky acquisition tool.  
• P16: There is a positive relationship between trust in the buyer and the 
offeror’s decision to participate in an e-RA 
• P17: There is a positive relationship between trust in the process and an 
offeror’s decision to participate in an e-RA 
• P18: There is a positive relationship between the offeror’s trust in the 
provider and their decision to participate. 
• P19: There is a positive relationship between trust in the process and 
offeror satisfaction 
In section “D” of the survey, we asked managers to rank the level of trust for the 
USAF, trust in the e-RA service provider, and trust in the individual buyer. Results of the 
code relations browser indicated that trust in the buyer/trust in the provider [10] were 
related. A deeper look into survey questions revealed two important findings. First, all 
three managers “mostly agreed” (average score of 2) that they could rely on the e-RA 
service provider before the event. They also “strongly agreed” that they could rely on the 
USAF. When asked whether their reliability changed after the e-RA, all managers agreed 
the e-RA did not change their level of trust for either the e-RA service provider or the 
USAF. Additionally, all informants strongly agreed that they would not participate in an 
e-RA if they did not trust the e-RA service provider.  
• P20: There is a positive relationship between the offeror’s trust in the 
buyer and trust in the provider 
Another dynamic that emerged was the use of a membership agreement by 
Sorcity, Inc. to establish trust between the e-RA service provider and each offeror. 
During initial coding, we found that managers also mentioned membership agreement (8) 
when describing why they trusted Sorcity from the start. Table 6 shows seven co-
occurrences of membership agreement/trust in the provider, suggesting a relationship 
between these two constructs.  
• P21: There is a positive relationship between the e-RA membership 
agreements and trust in the provider 
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Rival Theory: Some may argue that trust has little to do with a firm’s decision to 
participate, pointing to volume of the purchase as the force driving participation. At an 
estimated $2 million, we would have to agree that participation reservations tied to 
national culture (i.e., a high UA score) might be trumped by an attractive requirement. 
However, our survey results combined with interviews suggests that some Kuwaiti 
managers simply would not participate in an auction if it were for a non-DoD buyer due, 
in part, to the Middle Eastern business climate of distrust, corruption, favoritism and 
wasta.  
Aside from trust, we also wanted to see if e-RA participation impacted the buyer-
seller relationship so we created separate sections of the initial survey (sections B and E) 
to compare relational exchange attitudes prior to and just after the e-RA event. Managers 
were asked to respond to statement about their relationship with the USAF using a scale 
seven point scale ranging from strongly agree (1) to strongly disagree (7).  Figure 5 
shows the complex web of interactions resulting from P1 thru P21. 
 
 
Figure 5.   Procurement Integrity Model (Constructs for Questions 1–5 and 7) 
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One interesting finding we discovered during an interview indicated that the 
normal way that prime offerors and their prospective suppliers negotiate changed solely 
due to the e-RA. According to one manager, normally a supplier and a prime offeror 
negotiate a price prior to the prime’s submission of a proposal to the buyer. Later, if 
successful in winning the tender, the prime and its subcontractor re-negotiate the 
subcontractor’s prices lower—to the benefit of the prime. In interviews with one offeror 
and its supplier, we found that one of the primary reasons they selected each other was 
that the prime offeror was able to explain the concept of e-RA, negotiate the best price 
possible upfront, and lower the price during the actual bidding event. The example below 
illustrates how the e-RA changed the bidding process between the supplier and the prime 
offeror. 
I was telling them…For you, since you are suppliers of the generators, 
which are the biggest portion of this contract, you have to reduce your 
number up to this if you want us to win this project.” And they were like, 
“okay, we’ll call you back after 10 minutes.” So they were arguing and 
then calling me back, “No, no, we can’t go, can’t work, only up to this 
much.” So, by this bargaining process that took place ahead of time, I 
think this is the key for winning the reverse auction, is the bargaining 
during the bidding stage. Because the normal practice in this part of the 
world the main bargaining takes place after winning the contract because 
the supplier gets requests all the time from maybe 10 major contractors, so 
he will give all of them the same price and usually they try to keep some 
sort of a list on the actual [cost]… 
In addition to changing how the prime and supplier negotiate, the e-RA also 
caused managers to interact with their ownership to change bidding strategies (52), 
change profit margins (5), negotiate payment terms (2) and reach back to the 
manufacturer (5) during a bidding event. In the case of Manager “C,” this resulted in a 
profit margin reduction from 10% down to 2% during the course of the auction. The 
below testimony is an insightful quote from one manager describing his interaction with 
the business owner during the event. 
So my strategy changed completely. I would say that because in any big 
strategy—and I think our strategy is quite good. I’ve been in business for 
25 years in the DOD, around 22 years as a company with big business for 
big oil companies, big companies, which use our bidding process around 
the world. [The] strategy completely changed because I never use the 
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Board of Directors—In this case, [Added by the researcher for clarity] I 
called back more times to the Board of Directors. Normally, I don’t need 
to do this because I know what the Board of Directors want… When the 
price reached a 7% margin, I called [my company owner]. He said loudly, 
“I cannot talk.” And I woke him up because his wife picked up the cell 
phone and I said, “Ma’am, I’m sorry, but you need to wake up the boss.” 
She said, “Everything is okay? Because you don’t call when he is asleep.” 
I said, “Ma’am, I have to because it’s something.” So he said, “[Manager 
C”] what happened?” I said, “Sir, I’ve come down to 7%.” He said, “Why 
would you do that?” I said, “Sir, don’t talk about it now. Levels are higher, 
price changed like that.” This is very big order sitting in front of the 
laptop; you don’t have time to ask your boss’s advice.” He said, “Okay, 
how much more do you want to go down?” I said, “It’s not me. I’m not 
controlling it. I am just telling you this is what happened and what should 
I do?” Then he told me, “[Manager “C”], do not go below 5%!” Then he 
asked me, is it still going down? 
One of our key findings came from an interview with a highly competitive 
manager who felt that his ability to communicate how e-RA works allowed him to 
negotiate a lower cost prior to the auction. This is important because, according to 
multiple managers, in Middle Eastern B2B transactions, suppliers typically give prime 
offerors a high price upfront, and then negotiate downward after the offeror wins the 
award. In this event, managers who used a more traditional approach were at a 
competitive disadvantage in the bidding event because they had to secure discounts from 
the supplier in real time. As the competitive manager put it:  
There have to be a good relationship between the main contractor and the 
supply partner or subcontractors. That working relationship—this is what, 
this is what enables the contractor to give a low price or a competitive 
price. 
The importance of explaining the e-RA event to the prospective supplier, having a 
good working relationship with the supplier, and negotiating the best possible price 
upfront were all confirmed in separate interviews with the supplier referenced above. 
Additionally, the supplier mentioned that part of the negotiation included a promise from 
the offeror to purchase additional generators (at the quoted price) in the future.  
The examples above indicate the power of the e-RAs to change market dynamics. 
The latter changes are not uncommon when examining the literature; however, that e-
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RAs change the prices secured from subcontractors prior to proposal submission is: 1) 
uniquely caused by e-RAs and 2) a change in bidding strategy unique to the Middle 
Eastern business customs. Over the course of our study, we coded market changing 
implications 13 times, suggesting that savvy DoD buyers who can select appropriate and 
attractive e-RA requirements have the potential to directly impact the supply chain in 
ways conventional procurement techniques cannot.  Figure 6 shows a visual 
representation of P22, P23, and additional construct referenced in this section.  
• P22: e-RA use is positively related to an offeror changing its bidding 
strategy 
• P23: Altering the market dynamics gave the winning offeror a competitive 
advantage in the event 
 
 
Figure 6.   e-RA Altered Market Dynamics (Question 7a) 
D.  ANTECEDENTS FOR SUPPLIER USE 
• Sub-research question #6: Why do firms operating in an Arab country 
decide to compete in e-RAs? Do the reasons differ from those of U.S.-
based businesses? Hence, is perceived usefulness determined by the same 
or different factors? 
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In Chapter II, we identified that previous studies rate Kuwait high in the following 
categories of Hofestede’s dimensions of national culture: power distance (PD), 
uncertainty avoidance (UA) and collectivism (C). Given their high scores, we would 
expect that each of the managers would have chosen not to compete in the e-RA. The fact 
that they did caused us to ask why.  
We began by including 17 common motivational factors, or antecedents, for use 
(Hawkins et al., forthcoming) in section one of our initial survey (Appendix B). Of the 17 
factors, all three of the managers indicated the following as motivational factors shown 
below and again in Figure 4.  
• Motivational Factors  
• To gain insight into the competitive market 
• To gain access to buyers  
• To decrease time to contract award 
• To receive feedback from buyers on the event 
• To increase transparency in the bidding event 
• To increase reliability with the buyer/seller relationship 
• To penetrate or access new markets 
• To increase sales  
• To make them more efficient and effective for future business 
• To learn a new sourcing technology 
Going back to our cluster chart, we found that purchase volume (25) and the 
desire for suppliers to reduce excess inventory (5) also contributed to the attractiveness of 
the procurement for the supplier. To gain a better understand of what constituted each of 
these constructs, we looked for answers given during the initial interviews. Responses for 
a sufficiently attractive purchase volume between $200K and $1M. Manager “D” 
identified purchases less than $200K as “small dollar” procurements where the 19.9% 
savings the USAF received would not have been realized. Manager “C” explained that at 
roughly the $500K, the procurement became more attractive because he had more 
leverage to negotiate margins with suppliers. From the supplier perspective, Manager “E” 
verified that he was more motivated to reduce his price when the volume was large and 
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he had inventory on-hand. Both of these findings are consistent with existing e-RA theory 
(Hawkins et al., forthcoming).  Figure shows the relationship resulting from P24 through 
P26. 
• P24: There is a positive relationship between purchase volume and 
attractiveness 
• P25: There is a positive relationship between excess inventory and 
attractiveness 
• P26: The same antecedents that motivate western companies to use e-RA 
also motivate Middle Eastern companies 
 
 
Figure 7.   Supplier Antecedents to Supplier Use (Question 6) 
E.  OBTAINING A FAIR AND REASONABLE PRICE 
• Sub-Research Question #8: Why does e-RA use increase the buyer’s 
confidence in achieving a fair and reasonable price in a Middle Eastern 
market? 
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FAR Part 3 requires contracting officers, through full and open competition, to 
make a fair and reasonable price determination for every award unless certain exceptions 
apply. In a truly competitive market, which Manager “C” believes Kuwait is not, 
competition between two or more independent vendors usually satisfies this requirement. 
However, the 19.9% savings achieved by the focal e-RA of this case study, combined 
with vivid examples of price gauging and collusion gathered during our fieldwork, 
indicate that standard methods of competition may not achieve fair and reasonable prices 
in Middle Eastern markets. During an interview, a manager from company “A” provided 
an example of how collusion occurs and how it impacts price both in the private sector 
and between DoD and local businesses. He stated,  
Can you imagine coming to [a USAF Contracting Officer] with an 
example like this? We have four companies here, one is mine and 
threebelong to the same owner. One example could be I wouldn’t bid on 
this particular job . . . The otherthree companies are aware of it. They can 
just jack up a price, a job that could cost you 1000 KD could end up at 
6,000KD, and you guys would have to give it to the lowest bidder. And 
then what happened in other places... same thing. There are posing as three 
companies or four companies or whatever, they are quoting for a particular 
item or something equal will do [brand name equivalent]. Let’s say that 
three companies are giving the same specification and the fourth company 
is giving something a little bit different. The three companies say this is 
good and the fourth company doesn’t know what he is talking about. I say 
this item is equal and they say I don’t know what I’m talking about and 
the fourth guy is cut out. 
Over the course of our research, we coded supplier price gauging (20) times, 
indicating a problem area worth investigating further. In one interview, manager “A” 
provided a story of an actual encounter with a USAF contracting officer where he tried to 
explain how contractors are inflating prices.  
We started talking to ECES (Civil Engineering) about how much to do a 
[barrier] relocation, they just had to pick it up on one site drop it to another 
site. So they called this so-called big company to do the job. They [the 
winner] charged a price  seven or 9000 KDs to do the whole thing. It’s a 
one day job, 24 hours. I know that, since its in my field also. I know that it 
does not cost more than 1500 or 2000 KD. It told them and asked why I 
was not invited [to bid]. I did a calculation of approximately how many 
vehicles and people it would require [inaudible] that’s because of the 
relocation…Maybe we charge for each of the vehicles and a labor charge. 
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I told them this is how much it is going to cost. His eyes lit up [and and 
he] said whoa! I said what happened and he said 9000KD. And I was like, 
“Oh my god, you’ve paid 4 or 3 times the actual price!” He’s like yeah, 
[but] they did an amazing job and they finished in one day. I told him, 
anyone who knows a crane and three drives can get the job done [in one 
day]. Because the people who handle the crane and trailors are 
professionals. All I need to do is tell them where to show up and they will 
do it. He was shocked! 
This example was one of many similar stories shared with us regarding where the 
U.S. Government is being gauged on price in the Middle East. Manager “C” added that in 
certain areas like Iraq and Afghanistan, an e-RA could be “an effective tool” because 
many contractors inflate prices 30–50%. In areas like that, according to him, e-RAs could 
also reduce the time contracting officers spend negotiating procurements and bring down 
the margins up to 30% for larger acquisitions. Discussions with an ECES officer revealed 
similar thoughts on e-RA use as a deterrent to price gauging. 
I think that the e-RA basically showed them that they can’t gouge us. I 
think it was a very positive thing. It was a true competitive environment 
that caused them to realize that we have to pay rate and they can’t charge 
more than fair price. I think that was a wakeup call for them.  
Figure 9 illustrates how our unique finding of overpaying for goods and services 
fits into what is already known from appropriateness literature. These additional 
constructs are discussed fully in Chapter II, section “C” but are not further discussed here 
because they are outside of the scope of this project. For additional information, see 
Hawkins et al. (2009), Hawkins, et al. (forthcoming) Carter & Kaufman (2004) and Beall 
et al. (2003).  
Rival Theory: One manager felt concern of collusion, price gauging, and 
corruption are exaggerating in the Middle East. As an example, he made a comparison 
between large business owners who own many companies in Kuwait to Warren Buffet. 
His point was that critics look multiple Kuwati business with the same owner and think 
automatically that owners encourage and allow collusion between companies, which in 
reality is far from the truth. Middle Eastern owners, like Warren Buffet, are far to 
concerned with bigger problems than to manage the day-to-day activities of each 
company. This is a valid point but the problem with collusion, according to that same 
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manager, is that it happens at the manager level- particularly with supply-type contracts. 
The example above coupled with the 19.9% savings achieved on the procurement of 
generators suggest that many Kuwaiti companies (with or without collusion) are gauging 
U.S. contracting officers on price. Figure 8 shows P27 as well as additional constructs 
addressed in e-RA appropriateness literature. 
• P27: There is a positive relationship between the amount a buyer overpays 
for e-RA a goods/services and e-RA appropriateness.  
 
 
Figure 8.   Buyer Appropriateness Model (Question 8) 
The examples above create a dilemma for contracting officers who are required 
by the FAR to determine prices to be fair and reasonable prior to awarding a contract. E-
RAs provide contracting officers, a mechanism to (1) increase competition through real-
time competitive bidding, and (more importantly) to obtain a price that is closer to the 
real market price. During our initial coding phase, we noted competition (11), buyer 
savings (14), buyer satisfaction (14), collusion (39), offeror’s margins (19), and offeror 
satisfaction (42) To discern meaning, we again turned to the lexical search and code 
relations browser tools and found key relationships between buyer savings/buyer 
satisfaction [5]. While the idea that saving money increases buyer satisfaction is not new, 




the FAR requires contracts to be awarded for fair and reasonable prices. Furthermore, we 
found a co-occurrences of codes between competition/buyer savings [24] and [27] 
occurrences between fair and reasonable/buyer satisfaction. Figure 9 shows P28 through 
P31.  
• P28: There is a positive relationship between competition and buyer 
savings 
• P29: There is a positive relationship between buyer savings and buyer 
satisfaction 
• P30: There is a positive relationship between a buyer receiving a fair and 
reasonable price and buyer satisfaction  
• P31: There is a positive relationship between competition and a buyer 
receiving a fair and reasonable price. 
 
 
Figure 9.   E-RA Competition Model (Question 8) 
Each of the previous models are consolidated into Figure 10 to provide a snapshot 
of the complex dynamics at work. Table 6 shows the co-occurrence of codes generated 
from the MAXQDA code relational browser.  
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Figure 10.   Complete Conceptual Model  
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Table 6.   Relational Code Matrix 
Legend for Occurance Matrix                        
Yellow= 10-19                                     
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Arab Business Climate\Wasta\Good Wasta
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Arab Business Climate\Wasta\Allegiance or Loyalty 
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ERA SUCCESS FACTORS\Offeror pre-ERA 
preparation 0 0 0 2 2 3 0 0 0 0 3 0 2 1 0 1 0 2 2 1 4 1 1 9 2 0 3 0 6 15 7 0 0 2 4 1 0 2 0
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MODERATORS\Formal Rules and Procedural Fairness
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MODERATORS\TRUST\Trust in e-RA Service 
Provider 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 3 0 3 2 1 0 2 4 3 15 15 0 10 7 2 5 0 0 0 13 5 4 2 0 0 1 22 0 4 0
MODERATORS\TRUST\Trust in the USAF/Buyer
0 0 6 3 9 11 2 0 0 1 3 4 3 0 0 0 1 1 36 18 10 0 1 6 2 4 1 2 5 4 0 1 0 4 1 43 8 4 12
ACTUAL USE\Bidding Strategy
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ACTUAL USE\Attractiveness\Purchase Volume
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ACTUAL USE\Offeror's Margin
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ACTUAL USE\Contractor Performance
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ACTUAL USE\Subcontractor Price
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ACTUAL USE\Satisfaction\Buyer Satisfaction
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ACTUAL USE\Satisfaction\Offeror Satisfaction
0 0 7 5 12 15 2 1 0 4 5 2 4 3 0 7 6 10 37 10 13 5 5 4 14 0 2 3 0 12 2 1 0 4 6 43 0 6 2
ACTUAL USE\Change in Bidding Strategy
0 0 0 1 3 2 0 0 0 3 11 1 4 0 0 4 15 3 11 6 5 4 10 20 16 0 12 0 12 0 19 0 0 3 15 18 0 5 6
ACTUAL USE\Change in Bidding Strategy\Offeror 
bargaining with suppliers 0 0 2 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 1 0 4 0 7 4 2 0 6 0 2 19 0 0 0 0 3 7 0 5 0
Government Barriers to Use\Need for e-RA 
Training\Hands on e-RA Training 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 10 0 0 1 0 0 0
Government Barriers to Use\Need for DoD e-RA 
Policy / Leadership 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 3 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 3 0 0 0 2 0
Government Barriers to Use\Gov't overpaying for 
goods and services 0 0 2 5 16 3 0 0 0 2 1 0 5 0 0 1 2 0 4 3 0 4 1 6 8 1 0 1 4 3 0 0 3 0 0 6 3 0 1
Contractor's Barriers to Use\Profit Margins
0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 1 0 3 4 2 5 1 1 1 3 5 4 0 1 0 6 15 3 0 0 0 0 4 0 1 0
Perceived Usefulness\Transparency
0 0 10 2 8 21 2 2 0 1 7 5 6 0 2 1 1 3 89 28 22 43 6 3 6 4 0 5 43 18 7 1 0 6 4 0 2 13 12
Relational Exchange\Flexibility
0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 8 0 1 0 17 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 2 0 2 8
Relational Exchange\Relationship Building (1)
0 0 2 4 2 8 0 0 0 8 0 1 1 0 0 2 2 0 11 4 4 4 3 3 3 5 1 3 6 5 5 0 2 0 1 13 2 0 14
Relational Exchange\Commitment
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Decision to Participate
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V. FINDINGS—APPLICATION OF E-RAS  
A. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
This chapter is designed to answer research questions RQ2, RQ3, RQ4 and RQ5 
pertaining to applied elements of e-RA use within the Federal acquisition framework. We 
do this in two major sections as follows. 
First, we conducted a detailed spend analysis of USAF FY07 and FY08 contract 
data obtained from Monterey Consultants Incorporated (MCI) in order to determine how 
much of Air Force’s spend was appropriate for e-RA sourcing. This involved a step-by-
step process of analyzing and filtering spend that is not suited for e-RA, which we 
describe fully in section b (below). In addition to conducting a spend analysis, we then 
applied a second method—a benchmarking—to determine how much money the USAF 
could have saved by using e-RAs for requirements conducive to e-RA sourcing (i.e., e-
RA-appropriate spend or “auctionable” spend). Finally, we took the auctionable spend 
from USAF FY07 and FY08 contract actions and projected potential savings to top line 
FY01-06 spend for each branch of the DoD and to AFCENT (for USAF contingency 
operations). At each step, we explain our methodology in order to demonstrate: 1) 
procedural rigor, and 2) a repeatable process for subsequent research efforts and 
practitioners’ uses.  
The second part of this chapter is geared toward the DoD practitioner. We begin 
by building an e-RA Appropriateness Model (EAM) for contracting professionals to use 
in evaluating requirements based on relevant literature, success stories, and interviews 
with industry and DoD experts from DSCP and CECOM. Using the EAM, contracting 
professionals will be able to discriminate between requirements that are appropriate for 
sourcing via e-RA and those that are not. 
Finally, we present five FAR-complaint process flowcharts showing how to 
incorporate e-RAs into the following source selection methodologies: 1) simplified 
acquisition procedures (SAP): price only), 2) SAP: trade off, 3) SAP: LPTA 4) FAR Part 
15: LPTA and 5) FAR Part 15: full-trade-off. For brevity, we only discuss each step of 
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the SAP: LPTA model within this section while leaving the other models for reference in 
Appendices J–M. The remainder of this chapter addresses strategies to mitigate protests 
and examines structural barriers to e-RA use.  
B.  SPEND ANALYSIS RESULTS 
1. Current e-RA Use 
The first step in our analysis was to gather information from each DoD branch in 
order to determine current levels of e-RA use and savings. Following the footsteps of 
Brown and Ray (2007), we requested spend data from the three primary sources of e-RA 
capability: FedBid, CECOM (USAAVE), and Procuri/Ariba (Navy).  
Since 2000, CECOM has conducted 178 reverse auctions for commercial 
commodities under Simplified Acquisition Procedures (SAP). Since its inception, the 
USAAVE platform has delivered total savings of $44 Million, or 31% below the 
independent government estimate (IGE) (M. Meinert, personal correspondence, July 14, 
2009). 
Since 2000, the Navy (NAVCIP) has conducted 126 auctions using the 
Procuri/Ariba platform. Like the Army, the Navy has saved over $75M with an average 
savings of 18 percent. The Navy’s use of e-RAs is targeted to commodities although 
higher dollar procurements are recommended to entice bidders and increase savings.  
Figure 10 represents a broad snapshot of e-RA savings provided by FedBid. One 
number that stood out was the small number of auctions conducted by the USAF in 
comparison to sister branches and the DoD as a whole. While we were surprised with the 
disparity between branches, we were not surprised given the lack of official e-RA 
guidance and direction from the USAF. Still, 384 e-RAs indicated at least some offices 
were using e-RA so we asked FedBid to provide a spend break out by USAF office. What 
we found surprised us. According to FedBid, 381 of the 384 e-RAs shown in the USAF 
column were actually conducted by GSA on behalf of the Air Force (J. Lee, personal 
correspondence, June 25, 2009). This means the USAF placed an order with GSA who, in 
turn, used an e-RA to source the requirement. The other branches, in conjunction with  
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their software platforms, are using the e-RAs significantly more often and are saving 
more money.  Table 7 provides a snapshot of e-RA spend by each branch of the military  
using FedBid.  
 
Table 7.   FedBid Spend Data, through June, 2009 (From: Fedbid, 2009a) 
    USA USAF USN DOD Total 
Number of Buys 10,735 341 2,127 846 14,049 
Independent Estimate $450,908,616 $67,637,304 $81,378,928 $79,520,496 $679,445,344 




Provided Not Provided 
Agency Contracting Office $335,399,025 $14,313 $15,719,188 $2,996,312 $354,128,838 
GSA Assisted Acquisition 
Service $56,282,701 $62,182,727 $58,215,926 $65,854,800 $242,536,155 
Net Savings in Dollars $59,226,890 $5,440,264 $7,443,814 $10,669,383 $82,780,351 
Net Savings by Percentage 13.1% 8.0% 9.1% 13.4% 12.2% 
Average No. of Sellers 
Bidding 
5.5 3.7 6.3 4.6 5.5 
Average No. of Bids per 
Buy 
13.6 8.9 13.6 11.3 13.3 
Average No. of “No Bids” 71.9 61.0 56.1 61.6 68.7 
Average No. of Sellers 
Notified 
1,442 1,075 1,214 1,132 1,380 
% of Dollars to Small 
Businesses 
79.9% 81.3% 72.8% 77.0% 78.8% 
 
2. Obtaining and Filtering Data 
The second step of our analysis involved gathering, sorting, categorizing and 
analyzing USAF FY07and FY08 transaction data provided by MCI. MCI provided two 
reports, a CLIN-level contract action report (CAR) and a contract-level CAR from the 
Federal Procurement Data System—Next Generation (FPDS-NG) database. To maximize 
accuracy, we attempted to conduct the spend analysis at the CLIN level since different 
types of goods and services are commonly combined on single contracts. However, we 
found Product Service Codes (PSCs) and Federal Supply Codes (FSCs) at the CLIN level 
were inconstantly entered and sometimes missing altogether. Contract-level FSCs/PSCs 
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information contained a much higher level of fidelity; therefore we based our unit of 
analysis on contract-level data. The weakness of this approach was twofold: First, it 
compromised accuracy by potentially eliminating e-RA-suitable CLINS included in a 
contract classified with an inappropriate overall PSC. For example, a base contract coded 
with a PSC for research and development (R&D) may have included sub-line items for 
test equipment that is suitable for sourcing via e-RA. However, all of such a contract 
would be coded as R&D. The second weakness was that we had to accept the accuracy of 
contracting officer’s PSC/FSC designations on face value without looking at the 
individual contract.  
Our third step was to filter out transactions from the CAR that were inappropriate 
for e-RA use. In order to do this, we first calculated the percentage of spend where e-RAs 
could have been appropriately used. We call this e-RA appropriate spend, and use two 
methods to calculate it: (1) We filter out non-appropriate spend from the total spend by 
removing inappropriate contracts (i.e., the spend analysis approach) and (2) we apply the 
average percentage of total procurement dollars that industry typically spends using e-
RAs (i.e., the benchmarking approach). Table 11 shows the results of both methods.  
a. Method 1 
The Total Spend column represents the total amount the USAF spent each 
year. For our baseline, we selected FY07 and FY08 data because prior to FY07, the 
USAF did not use FPDS-NG. According to Monterey Consultants, Inc., FY01-06 data 
was incomplete because the Air Force switched to FPDS-NG in 2006, with full 
conversion as of the start of FY 2007. Furthermore, previous data is from DD350 
reporting only and does not include small purchases under $2500. Additionally, it may or 
may not include classified acquisitions and does not include foreign military sales. 
Finally, only years 1998–2006 have been audited. Earlier data is reasonably close but 
may not match official Air Force acquisition data. 
Using the e-RA appropriateness antecedents described in Chapter II, we 
filtered out the following contract actions in order to determine the total spend that was  
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appropriate for e-RA sourcing Antecedents include specifiability, competition, stable 
requirements, high-criticality/high supply complexity, and the need for relational 
exchange (trust, cooperation, collaboration, etc.).  
• All Research and Development (R&D) contracts: Rationale- R&D is 
not a stable requirement nor is it easily specifiable. Depending on the type 
of research and development needed, typical R&D requires a collaborative 
effort in order to develop cutting-edge technology to support major 
defense weapon systems.  
• Construction contracts: Rationale- While construction materials could 
be considered auctionable spend, we had no way of sorting out materials 
from actual building. Furthermore, construction rarely goes as planned due 
to unforeseen factors that evolve during the course of the project. Thus, 
modifications that impact costs and schedule are common. Without a 
stable and specifiable requirement, the government runs the risk of post-
award modifications giving the contractor an incentive to seek 
renegotiations. 
• Contracts awarded under other-than-full and open competition: 
Rationale- non-competitive procurements will not work in an e-RA 
sourcing event. Competition is a key component that must be present. 
• All contract types other than firm-fixed price, fixed price-economic 
price adjustment and fixed price award fee contracts: Rationale- 
Contract types other than fixed price, by design, are intended to 
accommodate situations where exact requirements are uncertain. Hence, 
specifiability is low. High specifiability is essential for e-RA use and 
contracts that lack this are destined for post hoc changes, which ultimately 
add costs and detract from savings in price and ultimately total ownership 
costs (Beall et al., 2003; Hawkins et al., 2009). Since e-RA bidding is 
based on prices and since the resultant prices are typically bid to low 
levels that force the supplier to economize on costs (and often profit), 
inviting changes after bidding is ill-advised. 
Removing the contracts described above reduced FY07 spend from $70.2 
billion to $17.7 billion dollars, leaving 25.22% of total spend being deemed appropriate 
for e-RA sourcing. Applying the same methodology, we reduced the FY08 spend to from 
$63.6B to $16.9B or $25.13% total spend being deemed appropriate for e-RA sourcing. 
We then averaged both percentages to reach a two-year average e-RA appropriate spend 
as a percentage of total spend (25.15%). According to this method, on average, 25.15% 
of the total USAF spend could be awarded using e-RAs. We then applied the two-year 
average to FY01–07 and 09 to calculate a total e-RA appropriate amount of spend for 
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each year. Finally, we applied an industry average savings of 20% (Cohn, 2000) to the e-
RA appropriate total for each year, leaving a potential USAF savings of $25.35 billion 
between FY01–09. These savings are roughly 126 times the combined Army, Navy, and 
FedBid savings of $201 million. Given the staggering amount of total potential savings, 
we feel it is important to disclose the weaknesses with this approach of figuring e-RA 
appropriate spend.  
First, not all FFP, FP-EPA, and FPAF contracts are appropriate for 
sourcing via e-RA, yet using this method assumes that they are. For example, some FFP, 
FP-EPA, or FPAF requirements may not be sufficiently specifiable or may be highly 
relational. Some requirements experience significant post-award changes. It is ill-advised 
to use e-RAs in such situations if the buying activity doesn’t have the time or resources to 
prevent the contractor from attempting to get well. Additionally, certain items or services 
may require greater relational (versus transactional) exchange (Webster, 1992). For 
example, using Kraljic’s (1983) framework, not all of the remaining spend will fall into 
non-critical and leverage categories of spend; some could be critical/strategic or 
bottleneck. For those procurements, buyers should consider different acquisition and 
supplier management strategies. Critical/strategic and bottleneck spend categories usually 
entail the availability of few suppliers, which may limit the number of alternative, 
qualified suppliers capable of satisfying the procurement. Thus, buyer dependence on the 
supplier may be high. Additionally, critical spend ideally uses a partnership type 
relationship between the buyer and supplier; this is arguably in contrast to the 
transactional nature of an e-RA. For these reasons, critical spend usually does not lend 
itself to an e-RA procurement. Also, we could not achieve a high degree of fidelity in the 
data because we could not see down to the CLIN level. This could lead to 
misclassification of dollars classified as FFP, FP-EPA, or FPAF when actually they are 
not. Finally, since this method is grounded in USAF spend, it assumes that USA and 
USN spend is characteristic of USAF spend. In other words, the auctionable spend 
percentage determined using USAF spend is assumed to apply to the other military 
branches’ spend. 
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b. Method 2 
According to a recent industry study conducted by CAPS, companies 
spend 2.58% of their total spend using e-RAs (CAPS, 2008). Using the CAPS 
benchmarks, we multiplied the total spend for each year by 2.58% to determine an e-RA-
appropriate amount, which we label as method 2, e-RA appropriate spend. Finally, we 
applied the industry average savings of 20% to the CAPS benchmark to determine a 
potential savings for the DoD, USAF, Navy and USA from FY2001-09 (Table 12). 
Taking the USAF as an example, although this total is considerably lower than method 
one, the $2.59 billion savings are 12.88 times the combined Army, Navy, and FedBid 
savings of $201 million. While this number is impressive, it is import to keep in mind 
that this method, similar to method 1, is fallible; thus, practitioners should consider the 
limitations. 
First, the CAPS benchmarking approach assumes that USAF spend 
resembles industry spend. Firms participating in the CAPS study, by now, likely have 
rationalized their supply bases and more of them are strategic partners. The USAF has a 
much higher proportion of transactional (arms-length) buyer-seller relations. In industry, 
many suppliers are rewarded with more business for performing well. The Competition in 
Contracting Act largely precludes the USAF from this practice. These two points, taken 
together, suggest that the USAF’s auctionable spend will be higher than that found in 
industry. However, USAF spend differs from industry spend in that the USAF buys much 
fewer commercial items and services than does industry, conducts much more sole source 
procurements, and procures more research and development. These three factors could 
significantly reduce USAF auctionable spend because (1) commercial products typically 
have more suppliers (i.e., more competition exists), (2) sole source requirements are not 
appropriate for e-RAs, and (3) research and development typically is too relational for e-
RA sourcing. While e-RAs and buyer-seller relationships are not mutually exclusive 
(Hawkins et al., 2009), e-RAs are not recommended for critical/strategic (Kraljic, 1983) 
items and services (Beall et al., 2003). Finally, weaknesses of the CAPS benchmark 
(2.58% of total spend is auctionable) must be considered. This report is based on a small 
sample size of 17 firms, and the study achieved only a 4% response rate to their survey—
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hardly representative of its population. Nonetheless, taking the two methods together, we 
can conservatively conclude that the potential savings for the USAF from FY01 to FY09 
was between $2.59B and $25.35B, or between $288M and $2.82B per year. Table 8 
provides a summary of our results.  
 
Table 8.   USAF Spend Analysis Results 






















FY01 $40,658,636,487  $10,235,811,735.60 $2,047,162,347 $1,048,992,821 $209,798,564 
FY02 $47,398,465,802  $11,932,563,765.65 $2,386,512,753 $1,222,880,418 $244,576,084 
FY03 $55,554,711,050  $13,985,898,506.84 $2,797,179,701 $1,433,311,545 $286,662,309 
FY04 $55,047,330,757  $13,858,165,518.07 $2,771,633,104 $1,420,221,134 $284,044,227 
FY05 $55,581,405,190  $13,992,618,756.58 $2,798,523,751 $1,434,000,254 $286,800,051 
FY06 $62,656,276,631  $15,773,717,641.85 $3,154,743,528 $1,616,531,937 $323,306,387 
FY07 $70,210,415,739 $17,707,066,849.38 $3,541,413,370 $1,811,428,726 $362,285,745 
FY08 $63,636,840,892 $15,991,938,116.16 $3,198,387,623 $1,641,830,495 $328,366,099 









    
FY07 E-RA 
Appropriate % 25.22%     
    
FY08 E-RA 
Appropriate % 25.13%    
    
AVG FY07/FY08 










D.  SPEND ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR DOD AND AFCENT 
In addition to the analysis of USAF spend above, we projected potential savings 
across AFCENT contingency spend (includes Kuwait), and to operational spend for each 
military service and the DoD as a whole.6 Like the analysis above, we began with spend 
data gathering.  
First, we pulled data from FPDS-NG for each branch of the Armed Services (see 
Table 9). This provided the total spend for each year but did not yield the contract-level 
data we would need in order to calculate e-RA appropriate spend using Method 1. For 
AFCENT spend, we obtained FY08 spend data directly from AFCENT. This data lacked 
contract-level visibility but did sort procurements into three categories of spend: (1) 
commodities, (2) construction, and (3) services.  
Next, we applied a methodology consistent with both methods used in the USAF 
analysis in section “C.” For each military branch, we first added FY01-09 spend data and 
placed the total in the Total Spend column. Next, we multiplied total spend by the e-RA 
two-year average of 25 and 18% to get an e-RA appropriate total spanning nine years. 
Finally, we used both methods in part “C” to calculate potential savings. For the DoD, the 
total savings using method one resulted in $117 billion and $11.9 billion for method 2. 
This method has all of the same weaknesses identified in the USAF spend analysis but 
adds a loss in fidelity because we were unable to break down spend to the contract or 
CLIN level. Undoubtedly, each branch awards contracts differently and has a different 
percentage of construction, R&D, and non-fixed price contracts. However, by providing a 
range from maximum auctionable spend (using spend analysis) to a conservative estimate 
(using an industry benchmark), the estimates sufficiently demonstrate a significant 
potential for savings using e-RAs.  
To analyze AFCENT spend, we had to modify our approach for a number of 
reasons. First, the data provided was not directly pulled from FPDS-NG and did not have 
contract-level data. Secondly, AFCENT data is broken down into CONUS and OCONUS 
                                                 
6 AFCENT spend included the units involved in the e-RA; therefore, we elected to analyze AFCENT 
spend instead of CENTCOM data (not available) 
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spend, and for the purpose of this study, our intent was to focus only on OCONUS 
savings. AFCENT OCONUS spend includes dollar values from FPDS-NG, thus to avoid 
double counting, we excluded CONUS (AFCENT) spend because this dollar value was 
already included under USAF spend. Finally, the type of spend for OCONUS differs 
from CONUS based on the warfighter’s mission, making it necessary for us to exclude 
R&D as filtering factor.  
To address these issues, we adjusted method 1 slightly. First, we only considered 
OCUNUS spend, which according to AFCENT, was 85% of their total spend. Next, we 
had to take out construction spend, which left 78% of the OCONUS consisting of 
commodity and service-type spend. Savings were then calculated by multiplying the e-
RA appropriate spend by 20 percent. Using our two methodologies, this left a range of 
potential savings between $3 million and $23.4 million. As with previous methods, we 
caveat this for its weaknesses.  
First, the type and mix of commodities and services that are bought overseas is 
different from CONUS operations because the living conditions, infrastructure, and 
missions differ depending on the location of the contracting office and the phase of 
operations. For example, a unit at an austere location during build-up will primarily buy 
security items, concrete, gravel, and building materials. In this phase, contracts are more 
likely to be awarded sole source due to urgent and compelling circumstances. Conversely, 
a more established location during a sustainment phase may shift spending to morale, 
welfare, and recreation (MWR) requirements. Another weakness is an assumption that 
the number of qualified and interested vendors overseas is similar to that of U.S. markets, 
and that internet access and use is not an impediment. In reality, contingency contracting 
officers (CCOs) are often limited to a small pool of vendors who can meet their time, 
performance, and schedule needs. Finally, as with the DoD in general, we were unable to 
sort data at the contract or CLIN level, which means we had to assume everything was 






Table 9.   DoD and AFCENT Spend Analysis Results 
Organization 
 
































$197,030,573,008 $35,279,475,857 $3,645,645,373 
USN 
 
$600,671,375,441 $151,219,018,767 $26,660,817,006 $2,732,270,422 
DoD $2,324,437,837,203 
 
$585,177,225,516 $117,035,445,103 $11,994,099,240 
OCONUS Contingency Level  
Organization Total AFCENT e-RA Appropriate Potential Savings Potential Savings 
     









E.  IDENTIFYING GOOD E-RA CANDIDATES (EAM MODEL) 
During our literature review, we identified a “lack of training” as a significant 
structural barrier to e-RA use. The goal of this section then, is to reduce the learning 
curve for Contracting Officers who want to use e-RAs but do not know where to start. 
The acquisition process starts with a strategy based on requirements and market research. 
Thus, we developed a model that helps identify requirements that will (1) produce 
significant savings, and (2) reduce the risk of a bid protest. The e-RA Appropriateness 













Do a sufficient number of 
technically qualified suppliers 
exist (3-5)?
Are the requirements highly 
specifiable?
Does your organization have 
personnel trained in eRA 
usage?
Will leadership support eRA 
as part of the acquisition 
strategy?
Is a sufficient number of 
suppliers attracted to your 
business?
Does the category of spend 
(Kraljic, 1983) necessitate a 
strong buyer-supplier 
relationship?
If you have a transaction 
cost associated with eRA, 
will your estimated savings 
exceed your transaction 
costs?  
Are 3rd party eRA service 
providers or software 
available?
Does technological 
infrastructure preclude the 
use of eRA?
If conducting the 
procurement in regions 
where it is not customary, do 
cultural considerations make 
eRA inappropriate?
Is the requirement 
sufficiently stable (few 
changes expected)?
Is the requirement for non-
critical or leverage spend?
If your organization is 
inexperienced with eRA, are 
you willing to add some 
acquisition lead-time to 
integrate eRA to the source 
selection?
 
Figure 11.   E-RA Appropriateness Model (EAM) 
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1. Phase 1: Requirement Evaluation 
a. Step 1—Are the Requirements highly Specifiable? 
Recent studies indicate that requirements for e-RAs must be highly 
specifiable, meaning the product has clearly a defined attributes that the supplier can 
translate into unambiguous specifications (Beall et al., 2003; Carter and Kaufman, 2004; 
Hawkins et al., 2009). According to some research, a well-defined requirement and 
competition among suppliers increases the perception of e-RA appropriateness, which, in 
turn, will attract more potential bidders (Hawkins et al., 2009). Without solidity in 
requirement definition, the procurement official increases procurement risk by allowing 
offerors to bid on items that may vary in quality or function. Beall et al. (2003) explains 
that “inadequate up-front event planning” can ruin an auction (p. 9).  
b. Step 2—Will Leadership Support e-RA As Part of the Acquisition 
Strategy? 
Contracting officers who elect to use an e-RA as part of their acquisition 
strategy will have to convince their policy departments, legal counsel, commanders, and 
perhaps higher headquarters that: (1) an e-RA is appropriate, (2) it will generate savings, 
(3) it is worth the effort, and (4) it will not result in a protest. Given the general lack of 
guidance surrounding federal government use of e-RAs coupled with gaps in practitioner 
knowledge, contracting officers must have the support of leadership, particularly if their 
strategy involves incorporating an e-RA into a LPTA or full trade-off source selection 
under FAR Part 15—procurements that are typically at higher risk for bid protests. Top 
management support for e-RAs is not uncommon. “As a result of this [increased] 
transparency, most top managements not only embrace the use of e-RA tools, but in some 
cases, seeing the impressive results of early e-RAs, set aggressive goals for e-RA use in 
annual sourcing requirements” (Beall, 2003, p. 8).  
c. Step 3—Does the Category of Spend Necessitate a Strong Buyer-
Seller Relationship?  
Suppliers, in some cases, resent being evaluated solely on price so 
requirements that require a high degree of collaboration and partnering might not be good 
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candidates. Still, e-RAs and evaluating non-price factors are not mutually exclusive--
meaning that savvy buyers can evaluate non-price factors in a full trade-off, best value 
acquisition. In section “G,” we demonstrate how this is possible.  
Some researchers found that e-RAs increase the supplier’s suspicion of 
buyer opportunism (Jap, 2003), which, in turn, decreases trust and (ultimately) 
deteriorates commitment—both central constructs to relational exchange (Morgan & 
Hunt, 1994). While studies have sought a link between e-RA use and damaged buyer-
seller relationships, none has found an effect. However, buyers cannot ignore the 
evidence above that e-RAs could decrease trust, but they should consider that that trust is 
not paramount in all contracts—particularly non-critical and leverage spend (Beall et al, 
2003). 
d. Step 4—Is the Requirement Sufficiently Stable? (Few Changes 
Expected)  
Requirements that are expected to have a significant number future 
changes or modifications may negate the savings gained from an e-RA procurement. The 
CO should ensure that the requirement is stable with tight specifications to ensure the low 
probability of costly modifications. 
e. Step 5—Is the Requirement for Non-critical or Leverage Spend?  
E-RAs are not appropriate for all requirements, and (as described in step 
3) they may lower trust and commitment levels of suppliers who offer critical services 
and supplies and value a close partnership. An e-RA is more transactional and suited to 
“non-critical” and “leverage” requirements offered by many suppliers. 
2. Phase 2: Market Research 
The market research phase involves making an assessment of the supplier base, e-
RA providers, and the organic capabilities and competencies of the buying organizations. 
Contracting officers who are unfamiliar with e-RAs should build in extra lead time to 
ensure each of the steps below are addressed before moving ahead with an auction. 
Failure to conduct thorough market research--as in any procurement—increases  
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the risk of buying an inferior product or service. With e-RA, poor market research could 
result in an event with no bidders. The steps below explain how to determine whether the 
market meets the buyer’s needs. 
a. Step 1—Does a Sufficient Number of Technically Qualified 
Offerors Exist?  
FAR Part 15 requires the solicitation of at least two qualified offerors to 
satisfy competition requirements. E-RA research, however, indicates at least three or 
more are needed to generate substantial savings (Beall et al., 2003). Wagner and Schwab 
(2004) indicate that adequate competition is key for e-RA success and is often a key 
driver in the amount of savings obtained.  
b. Step 2—Are a Sufficient Number of Suppliers Attracted to your 
Business?  
Note the slight difference between finding capable suppliers and having 
suppliers who are attracted to your business. As mentioned previously, some suppliers 
prefer to compete by traditional methods or simply dislike the e-RA process. In the 
generator procurement, the ECONS commander and the e-RA service provider conducted 
extensive market research to find qualified and interested vendors prior to deciding to use 
an e-RA. 
c. Step 3(a)—If you Have a Transaction Cost Associated with e-RA 
Use, Will your Estimated Savings Exceed your Transaction 
Costs? 
Using a potential 20% savings, estimate how much savings your 
organization stands to achieve by using an e-RA. In general, larger volumes increase 
attractiveness, which leads to increased competition and higher savings. Finally, many e-
RA service providers charge a fee ranging from 1% to 10% depending on the level of 
service needed and their business model. Typical business models of e-RA service 
providers include the following. 
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• Seller pays a per-transaction fee: (% of pre-auction estimated value of 
procurement)—Winning seller pays fee, and e-RA service provider assists 
with market research, builds the e-RA in the software application, trains 
bidders, and runs the e-RA biding event (full-service option). 
• Buyer pays a per-transaction fee: (% of pre-auction estimated value of 
procurement) –e-RA service provider helps with market research, builds 
the e-RA, trains bidders, and runs the e-RA (full-service option). 
• Software-only option: Buyer acquires a license to use e-RA software, 
builds each auction, and conducts e-RAs in-house. Here, the buyer must 
provide training to bidders.  
• Outsourced option: The buyer contracts with an e-RA service provider for 
a fixed price per period of time (and/or for an estimated number of e-RA 
events), and the e-RA service provider helps with market research, builds 
the e-RAs, trains bidders, and runs the e-RA bidding events.  
In determining whether the e-RA will be cost effective, the buyer should consider any 
transaction fees, per the business models above, for using e-RA applications and/or 
support services. 
d. Step 3(b)—If your Organization is Inexperienced with e-RAs, are 
you Willing to Add Some Acquisition Lead Time to Integrate e-
RA into the Source Selection?  
Equally important is the amount of time your organization has to conduct 
market research and build a solid requirement. Initially, an organization may have to 
expend more time to increase the specifiability of the requirement. This entails writing 
instructions to offerors and evaluation criteria for award that adequately describe how the 
e-RA will be integrated into the procurement and mitigate the possibility of protests. 
e. Step 4—Are Third Party e-RA Service Providers Available?  
We recognize this step as potentially frustrating and time consuming for 
contracting officers with little-to-no e-RA experience; thus, we offer the following list of 
e-RA providers. One point worth highlighting is that providers offer varying levels of 
service ranging from software only to full service. A unit with a complex requirement 
and limited time or resources to conduct market research could benefit from the 
assistance of a full-service provider. For more seasoned e-RA contracting personnel, 
CECOM’s no-cost software might suit their needs better because experienced, available 
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in-house COs will have the requisite knowledge to build the e-RA, conduct market 
research to find and build interest in the supply base, train offerors on use of the tool, and 
conduct the bidding event. Table 10 provides contracting officers with initial points of 
contact.  
Table 10.   E-RA Providers Contact List 
E-RA Service Provider Information 
Provider Email Phone # Website Level of Service 
Ariba Contact Us Form 1-650-390-1000 www.ariba.com Full Service 




.com Full Service 
Exostar Saleslead @exostar.com 
1-703-561-
0500 www.exostar.com Full Service 
FedBid ClientServices @FedBid.com 
1-877-933-
3243 www.FedBid.com Full Service 
HedgeHog sales@hedgehog.com 1-800-208-2335 www.hegdehog.com Full Service 












3788 www.perfect.com Full Service 
Sorcity ContactUs@sorcity.com 1-800-525-2401 www.sorcity.com Full Service 
USAAVE 
(U.S. Army) 





monmouth.army.mil Software Only 
f. Step 5 and 6—Cultural Considerations and Technology 
Our research indicates that e-RAs work well in Kuwait because the 
transparency of the process coupled with the high level of trust in the USAF (Federal) 
acquisition process motivated contractors to overcome their natural resistance to 
technology. While this held true in Kuwait for this one case study, research on the 
cultural impact on e-RA (and vice versa) is still nascent. Contracting officers must be 
sensitive to the cultures of their host nations and be aware of technological barriers to 
include low internet/computer usage. Additionally, e-RAs may be welcomed in certain 




collusion, corruption, or favoritism. In this circumstance, the buyer and the supply base 
both reap the benefits of an e-RA by increasing transparency, fairness, offeror satisfaction, 
and overall competition.  
3. Phase 3: Execution  
a. Step 1—Does your Organization have Personnel Trained in e-
RA Usage?  
According to feedback we received from AFCENT, a lack of familiarity 
with the e-RA process is a major deterrent for use. Given the lack of guidance and high 
operational tempo, it is no wonder contracting officers are not using e-RAs—they are too 
busy and not otherwise incentivized to do so. One of the major reasons the Kuwait 
generator procurement was successful was the experience the squadron commander 
brought to the table from an Education with Industry internship and from doctoral studies. 
Inexperienced personnel may “risk many problems and may contribute to the negativity 
in that they may not adhere to sound guidelines or follow through with an award, making 
it distasteful for suppliers” (Sorcity, personal correspondence, March 26, 2009). The 
EAM and process models should give contracting officers a head start but a certain 
amount of experiential learning should be incorporated into the acquisition plan. Notably, 
the learning curve for integrating e-RA use into federal procurements should level off 
quickly—to the point where e-RAs may save acquisition lead-time as is common in 
industry (Beall et al., 2003). 
F.  BUILDING A FAR-COMPLIANT E-RA  
While e-RAs are being used by the Army and Navy, most of their auctions focus 
on simple commodity buys pursuant to FAR Part 13. The Army’s policy requires e-RA 
use below the SAT ($100K). Additionally, FedBid, a commonly-used e-RA service 
provider by DoD agencies, prefers transactions below the SAT threshold. Appendix I 
provides a snapshot of items (primarily commodities) procured through FedBid. While 




same time period, the DoD has ceded a potential of $12 billion to $117 billion by not 
including e-RAs as a pricing tool for many of its e-RA-appropriate requirements (See 
method 1, part C). 
According to CECOM, there are several reasons contracting officers are not using 
e-RAs for more complex, best value acquisitions pursuant to FAR Part 15. First, simple 
auctions are easiest to set-up and execute. CECOM’s software allows contracting officers 
to build and execute their own auctions; however, “for some reason, contracting officers 
prefer to have a helpdesk control this function” (M. Meinert, personal correspondence, 14 
July 2009). Another reason is complexity, both on the side of the buyer and supplier. 
CECOM’s USAAVE platform has the capability to conduct multi-line auctions, as well 
as full-trade off auctions with non-price factors, such as delivery schedule, warranty, 
quality, etc.). To date, contracting officers have steered away from the tool because it 
may be perceived that adding non-price factors into an auction may increase the chance 
of protest through the use of a computer-based formula to determine the winner. Finally, 
the lack of best-value e-RA experience among practitioners has resulted in a natural 
barrier to implementation. Contracting officers who want to incorporate e-RAs into best 
value acquisitions face a learning curve, increased protest risk, and—at least initially—
added procurement lead time.  
Therefore, we provide contracting officers FAR-compliant process flows for most 
types of source selections ranging from simplified acquisitions to full trade-off 
procurements pursuant to FAR Part 15. These flowcharts should help reduce their 
learning curve, minimize protest risk, and provide guidance for implementation by 
explaining the e-RA-specific tasks and how they integrate into a federal source selection. 
Rather than address each model separately, we focus only on the SAP: LPTA model 
because it (1) has the greatest propensity for use, (2) entails the assessment of non-price 
factors, (3) can be used with minimal additional steps, and (4) uses streamlined 
procedures in accordance with FAR Part 13. Sample SAP: LPTA instructions to offerors 
and evaluation factors for award are attached in Appendices F and G, and additional 
process models for SAP: price only, SAP: trade off, FAR Part 15: LPTA, and FAR Part  
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15: full trade-off are included in Appendices W, X, Y and Z.  Figure 12 highlights extra 
steps contracting officers will need to include in their acquisitions, and the discussion 
below describes each additional step in more detail (shaded or partially shaded in orange). 
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Figure 12.   SAP: LPTA Model 
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1. Step 1—Thoroughly Define Requirement 
This block is partially shaded, which indicates the FAR already requires 
contracting officers to conduct market research and thoroughly define their requirements 
in terms of specifications, drawings, and statements of work. Simply put, the e-RA event 
adds value only when offerors clearly understand, and are bidding on equivalent supplies 
and services. Contracting officers who provide poor, vague specifications run the risk of 
assuming increased cost because winning contractors may look to increase their profit 
margins by decreasing quality or seeking changes after award in order to “get well.” The 
EAM Model (Figure 7) provides additional insight in terms of “specifiability.”   
2. Steps 2 and 3—Asses e-RA Appropriateness and Select e-RA Provider 
Contracting officers must consider a variety of factors that will determine the 
appropriateness of an e-RA. After CO determines appropriateness, selecting an e-RA 
service provider or platform that best meets their needs is next. Both of these steps are 
described in detail within the EAM (Figure 7).  
4. Step 4—Determine e-RA Lotting Strategy 
A lotting strategy, in general, allows a buyer to structure the e-RA in a manner for 
suppliers to efficiently bid on the requirement (Sorcity, personal correspondence, 26 
March 2009). It resembles a contract line item (CLIN) structure commonly found in the 
bid schedule of solicitations and contracts. For example, a buyer may have 500 lines 
items of supplies to place on contract and, after market research, may determine that that 
he or she can get maximum bidding at a better price if he or she divides them into five 
separate groups (CLINs—or bid lots). This allows suppliers to bid in subcategories that 
are more suited to their market niche or area of expertise while not having to bid on all 
CLINs/lots. Sometimes, awarding multiple contracts will allow the buyer to achieve the 
lowest total price by “cherry picking” the lowest bid from each lot. The key, according to 
Sorcity, is to balance the buyer’s needs to the supplier’s capabilities and do a market 
check. Third party providers, like Sorcity, can help identify what the optimal lotting 
strategies are based on their experience with e-RAs and their knowledge of cost drivers of 
the requirement and cost structures of the market. All of this knowledge enables buyers to 
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have successful e-RA events. In the generator e-RA, the squadron commander conducted 
initial market research and determined to use a single lot because there were sufficient 
distributors or resellers that could provide the entire lot, and multiple awards were not 
desired or practical.  
5. Step 5—Schedule e-RA 
Contracting officers should schedule the date for the e-RA after negotiations on 
non-price factors have concluded because negotiation time is highly variable. Scheduling 
entails coordinating the date of the e-RA with all participants: offerors, the buyer, internal 
customers, and the e-RA service provider.  
6. Step 6—e-RA Service Provider or Government Provide Training to 
Offerors 
It is a good idea to provide offerors training on using the bidding software prior to 
the event. Most providers offer some level of training either through a tutorial, which can 
run mock auctions for practice, or provide hands-on training. While this step seems 
straight forward, buyers needs to ensure that each of the suppliers understands the 
timeline for the e-RA, the auctioning software, the auction duration, rules regarding 
overtime, and how to handle contingencies during the bidding. Levels of support vary; 
therefore, buyers who are new to e-RAs will need to either develop their own training or 
ensure the e-RA provider is willing to provide training. Special attention should be given 
to offerors in OCONUS locations who may be unfamiliar with commerce in English or 
the speed of e-commerce. One manager stated that he spent over a week and a half trying 
to find information on e-RAs and was unprepared to place bids when the pace of the 
auction increased during the overtime period. For buyers who incorporate non-price 
factors, the increased complexity has the potential to confuse offerors and negatively 
impact their bidding strategy. Additionally, researchers also stress the importance of 
training the buyer as a key enabler for e-RA success and stress the added value of hands-
on versus video training techniques (Beall et al., 2003).  
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7. Step 7—Conduct e-RA Bidding Event 
During the actual event, buyers need to keep in mind that computers crash, the 
internet may go down, and confusion may leave offerors in need of real-time help. All of 
these contingencies should be considered during solicitation planning and be addressed in 
the instructions to offerors so offerors know the procedure for contingency situations 
during the event. Simple mechanisms, such as having the provider and buyer on 
telephone standby to be able to place and receive manual bids, pausing the auction, and 
providing real-time assistance can help overcome these hurdles. Improper handling of the 
auction itself could result in a protest, so buyers need to plan for the unexpected.  
8. Step 8—Capture e-RA and Spend Data 
An e-RA, if used properly, is a tool often used as part of a strategic sourcing 
approach toward leveraging DoD’s massive spending power. As such, organizations 
should incorporate spend goals and create control mechanism (e.g., metrics) to measure 
whether savings and efficiency goals are met. Capturing spend data helps provide buyers 
an accurate, historical database of market prices for goods and services (compared to 
non-e-RA prices), and it provides data to senior strategic sourcing planners for analysis, 
reporting, planning, goal setting, and organizational improvement.  
G.  SAFE GUARDING AGAINST PROTESTS  
A review of bid protest decisions associated with e-RAs is marginally helpfully 
because only three cases have reached the GAO in the past 10 years.7 All of these 
involved simplified acquisition procedures, and all were denied (Brown & Ray, 2007). 
The findings are helpful, however, because they indicate large, overarching issues 
associated with e-RA use in the DoD, but are limited because they do not include 
potential issues associated with e-RA use as part of larger, more complex (FAR Part 15) 
acquisition strategies. In larger acquisitions, the stakes for losing are substantially higher, 
and typically non-price factors, such as past performance, management, technical 
                                                 
7 Agency-level protest information, not available to researchers, might identify additional vendor 
concerns. Agencies were contacted but did not have a mechanism to track and record protests across 
contracting activities.  
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capability, and delivery time are evaluated. Since we posit that the latter is appropriate in 
certain circumstances, we will discuss both scenarios starting with existing, overarching 
case law.  
On July 19, 2001, the GAO denied a protest from the Pacific Island Movers Co. 
against the Department of the Navy due to the Navy’s decision to request final pricing 
proposals after the conclusion of an e-RA event. Pacific, the lowest-priced vendor at the 
end of the auction, protested on two primary grounds, (1) Pacific’s e-RA price was made 
available to other competitors, creating an unfair pricing advantage for final proposals 
and (2) Pacific had the low price at the end of the auction and, according to the (revised) 
evaluation criteria, should have won the award. The GAO denied Pacific’s requests to 
overturn the award based on case law suggesting the Navy appropriately used its 
discretion to resolve an ambiguous situation caused by multiple solicitation amendments. 
In its decision, the GAO also felt that Pacific’s decision to participate implied consent to 
disclose their prices and, since their competitors voluntarily disclosed pricing as well, no 
competitive advantage was gained (Brown & Ray, 2007).  
On October 31, 2001, the GAO denied a protest from Royal Hawaiian Movers 
against the Department of the Navy. Similar to the Pacific case, Royal Hawaiian felt the 
Navy should have awarded the contract based on its low bid during the auction. Instead, 
the Navy (again) decided to request final proposals after the conclusion of the event in 
order to clear up ambiguity caused by incorrect auction instructions in the RFP. Based on 
the Pacific precedent, the GAO denied the protest, citing that the Navy acted properly in 
order to “ensure the offerors were competing on an equal basis” (Brown & Ray, 2007, p. 
31). It is worth noting (as a point of reference for more complex acquisitions) that the 
Navy included e-RA language in the instructions to offerors that stated, “conduct of the 
reverse auction constituted discussions with the offerors” (Brown & Ray, 2007, p. 30).  
The third and final DoD e-RA case, B-295463, was submitted by the MTB Group 
against the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) on February 23, 
2005 (GAO, 2005). After losing an LPTA source selection involving an e-RA for 
housing inspection services, MTB protested on the basis that the e-RA violated OFPP Act 
41 USC 423 (a), FAR 3.104-3 and 3.104-4 because it was inappropriate for the 
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government to disclose its pricing. In this case, the GAO ruled that e-RA is appropriate 
because, in accordance with FAR 1.102(d), e-RA is not “expressly forbidden;” therefore, 
it is appropriate (Brown & Ray, 2007, p. 29). Furthermore, the GAO found (again) that e-
RA price disclosure was appropriate but added: 
[E]ven if the price disclosure were considered to be by the government 
officials due to its nature as a precondition to a vendor’s competing, the 
disclosure is pursuant, and integral, to the reverse auction procurement 
procedures established by the agency; we thus would view the disclosure 
as being to persons authorized by agency procedures to receive the 
information, consistent with exceptional language. (GAO, 2005, p. 3) 
These findings indicate important precedents for future acquisitions. First, the 
GAO considers e-RA as a process in which offerors willingly disclose their prices by 
electing to participate. Second, the government may request final proposals after the e-
RA has concluded, so long as the decision to re-open the competition is done to clarify 
ambiguity or level the playing field for participants. While this case supports the 
appropriateness of final proposal revisions after the e-RA has concluded, it may not be 
inclusive of all the cases where final proposal revisions are appropriate. Finally, e-RAs 
are appropriate for government acquisition. Now, we turn to FAR Part 15-specific 
implications. 
A review of 50 sustained GAO decisions, a GAO summary of significant cases, 
and USAF source selection evaluation lessons learned, revealed additional hazards 
contracting officers should avoid when using e-RAs in a lowest price-technically 
acceptable (LPTA) or full trade-off (best value) source selection with non-price factors. 
In the latter, price and non-price factors are evaluated in terms of the overall best value 
provided to the government in accordance with the relative weighting of each evaluation 
factor. We identify these overarching areas below.  
1.  Non-priced Evaluation Factors in a Full Trade-off with e-RA 
The award decision must be consistent with the evaluation factors listed in criteria 
for evaluation (Appendix G) of the solicitation (GAO, 2009). CECOM’s e-RA 
application has a built-in capability to evaluate dynamically and trade-off non-priced 
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factors with price, but contracting officers currently are not using this capability due to 
the perceived complexity it adds by assigning quantitative, weighted values to non-priced 
factors. Additionally, many agencies’ source-selection regulations and guidance prohibit 
numerical ratings and weightings and mathematically derived evaluation-scoring schemes. 
Although discouraged in all source selections, these prohibitions typically do not apply to 
acquisitions using simplified acquisition procedures. Specific guidance regarding how to 
build and use non-priced factors within an e-RA platform is necessary and, therefore, 
provided in Chapter V, Section H.  
2.  Submission, Modification, Revision and Withdrawal of Proposals 
FAR 15.208 identifies the procedures for accepting/rejecting late proposals. E-
RAs clearly fall within the guidelines of Section 15.208(1)(i) as an “electronic commerce 
method authorized by the solicitation,” but contracting officers will need to address a 
mitigation plan for system glitches to include power outages, software problems, and 
internet connectivity by all parties. In the event of a power failure or offeror connectivity 
issues, contracting officers can plan for such mishaps by having real-time phone-in bid 
accessibility or temporarily suspend the e-RA until the problem is fixed; these procedures 
must be clearly identified in the instructions to offerors to alleviate any confusion from 
participants.  
3.  Mistakes in Bids 
FAR 15.508 and 14.407-3 suggest that because an e-RA involves real-time 
bidding in which prices are changed in real-time, it is possible for vendors to make a 
mistake in real-time without a mechanism to correct its mistake (Turley, 2002). Examples 
specific to e-RA include entering an incorrect bid amount during the auction or placing 
unintentional bids due confusion or technical difficulties during the auction.  
4.  Unrealistic Pricing 
In a commercial e-RA, our research revealed that one auction award was 
overturned when a losing vendor brought forward evidence that the winning price was 
not possible within industry standards (FedBid, personal correspondence, June 15, 2009). 
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E-RAs do not replace prudent price analysis. Contracting officers must be aware of and 
prevent buying in with the intent of suppliers getting well later though post-award 
changes (Cibinic, Nash & Nagle, 2006). 
5.  Collusion 
While collusion has not been protested to date, some critics feel that a vendor’s 
auction behavior can “highlight collusion by exhibiting bidding patterns that seem to send 
signals, or by a lack of bids indicating a vendor has conceded a contract” (Turley, 2002, p. 
27). An offeror with evidence of collusion might protest an award.  
6.  Exclusion from Competitive Range 
When hosting using a third-party e-RA service provider that is unfamiliar with 
Federal procurement regulations, contracting officers may have to make an extra effort to 
ensure suppliers are not weeded out of the competition unfairly. Commercial rules allow 
purchasing managers more flexibility to handpick suppliers. Simply put, contracting 
officers need to keep in mind that e-RAs must be used within the confines of the FAR 
regardless of the advice provided by third party providers. In some cases, contracting 
officers may elect to use third-party providers to host an event because doing so adds 
market knowledge and expertise. However, doing so comes with risk for contracting 
officers because commercial rules for usage do not entail the same detailed selection, 
documentation, and approval processes as those mandated by public purchasers. Instead, 
commercial procurement managers can select top performers based on reputation, 
capabilities, experience, and past performance alone. By allowing a third-party provider 
to conduct an auction without cognizance of FAR-compliant processes, a contract officer 
increases protest risk.  
7.  Unbalanced Prices 
FAR 15.404-1(g)(1) identifies a situation in which an exceptionally high or low 
price of one or more contract line items adds unacceptable risk to the overall procurement. 
Accordingly, if the contracting officer determines an offer as materially unbalanced, 
he/she may eliminate the offeror from the competitive range or elect to reject the offer 
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outright (FAR 15.404-1(g)(2)(i); FAR 15.404-1(g)(3). In three GAO cases, we reviewed 
regarding unbalanced prices, the GAO ruled on the side of the contracting officer—as 
long as clause 52.217-5 was included in the solicitation,(B-219444, 1985) the contracting 
officer used unbalanced pricing as the basis for a non-responsibility determination (B-
227304, 1987), and the structure of the evaluation factors did not force contractors to bid 
unevenly (B-244682.2, 1991). This is applicable to e-RAs because offerors typically bid 
on the total contract price, but contracts are often structured with multiple Contract Line 
Item Numbers (CLINs) and subordinate CLINs. Contracting Officers conducting e-RAs 
with multiple CLINS should evaluate the price of each CLIN to ensure one low price 
does not add risk to the procurement as a whole. In a two-step procurement, this could be 
done by evaluating initial proposals, or after the auction just prior to the award 
determination.  
8.  Evaluate IAW the Evaluation Factors Stated in the RFP 
Among the four top reasons for GAO protests was a failure to award based on the 
evaluation factors (CRS, 2009; GAO, 2009). Since we are proposing e-RA use as part of 
a FAR 15 full-trade off, and adding non-price evaluation factors adds complexity (and 
potential supplier confusion) to the procurement, contracting officers will need to ensure 
that auction procedures and evaluation criteria established in the solicitation are followed 
precisely.    
9.  Eliminate Internal Inconsistencies in the RFP 
In the case of Pacific Island Movers (discussed above), unclear language in 
Section “L” regarding the auction end time confused Pacific (Brown & Ray, 2007). As a 
result, the company protested because its bid was the lowest at the end of the auction (per 
solicitation instructions) and that overtime bids should not count. The lesson learned here 
is that, to avoid a protest, ensure that the instructions to offerors are clear and consistent 
regarding how the auction will end.  
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10.  For Part 15 Full Trade-off Source Selections, Keep it Simple 
A review of USAF protests indicated that complicated source selections increase 
the chances of protest due to potential disconnects between source selection evaluation 
methodology and evaluation criteria (SAF/AQC, 2001). The same holds true for e-RA 
use, particularly in a full trade-off procurement—in which multiple lots and/or objective 
scoring of non-price factors, which is possible with CECOM’s e-RA software, could 
potentially confuse an offeror during a real-time bidding event. That said, the technology 
does exist to support full trade-off acquisitions and saavy government buyers could easily 
incorporate simple multi-attribute actions with minimal guidance and support. The next 
section explains why and how.  
H. INTEGRATING E-RAS INTO FULL TRADE-OFF SOURCE 
SELECTIONS. 
E-RAs can be integrated into full trade-off source selections—either using SAP or 
formal procurements under FAR Part 15. There are three different means to do this. First, 
different e-RA service provider’s auctioning applications provide different functionality. 
Generally, many offer multi-attribute bidding where certain factors, such as price, 
delivery, and quality are assigned weights. These three factors can be dynamically bid in 
real time where a composite score indicates the best value. Since these scores are 
mathematically derived, they violate some agencies’ procurement policies (e.g., those 
that require qualitative ratings, such as color codes or adjectival ratings). Therefore, while 
this method could be used with SAP, it is not further discussed.  
The second method entails the trade-off of predetermined levels of objective non-
price factors and allows these varying performance levels during dynamic e-RA bidding. 
For example, you may need to evaluate the value of taking faster delivery or of acquiring 
higher quality. To do so would require a special construction of bid lots shown in Figure 
13. Essentially, the contracting officer would need to build a bid lot (resembles a contract 
line item) for each possible combination of levels of non-price factors—in this case 
delivery and quality. In the Evaluation Factors for Award, the solicitation would need to 
state the relative importance of price and non-price factors. Assume that, taken together, 
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non-price factors are as important as price. With the following lowest bids per offeror per 
bid lot taken from the e-RA, the Source Selection Authority’s (SSA) integrated 
assessment must consider these prices and performance levels. Figure 13 is an example of 
special bid lots that incorporate non-price factors.  
________________________________________________________________________ 
ITEM* SUPPLIES/SERVICES QTY UNIT UNIT PRICE TOTAL AMT 
0001 Firm-Fixed Price.  10 EA $_________ $__________ 
Deliver and install standby generators  
in accordance with the attached Statement  
of Work. FOB: Destination  
Delivery: 60 Days ARO. Warranty: 1 Yr 
 
0002 Firm-Fixed Price.  10 EA $_________ $__________ 
Deliver and install standby generators  
in accordance with the attached Statement  
of Work. FOB: Destination  
Delivery: 90 Days ARO. Warranty: 1 Yr 
 
0003 Firm-Fixed Price.  10 EA $_________ $__________ 
Deliver and install standby generators  
in accordance with the attached Statement  
of Work. FOB: Destination  
Delivery: 120 Days ARO. Warranty: 1 Yr 
 
0004 Firm-Fixed Price.  10 EA $_________ $__________ 
Deliver and install standby generators  
in accordance with the attached Statement  
of Work. FOB: Destination  
Delivery: 60 Days ARO. Warranty: 2 Yrs 
 
0005 Firm-Fixed Price.  10 EA $_________ $__________ 
Deliver and install standby generators  
in accordance with the attached Statement  
of Work. FOB: Destination  
Delivery: 90 Days ARO. Warranty: 2 Yrs 
 
0006 Firm-Fixed Price.  10 EA $_________ $__________ 
Deliver and install standby generators  
in accordance with the attached Statement  
of Work. FOB: Destination  
Delivery: 120 Days ARO. Warranty: 2 Yrs 
 
*Note: The government will award only one of the bid lots above in accordance with the best value evaluation 
criteria stated in the solicitation.  
________________________________________________________________________ 
Figure 13.   Bid Lots 
This bid scenario from an e-RA-enhanced procurement poses no different 
challenge or process for the SSA than any other full trade-off source selection. The SSA 
 108 
must assess the value of higher performance levels traded off against price differentials. 
Here, the SSA may choose to go with basic performance levels awarding to offeror D for 
$415,000, or award to offeror D for $518,000 and take delivery 60 days sooner. 
Alternatively, if the benefit of an extra year of warranty coverage exceeds the added cost, 
the SSA may elect to pay a quality premium of $81,000 and award to offeror C for 
$496,000. If delivery and quality are valuable, the SSA may deem the best value is 
provided by offeror C who is the lowest with a 60-day delivery and two-year warranty. 
As usual, the SSA would be constrained by the language of the solicitation as to the 
relative importance of price and non-price factors, and would need to justify the trade-
offs in writing. The benefit of executing this trade-off via an e-RA is, (1) the efficiency 
(speed and minimum effort) of negotiations in each lot (i.e., in each possible combination 
of performance levels), and (2) the benefit from the hyper-competition offered by e-RAs 
in each lot.  
Using a third method, a Contracting Officer could integrate an e-RA into a full 
trade-off source selection where objective performance levels and ratings are not possible. 
For example, if the government must, in order to manage risk, evaluate the offeror’s 
experience or technical approach, subjective ratings are necessary. In this case, the source 
selection process (Appendix M) would be nearly identical to that of a source selection not 
involving an e-RA. The only difference would be that after conducting all of the 
discussions necessary to allow offerors remaining in the competitive range to address 
weaknesses, risks, and deficiencies, the CO would then schedule and conduct the e-RA. It 
is important to note that by using an e-RA in this manner, the contracting officer may not 
award without discussions. Successive bids in an e-RA held after receipt of proposals 
would constitute proposal revisions. Also, after the close of the e-RA, the contracting 
officer must request and evaluate final proposal revisions (FPR), wherein the offeror 
could again alter its price—upward or downward. If, in its FPR, the offeror makes no 
change to its price, the offeror’s last bid price(s) in the e-RA would be the evaluated 
price(s) that would be traded off with non-price factors in accordance with the best value 
provisions of the solicitation. Figure 14 illustrates the results of the hypothetical multi-
attribute auction just described.  
 109 
 
Bid Lot 0001 Bid Lot 0002 Bid Lot 0003 
Del. 60 / Warr 1 Yr Del. 90 / Warr 1 Yr Del. 120 / Warr 1 Yr 
      
Offeror Price Offeror Price Offeror Price 
D $518,000 D $423,000 D $415,000  
B $526,000 B $441,000 B $441,000  
A $533,000 C $452,000 C $452,000  
C $534,100 A $455,000 A $453,000  
  
Bid Lot 0004 Bid Lot 0005 Bid Lot 0006 
Del. 60 / Warr 2 Yr Del. 90 / Warr 2 Yr Del. 120 / Warr 2 Yr 
      
Offeror Price Offeror Price Offeror Price 
C $589,400 C $496,000 C $496,000  
D $602,300 D $513,000 D $525,000  
B $610,000 A $527,000 A $539,000  
A $619,000 B $540,000 B $540,000  
Figure 14.   e-RA Results 
I.  OVERCOMING BARRIERS TO E-RA USE 
Contracting officers and sourcing professionals must be aware of the challenges 
and barriers presented when attempting to implement an e-RA event. These challenges 
include (but are not limited to) assumptions made in Chapter II based our literature 
review. These initial assumptions included a high operational tempo, a lack of published 
guidance from leadership, difficulties with the federal acquisition framework, and 
training concerns. This section discusses techniques for overcoming barriers in each of 
those original areas and incorporates a new barrier, local market development that 
emerged from interviews with AFCENT leadership.  
1. High Operational Tempo 
All branches of the DoD are under tight timelines for accomplishing missions. As 
the acquisition workforce declines, increased acquisition lead time becomes a constant 
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concern since sourcing professionals must fill their requirements in an expeditious 
manner with fewer and fewer procurement resources available. To combat this, sourcing 
professionals must use their acquired knowledge of e-RAs and procedures to analyze 
whether the procurement is suitable for an e-RA. The EAM can guide a CO to determine 
appropriateness quickly. Once the determination of appropriateness is made, the CO 
should follow normal sourcing procedures coupled with the additional e-RA necessary 
practices to begin the e-RA event. Commands can establish an e-RA checklist to include 
the added e-RA procedural steps needed in order to expedite the procurement process. 
2. Guidance and Leadership Support 
FAR part 1.102-1(d) implores the acquisition team (e.g., CO) to seek sourcing 
strategies that are in the best interest of the government. One such strategy is the use of 
electronic reverse auctions. As with any strategy, guidance via policy or directive is an 
effective way to influence behavior. Policies either stressing or mandating the use of e-
RAs will not only increase usage but also induce leadership to support such sourcing 
strategies and encourage their future implementation. The lack of current guidance, 
experience, knowledge and expertise by sourcing professionals deters leadership from 
pursuing e-RAs in many instances (J. Swall, personal communication, March 22, 2009). 
Leadership must put into action local guidance enforcing the use of e-RAs whenever 
practical in order to reap the cost-reducing benefits e-RAs can provide.  
3. Federal Acquisition Framework 
Contracting officers are bound to adhere to numerous statutory, regulatory, and 
agency level mandates in every procurement. An e-RA event is no different and can 
increase complexity in the sourcing environment. COs cannot circumvent the system but 
must understand the nuances and procurement risks e-RA can exhibit. An extensive 
knowledge and understanding of potential problematic areas can save not only 
acquisition lead time but also prevent future protests. As mentioned in Chapter II, an 
amendment to the FAR could authorize e-RAs as a legitimate sourcing tool, which might 
prompt more ubiquitous use (SAF/AQC, 2001; Turley, 2002).  
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4. Local Market Concerns 
E-RAs are not without their limitations, and use in foreign markets may prove to 
be difficult. COs must examine the business environment and capability of the local 
market to support an e-RA sourcing event. One interviewee remarked that the Middle 
Eastern market in not fully developed and B2B does not occur. This undeveloped market 
will require time to foster a business environment that is capable of supporting an e-RA. 
Another informant mentioned the way of doing business is still “old school” with owners 
that are reluctant to change their habits to adapt to the new modern business environment. 
Contracting officers have to be cognizant of their surroundings and skillfully understand 
the business climate to include possible cultural barriers.  
5. Training 
Although e-RAs have been instituted and employed in industry and in the military, 
relatively few people have an adequate understanding of the e-RA process and its 
execution. The DoD can invest in establishing training centers to include e-RA help desks 
(both web-based and in-person hotlines) to educate the acquisition workforce and provide 
real-time assistance to sourcing professionals (J. Swall, personal communication, March 
22, 2009). Creating and mandating a Defense Acquisition University (DAU) e-RA web-
based course would provide COs with, at a minimum, a baseline for understanding e-RAs 
and t capabilities. COs must escape from their “zone of familiarity” and seek out help 
from functional experts in the field. These subject matter experts (SMEs) could be 
deployed to the field to teach the workforce the advantages and proper implementation of 
e-RAs (J. Swall, personal communication, March 22, 2009).  
J.  SUMMARY  
This chapter provided the DoD practitioner with the tools and knowledge to 
adequately understand and utilize an e-RA in the field. It also gives procurement 
leadership an idea of how much money the DoD, USAF, and AFCENT are leaving on the 
table by not using e-RAs more. Specifically, we developed an e-RA appropriateness 
model to help contracting officers identify and execute requirements that will lead to 
increased competition, savings, and successful e-RA events. An e-RA provider POC list 
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is included, as well as an LPTA model and a best value, trade off guide for COs who 
want to use e-RA to source more complicated requirements. Next, we close with a 
discussion of managerial implications and recommendations/conclusions.  
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Our research provides both academic and practitioner utility regarding the use of 
e-RAs in both CONUS and OCUNUS. From an academic perspective, we used the case 
study and grounded theory methodologies to develop a new mid-range theory that 
enhances ‘received theories’ (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) of TAM, e-RA, and national 
cultural. We developed a conceptual model, which explains how national culture affects 
and is affected by e-RA use from buyer, seller, subcontractor and end user, and e-RA 
service provider perspectives. By theoretical sampling, coding, pattern matching, and 
constant comparison, we identified the theme of wasta as a culturally-unique 
phenomenon that, in addition to the Middle Eastern business climate, decreases 
procurement integrity, and indirectly reduces the contractor’s level of trust in the buyer, 
and the acquisition process. More importantly, we found that offerors perceived an e-RA 
as a tool that could increase fairness in the acquisition process by increasing transparency 
and overall procurement integrity. Consequently, the informants in this case study felt 
higher levels of satisfaction with the e-RA process than they did with the standard 
procurement process—even though they did not win the contract. Greater satisfaction 
with the process indicates that offerors will continue to participate in future e-RAs; thus, 
its use is sustainable in the Middle Eastern culture.  
In addition to building new e-RA theory, we provide tools and data to help DoD 
contracting officers integrate e-RAs into their source selections. First, we identify a 
potentially significant cost savings that the USAF and (DoD as a whole) could obtain 
using e-RAs. Secondly, we present an e-RA Appropriateness Model (EAM) to assist 
contracting officers in identifying requirements appropriate for e-RA sourcing. Finally, 
we provide five FAR-compliant process flow charts, which show how to incorporate e-
RA into federal procurements. Our models indicate where e-RA-specific steps are needed 
and the elements in each step necessary to reduce protest risk, increase transparency, and 
increase the effectiveness of the e-RA.  
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B.  ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
• RQ1: What are the Cultural Implications of e-RA Use in the Middle East? 
Our findings indicate that a nation’s business climate is complex and is influenced 
by many factors outside the constructs of uncertainty avoidance, power distance, 
masculinity/femininity, and individualism/collectivism proposed by Hofstede. For 
example, one major factor that influences the Middle Eastern business climate is the 
construct wasta. In Chapter IV, we discussed 31 propositions, which explain how wasta 
impacts e-RA implementation and vice versa, but the overarching contribution is twofold. 
First, e-RA increases procurement integrity, which, in turn, increases offerors’ 
satisfaction regardless of whether the offeror wins the tender, or not. This means a 
segment of the Kuwaiti market values procurement integrity and could be open to e-RA 
use. Hence, an e-RA is a sustainable acquisition strategy in this culture. Secondly, due to 
the extraordinary trust local Kuwaiti contractors place in the Federal acquisition system, 
the DoD is uniquely positioned to use e-RAs as a tool to combat the price gauging that 
plagues DoD contracting in Kuwait. Thus, buying firms considering using an e-RAs in a 
Middle Eastern culture must establish an unwavering trust in their employed sourcing 
processes and buyers from the local supply base. This finding is quite paradoxical—that a 
central tenet of relational exchange would be the key enabler to the use of a supposed 
transactional procurement venue (e-RA).  
• RQ2: How should contracting officers in the Middle East identify and 
implement potential e-RA candidates? What process would they use?  
A significant contribution of this research is the e-RA Appropriateness Model 
(EAM). The EAM outlines in three phases of the acquisition process a set of go/no-go 
questions to address in order to identify requirements appropriate for e-RA sourcing. As 
appropriateness increases, so will the effectiveness (savings and lead time reduction) of 
the e-RA (Hawkins et al., 2009). The result will be more of DoD’s scarce budget will be 
available to fund other mission priorities. The EAM also addresses key issues, such as 
market research, selecting an e-RA service provider, and assessing the competency level 
of the acquisition team in order to set realistic expectations. In short, the EAM provides a 
foundation for identifying and selecting requirements and executing e-RAs. 
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• RQ3: How can contracting officers identify and mitigate procurement 
risks specific to e-RAs?  
In Chapter V, we address 10 regulatory issues that have consistently caused 
protest to the GAO. These issues include the following. 
• Non-priced evaluation factors in a full trade-off with e-RA 
• Submission, modification, revision and withdrawal of proposals 
• Mistakes in bids 
• Unrealistic pricing 
• Collusion 
• Exclusion from competitive range 
• Unbalanced prices 
• Evaluate IAW the evaluation factors stated in the RFP 
• Eliminate internal inconsistencies in the RFP 
• For Part 15 full trade-off source selections, keep it simple 
Although only three cases involving e-RAs have been decided by the GAO, there 
is still a chance that contracting professionals who elect to use e-RA may increase protest 
risk by not minding nuances peculiar to e-RAs. Eliminating inconstancies in the RFP (#9) 
include having a plan in place to pause the event due to technical problems and including 
clear “instructions to offeror” in RFPs or RFQs, which outline bidding guidelines and 
overtime rules. To avoid unbalanced pricing (#7), contracting officers conducting e-RAs 
with multiple line items should evaluate the price of each to ensure one unrealistically 
low price doesn’t add risk to the procurement as a whole. In a two-step procurement, this 
could be done by evaluating initial proposals, or after the auction just prior to the award 
determination. Finally, as with any procurement, COs should be cognizant of unusual 
bidding behavior exhibited by offerors, possibly indicating collusion.  
• RQ4: How can contracting officers identify and overcome structural 
barriers to effect successful e-RA implementation? 
Contracting officers have been encouraged since 2001 to use e-RAs as a pricing 
tool. Unfortunately, since SAF/AQC’s guidance letter first went out, over tasked and 
understaffed contracting offices have put e-RA implementation on a back burner. This 
effort outlines the historical issues associated with e-RAs and makes recommendations to 
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address and fix disconnects between leaders who like the idea of using an e-RA but have 
not taken the time to incorporate use, metrics, and goal setting into an overall savings 
strategy. This research, by identifying e-RA service providers and their business models, 
by providing five process showing how to integrate e-RAs into Federal source selections, 
by providing a framework from which to identify requirements appropriate for e-RA 
sourcing, and by identifying protest risks, reduces many of the structural barriers that 
have hindered e-RA implementation. Therefore, the substantial savings foregone by the 
DoD in the past should be achieved in the future. 
• RQ5: What are the potential cost savings of using e-RAs domestically and 
in the Middle East? 
According to our data analysis, the USAF and DoD are leaving billions of dollars 
worth of savings on the table each year by not using e-RAs strategically. In order to 
estimate potential savings, we used a combination of methods. First, using spend analysis, 
we filtered inappropriate types of requirements out of the pool of potential spend suitable 
for e-RA sourcing. This method removed R&D, non-fixed price contracts, construction, 
and any award not awarded under full and open competition. This gave us a percentage of 
total spend that we then applied to total spend from FY01–06 and FY09 yielding 
auctionable spend for a nine year period. The second method used a more conservative 
industry benchmark of total spend (2.58%) (CAPS, 2008) in order to estimate auctionable 
spend. Running the analysis with both methods provides a range of potential savings of 
$2.59B to 25.35B for USAF spend and $11.9B to $117B for DoD CONUS spend. For the 
USAF’s expenditures supporting contingency operations (excluding spend of JCC I/A 
where e-RAs use is not as practical), foregone savings are estimated from $3M to $25.3M. 
Using the more conservative benchmark, the DoD and its agencies are clearly 
underutilizing e-RAs. Thus, paradoxically, the Government is opting out of opportunities 
for substantial savings at the same time it is seeking contract spend reductions of 7% 
(OMB, 2009).  
• RQ6: How do subcontractors in the Middle East perceive e-RAs, and what 
are the possible long-term repercussions for use? 
We examined how e-RA use, in the one particular case study, changed the market 
place in Kuwait. Evidence suggested that Kuwaiti contractors essentially altered their 
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routine method of negotiating with suppliers due to the fast-paced, real-time bidding. 
Long-term repercussions for subcontractors include, lower margins, pressure to become 
more efficient, and bottom-line pricing prior to the tender rather than renegotiations 
afterward. Additionally, as is common in e-RA use, suppliers used creative strategies to 
remain competitive. Strategies included: securing future price discounts from 
manufacturers, adjusting payment terms, and altered communications during the bidding 
event among key leaders from many members of the supply chain. If e-RA use 
proliferates, suppliers will likely have to continue to react with creative strategies in order 
to achieve and maintain a competitive advantage.  
C.  THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
This research enhances our understanding of e-RA use by combining theories of 
e-RAs, technology adoption, and national culture. Using grounded theory development, 
we extend e-RA theory in Middle Eastern cultures by unveiling- and then explaining- 
interesting and useful dynamics pertaining to procurement integrity, supplier pricing, and 
e-RA appropriateness. First, our research indicates that e-RA use can help reduce the 
negative effects of the Middle Eastern business climate (including wasta) in the private 
and public sectors by increasing transparency in an environment of distrust, favoritism, 
and collusion. In this particularly study, Kuwaiti business managers overcame their 
natural aversion to technology and innovation in order to participate in an e-RA because 
of high levels of trust in the USAF and its procurement system. Taken a step further, the 
data suggests that e-RAs can be used as a tool to build trust between buyers and sellers in 
regions of the world with similar ethical norms. 
The 2005 World Development Report cites three techniques to deal with 
corruption. 
• Increase competition whenever possible and reduce government 
interventions that lack policy justification (p. 42)  
• Reduce unnecessary ambiguity or vagueness of policies and regulations 
(p. 42) 
• Enhance transparency (p. 43) 
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Of the three methods listed above, transparency is cited as “one of the most 
promising strategies…to address corruption world-wide” (WDR, 2005, p. 43). One 
technique referred to in the report (WDR, 2005) is the use of computerization (and 
internet) to increase transparency, reduce corruption, and [therefore] improve the 
investment climate (p. 114). According to Transparency International (2009), auctions 
may serve as a good method to increase competition and reduce the likelihood of corrupt 
dealings (p. 114). Robust competition, information flow, and simple sales contracts are 
important to improve capital markets. Simply put, a trend toward acquisition reform may 
favor the use of e-RA as a tool to achieve transparency and competition policy goals for 
developing nations.  
Since 2006, 181 international economies have passed reforms strengthening 
acquisition reform to improve their business climate (Doing Business, 2009, p. 37). Areas 
covered included Eastern and Central Europe, OECD high-income earning countries (30 
countries, U.S. included, of which twenty countries originally signed the Convention on 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development on December 14, 1960), 
East Asia and Pacifica, Latin America and the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, and South 
Asia (Doing Business, 2009, p. 37). Additionally, the Global Corruption Report (2009) 
uses a corruption perceptions index (CPI) to rank countries in terms of the degree to 
which business people and country analysts perceive corruption to exist among public 
officials and politicians. Of 180 countries participating in the survey, Kuwait ranked 65th 
(p. 399), which means 115 countries have higher levels of perceived corruption. Some of 
these countries, such as China/Mexico (Tied- 72nd), Brazil (80th), India (85th) and Egypt 
(115th), are major trading partners with the U.S. We suggest these countries, like Kuwait, 
could use e-RAs as part of a strategy to increase transparency and reduce corruption. 
Given this number, there is ample opportunity for e-RAs to make a global impact on 
procurement integrity.  
Second, data suggests that e-RA use in Middle Eastern markets alters the 
supplier’s bidding process. Rather than obtaining prices from prospective subcontractors 
then renegotiating better prices if and after winning a competitive tender, suppliers 
worked with prospective subcontractors to secure more competitive pricing in advance.  
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Finally, the enhanced theory adds one more antecedent to e-RA appropriateness 
unique to Middle Eastern markets and situations prioritizing procurement lead time over 
best prices. In situations where buyers are overpaying for goods and services, e-RAs are 
appropriate tools to efficiently lower purchase costs by relying on their inherent hyper-
competition.  
D.  MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
E-RAs are certainly not new to the DoD. The U.S. Army and U.S. Navy have 
software contracts in place with differing levels of technical support available to 
contracting officers who wish to (or are required to) conduct an auction. However, our 
research indicates a myriad of issues the DoD must acknowledge and address in order to 
expand e-RA use.  
First, the DoD is failing to achieve maximum savings by limiting e-RA use to 
simplified, low-dollar acquisitions. Real savings, we argue, are obtainable through 
strategically identifying goods or services in large volume in order to maximize 
economies of scale. While focusing on simple commodities saves cycle time, our 
research indicates that contractors have more room to bargain with larger volumes.  
Secondly, fair and reasonable prices, in many cases, are not being obtained where 
e-RAs are appropriate but not being used—by an average margin of 20% (Cohn, 2000). 
While fair to the seller, prices obtained without an e-RA are hardly fair to the buyer, and 
certainly not reasonable. For example, by obtaining at least two offers/quotes, COs 
declare their prices to be F&R; whereas, in reality, they may not be. According to 
researchers, “the mere presence of competition is inadequate to assure that the prices 
proposed are fair and reasonable” (Cibinic and Nash, 1998, p. 1313). Additionally, COs 
and buying activities are not held accountable for obtaining the best price/cost. While 
acquisition professionals must secure the best value (FAR 1.102-1), this is a nebulous 
term. It is true that more goes into value than price/cost alone. However, when industry 
procures the same or similar commercial items and services for much lower prices/costs 
using e-RAs, the government's best value determinations are, at best, suspect and, at 
worst, irresponsibly erroneous.  
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Government buying activities are principally assessed by three metrics: contract 
award dollars, number of contracts awarded, and procurement lead time (Cavadias, 2004). 
The Government Performance Results Act of 1993 requires that organizations measure 
themselves against desired outcomes. Apparently, price/cost performance is not a 
desirable outcome since metrics to this effect are not used. Research of the many studies 
conducted by the Navy indicates that the hierarchy may not be interested in how efficient 
a contracting office performs. Instead it appears that they are more interested in 
appeasing the interests of their many stakeholders” (O’Sullivan, 2003, p. 67). 
Thirdly, in contrast, industry procurement activities are brutally held accountable 
for price/cost. Common metrics include: “1. target prices—based on cost reduction goals, 
product/service budgets, and/or competitor prices; 2. Cost reduction (comparing actual 
prices paid in a current period to actual prices paid in a prior period); 3. Rate of actual 
price change to market index rate of change; [and] 4. “Cost avoidance” (Carter, Monczka, 
and Mosconi, 2005, p. 17). In this context, cost avoidance refers to the amount of money 
that would have been spent if purchasing and supply had not taken appropriate action. 
According to Carter and Monczka, “There is enormous waste in government 
procurements…[and] the problem is not the people, it is the processes being used” (p. 15). 
As one official put it, “The last of the major changes that needs to be made...is a shift 
toward e-business (Gansler, 2002, p. 15).”  
Finally, the federal government has a mandate from the OMB to reduce contract 
spend by seven percent by FY2011 (OMB, 2009). Further, the OMB mandated that 
agencies must negotiate more favorably-priced contracts—insinuating that the 
government is nowhere close to F&R prices/costs. E-RAs generate, on average, 20% 
savings (Cohn, 2000). What if an agency could say: I take your seven percent, and raise 
you 13?  
The following recommendations provide a way forward. 
• Recommendation #1: Add e-RA data collection to CARs and to FPDS-
NG. Capture that an e-RA was used, whether it encompassed an 
evaluation of non-price factors, and savings from the IGE.  
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Rationale: Our data suggests the DoD could potentially save billions of 
dollars using e-RA strategically. CAR fields designed to track e-RA 
specific data will assist leadership in assessing e-RA use for goal setting, 
reporting, and planning purposes.  
• Recommendation #2: The USAF should set goals for use and routinely 
track progress toward goals.  
Rationale: CAPS research indicates a “top-down implementation 
approach to e-RAs is more effective than a bottom-up approach in 
minimizing resistance from other functional areas in the organization 
(Beall, 2003 p. 42).” Top-down goals and progress checks will help 
planners set new goals while keeping pressure on subordinate units to 
perform and be accountable for operating costs.  
• Recommendation #3: E-RA use should be evaluated by DCMA when 
conducting contractor purchasing system reviews to ensure contractors are 
securing F&R prices from subcontractors. 
Rationale: Firms outsource most of their revenue to suppliers. If prime 
contractors are not maximizing e-RA use, then prices (that are ultimately 
passed on to the U.S. government) are likely higher than they could be. 
While e-RAs force contractors to squeeze profit margins, they also force 
suppliers to become more efficient—to reduce their costs of operating  
• Recommendation #4: Each military department (possibly DoD) and each 
civilian agency should build the supporting structure to support e-RA use. 
This includes:  
• Establishing a center of excellence: As part of the ongoing 
strategic sourcing effort, we also recommend that the USAF (or 
DoD as a joint effort) stand up an e-RA center of excellence 
embedded with the Installation Acquisition Transformation 
leadership (IAT) at Wright Patterson AFB.  
Rationale:  
• An e-RA is a tool ideally suited for highly-specifiable 
goods and services where at least 3–5 capable vendors are 
interested in competing. Although e-RAs can be used for 
small procurements, strategically consolidating 
requirements can increase the attractiveness of the tender 
and give prime contractors more leverage to negotiate price 
reductions with suppliers. Strategically buying items like 
furniture, computers, and medical supplies could result in 
savings of 15–20% (Cohn, 2000). These types of 
procurements generally fall under the purview of 
commodity council sourcing.  
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• The USAF lacks corporate knowledge on e-RA use. A 
centralized (and deployable) team could help identify 
suitable requirements and provide hands-on guidance and 
support to CONS/ECONS commanders who want to push 
e-RA use in their units both CONUS and OCONUS.  
• IAT leadership has spend data analysis support available to 
assist the e-RA team identify potential candidates across 
the USAF and root out potential problems with data 
accuracy. 
• E-RAs are best used as part of a strategic purchasing 
portfolio. It is not appropriate for all transactions; thus, 
leadership will need to work closely with commodity 
council leaders to set goals, track spend and savings, and 
develop strategies to incorporate e-RAs into SAP, full 
trade-off, and LPTA source selections. 
• Experts on e-RA software and provider solutions can 
greatly reduce the learning curve for contracting officers 
who lack e-RA experience but desire to incorporate 
auctions into their acquisition plans.  
• A common industry practice is to staff an e-sourcing 
manager whose role it is to help orchestrate e-RAs. 
• Developing and deploying e-RA training—including a DoD-level 
e-RA guide.  
Rationale: The USAF is behind the curve regarding e-RA use. The 
other branches are saving millions of dollars annually for the 
procurement of similar products and services. Like the other 
branches, we recommend the USAF  develop new guidance to 
contracting officers, which pushes e-RA use for appropriate 
requirements. Given the high operational tempo, it is unlikely that 
contracting officers will take the additional time necessary to learn 
the nuances of e-RA use. To that end, we have provided tools, 
templates, and guidance to help give them a head start.  
• Source an e-RA service provider based on expected annual volume 
of e-RAs in order to avoid the approximate 3% fee for each e-RA 
transaction.  
Rationale: E-RA use makes sense when the savings outweigh the 
costs of setting up the auction. Hiring a provider at a cost lower 
than the expected 3% of annual volume sourced via e-RA could 
increase the government’s savings. For example, if projected 





to providers would total $600 million. Contracting a provider for 
$2 million could net the DoD $598 million on top of the savings 
from each e-RA.8 
• Incorporate e-RA training through the DAWIA certification 
process.  
Rationale: DAU, CECOM and NAVICP all offer user guides, 
which combined with elements of this project, could quickly be 
combined into a user guide for contracting officers. Some software 
solutions, such as that of CECOM’s USAAV, offer hands-on 
training through mock auctions to augment written content. 
Regardless, incentivizing e-RA use, either through a top-down 
push or career incentives, such as dedicated e-RA performance 
awards for individuals and units and stratification in performance 
reports, is the next logical step towards increasing the scope and 
breadth of use.  
E.  AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
During our research, a number of potential areas for additional research evolved, 
which due to time and resource constraints, were outside of our scope. The following 
areas could provide added value to the DoD as a buying activity or to e-RA theory in 
general.  
• Explore why the USAF has Lagged other Services in e-RA Use 
Our research indicates that SAF/AQC invested a substantial effort researching the 
appropriateness of e-RA within USAF acquisition. As a result, guidance in 2001 
supported the use of e-RAs but left the decision to contracting officers on a case-by-case 
basis. Since that time, very few e-RAs have been conducted by the USAF while the other 
branches have conducted hundreds, saving over $100M from 2000-2009. Was 
operational tempo too high after 9/11? Where there competing objectives? Was the ball 
dropped? Researchers should explore the slow diffusion to understand better the 
structural barriers in place.  
 
 
                                                 
8 CECOM’s USAAVE tool is already in place and free of charge for federal agencies, provided they 
agree to build the support structure needed to sustain agency use.  
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• Conduct other e-RAs in the Middle East to validate/test our findings.  
One limitation of this effort was that we were limited to one event between the 
USAF and Kuwaiti vendors. In order to test our findings, researchers should conduct case 
studies of additional e-RAs within the Middle East in both the private sector and between 
the DoD and industry. Questions to consider include, does wasta affect e-RA 
participation or use in other countries within the Middle East? Do e-RAs reduce the 
effects of collusion and corruption found in similar areas of the world? Are there 
additional cultural considerations impacting the use of e-RA that we did not discover? All 
of these questions require additional, empirical research. 
• Explore the variances in contracting systems that cause inaccurate spend 
data 
During our CLIN-level analysis of FY07 and FY08 USAF spend data, we 
discovered that it was not possible to accurately categorize and sort transactions into 
strategic “buckets” because the PSC/FSC data was either not entered at the CLIN level or 
contract writing systems are not capturing and importing the data into FPDS and CBIS. 
Additional research into the causes of low data fidelity could help strategic sourcing 
leadership conduct more accurate spend analyses and increase the effectiveness of their 
strategic planning efforts.  
• Based on the findings of this research, explore other nationalities to 
determine which cultures present the best opportunities for e-RA use 
Our findings indicate that Hofstede’s dimensions of national cultural, combined 
with specific cultural phenomenon, such as wasta, create an environment that is 
appropriate for e-RA use. Because our case study was limited to Kuwait, other 
researchers should conduct similar studies in other developing countries to explore 
whether similar or other novel phenomenon affect e-RA use and outcomes. 
• Conduct an industry study to determine the amount of e-RA usage, what is 
currently being bought, how it is being bought, and how buys are managed 
(metrics, management, reporting, systems, etc…), percentage of total 





During this project, we struggled to find recent e-RA industry spend data. One 
study, conducted by CAPS in 2008, showed a decrease of industry spend from 3.6% of 
total procurement dollars to 2.58%. However, given the 4% response rate, the recent 
400% increase in interest to Sorcity, and the global economic crisis, actual use may be 
higher.  
F.  LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH  
This research was not without limitations. First, the theory surrounding e-RA use 
and national culture was developed from a single case study. Ideally, we would have 
preferred to compare responses from informants across multiple bidding events in order 
to increase the range, number, and depth of observations contained in the data” that help 
build credibility (Charmaz, 2006, p. 182), limiting our findings to interviews, data, and 
surveys of participants in one event restricted our constant comparison methodology. 
Discovering additional phenomenological nuances in our resulting theory of e-RA use 
and national culture may have been stymied by a lack of exposure to more cases. Still, 
we made every effort to increase credibility by triangulating data (Yin, 2009), and by 
including interviews of the entire logistic chain from end users to a second tier supplier. 
We also applied constant comparison across informants by repeatedly engaging the 
different offerors who competed in the e-RA. 
A second limitation was resources. Due to funding and time constraints associated 
with our MBA program, we were unable to return to the field to conduct follow-up 
interviews in person. Face-to-face interviews could have provided subtle body language 
cues as we discussed sensitive issue, such as procurement ethics and wasta. Instead, 
follow-up interviews were conducted over the phone after written responses to 
questionnaires were received.  
A final limitation was the methodology we used to conduct the spend analysis. 
Each method had inherent weaknesses based on the fidelity of data and time/resource 
constraints. For example, due to the inaccuracy of CLIN-level data from FPDS-NG, we 
had to conduct our data analysis at the contract level. This essentially means that large 
cost-type contracts may have included smaller fixed price CLINS that were appropriate 
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for e-RA use, but would be excluded from our analysis since it was all coded as cost 
reimbursement. Additionally, FY2001–2006 FPDS-NG data pulls were limited to total 
spend because contract level data for the USAF, Navy, and Army was not available or 
accurate prior to FY07. According to Monterey Consultants Inc., earlier data was 
collected from numerous contract writing systems, which had conflicting fields and failed 
to include spend under $25K. To overcome these limitations, we conducted a thorough 
and repeatable spend analysis for FY07 and FY08, then applied our percentage of e-RA-
appropriate spend to top-level spend from AFCENT, the Navy, and the Army.  
G.  SUMMARY 
While the e-RA is not appropriate for every transaction, our analysis indicates the 
DoD is leaving billions of dollars on the table by not incorporating them into larger 
acquisitions of involving non-critical and leverage types of spend (Kraljic, 1983). Put into 
perspective, the potential savings generated by e-RA use over the past nine years could 
have been used to buy the following high priority platforms using the most conservative 
method of analysis (CAPS #2 methodology). 
• USAF: (65) RQ-1 Predators. Price: $40 million each (Air Force Fact 
Sheet, 2009) 
• USNAVY: (78) F-18 E/F. Price: $35 million each (U.S. Navy, 2009) 
• USA: (2,800) MRAPS II: RG-33s. Price: $1,301,974 each (Army Guide, 
2009) 
Our analysis sends an important message: An e-RA is a powerful tool that, if used 
appropriately, has the potential to increase transparency, competition, efficiency, and 
taxpayer savings. The tools we provide are a step in the right direction, designed 
specifically to help contracting officers overcome structural barriers including training, 
operational tempo, and a lack of e-RA policy/guidance.  
Specifically, our processes and models should help contracting officers select 
appropriate e-RA requirements, contact e-RA service providers for assistance if 
necessary, and appropriately structure e-RAs for optimal savings, compliance with the 
FAR, and minimal risk.  
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The savings generated by this case study were impressive but not unique. Since 
mid-2000, the Army and Navy have used e-RAs to save over $100M while increasing 
awards to small business and decreasing their lead time for simplified acquisitions 
(Fedbid, 2009a; M. Meinert, personal correspondence, July 14, 2009). Given the current 
push to leverage the DoD’s spending power though strategic sourcing, e-RAs offer DoD 
leadership a proven, transparent, and readily available mechanism to create value through 
substantial cost savings and process efficiencies. This study also shows that an e-RA is 
one tool that the DoD is uniquely positioned to use in the Middle East because of the 
levels of trust and perceived fairness local vendors place on the Federal Acquisition 
system. To them, e-RAs provide an opportunity to compete on an equal playing field 
outside the reach of corrupt influences, wasta, and collusion that plague the Middle 
Eastern business climate. Key contributions include: (1) an e-RA Appropriateness Model, 
(2) five source selection flow charts designed to integrate e-RAs into a variety of Federal 
source selections, (3) spend analyses identifying levels of spend -appropriate for e-RA 
sourcing by each military branch, and (4) a new mid-range theory of e-RA use and 
national culture identifying wasta and trust in the buyer as significant additions to e-RA 
theory.  
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APPENDIX A. E-RA QUESTIONNAIRE 
Research Questionnaire/Interview Guide 
Electronic Reverse Auction (e-RA) Case Study 
USAF Procurement of 23 Standby Generators 
Solicitation F38604-08-R-S014 
 
Researchers: Adam Coyne, Michael Collins 
 
 
Thank you for your time, effort, and willingness to assist in this important research 
project. The purpose is to document several aspects of the e-RA that the U.S. Air Force 
recently used to procure 23 standby generators for Ali Al Salem Air Base, Kuwait. The 
goal is to help others better understand the use of the e- RAs as an e-commerce tool, 
including its advantages, disadvantages, limitations, antecedents, and outcomes for 
buyers and suppliers (including subcontractors). Ultimately, we intend to publish the 
results of the research in a peer-reviewed academic journal; we will provide you a copy.  
  
Your identity, including your company’s identity, will be kept confidential (unless you 
specifically grant permission to use your company’s name). Additionally, your input will 
not be provided to the 386th Expeditionary Contracting Squadron (ECONS). Our sole 
purpose is research-related, with no intent to impact or otherwise influence any 
transaction—past, present, or future—between your company and the U.S. Air Force. 
This project does not involve greater than minimal risk and involves no known 
reasonably foreseeable risks or hazards greater than those encountered in everyday life. 
No tangible compensation will be given for your participation.  
 
Confidentiality: All records of this study will be kept confidential, and your privacy will 
be safeguarded. No information will be publicly accessible that could identify you as a 
participant without your express authority to do so. Your input will be identified only as a 
code number on all research forms/data bases. Your name on any signed document will 
not be paired with your code number in order to protect your identity. Records of your 
participation will be maintained by NPS for three years, after which they will be 
destroyed. Any audio recordings will be destroyed within six months of project 
completion. 
 
Your participation is strictly voluntary, and if you agree to participate, you are free to 
withdraw at any time without prejudice.  
 
Should you have any questions or comments regarding this project upon the completion 
of your participation, you should contact the Principal Investigator, Capt Adam V. Coyne. 
Any other questions or concerns may be addressed to the Institutional Review Board 
(IRB) Chair, Background and Business Practices 
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1. How do you normally procure supplies? Please describe how, for example, how 
you would normally go about buying and installing generators for a non-USAF 
customer. From what supplier(s) would you buy?  
2. Please describe how conducting business with the USAF for generators was 
similar/different than with Kuwaiti Companies? Other foreign companies? For the 
USAF’s generator procurement, did you do anything out of the ordinary in 
preparing for the tender? Did you contact suppliers that you would not normally 
have contacted? 
3. Prior to this acquisition, what was your knowledge of Electronic Reverse 
Auctions? Auctions in general? Had you ever participated in one? Have you 
since? 
4. Why did you decide to participate/bid in the E-RA? Top reasons?  
5. If another non-U.S. Government customer asked you to compete in an E-RA, 
would you do it? What reservations would you have? If the answer “depends,” 
what factors would influence your decision? 
6. At the time of this event, describe your dealings with the Contracting Officer. Did 
you interact with her often? Did that interaction impact your decision to compete?  
7. Was Sorcity.com helpful in preparing for the E-RA? In what ways did 
Sorcity.com help you prepare for the E-RA bidding event? 
8. Do you continue to receive RFPs from the 386 ECONS since the RFP for the 
generators? 
9. If so, did you continue to bid?  
10. The pre-bid strategy process:  
11. How, if at all, did the E-RA alter your normal bidding strategy? Would it have 
been different if the buyer were a Kuwaiti company?  
12. Did the USAF’s use of an E-RA influence you to alter your normal supply chain 
(i.e., your suppliers, or the brand of generators you chose to bid)? If so, how? 
13. How did the e-RA impact your initial proposal price? Was it higher or lower than 
a normal LPTA procurement? Would your initial proposed price have been higher 
or lower if the tender did not involve an E-RA?  
14. What strategies do your suppliers/subcontractors usually use when competing for 
your contracts? Do they typically submit inflated prices, then do you negotiate 
them down later? Or, do they submit the lowest possible offer the first time?  
15. After selecting a subcontractor for a tender and winning the contract, do you 
further bargain a lower price with the selected subcontractor?   
16. Prior to the bidding event, did you establish an absolute lowest bid that your 
company would/could bid? Did you stick to it during the E-RA bidding?  
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17. Since you moved a large quantity (i.e., lots of inventory) of generators in this sale, 
did you secure future discounts or other benefits from your supplier(s) (e.g., 
discounts on future inventory replenishment order)?  
18. Of the 23 generators ordered by the USAF, how many were in stock within 
Kuwait on the day of the bidding event? _______ 
19. Do you believe that your supplier’s need to offload surplus inventory enabled you 
and your supplier to bid as low as you did?  
20. Why did you choose the supplier you did?  
21. Do you believe the USAF’s technical proposal submission and evaluation 
sufficiently weeded out companies that were not qualified to perform the project 
to the technical specifications and schedule?  
22. About how many hours did you spend learning how to participate in the auction? 
Was your time/effort well spent?  
23. Prior to the bidding event, did you know the identity of any other companies you 
would be competing against?  
24. Were you reluctant to compete in the e-RA? If so, why?  
25. At the time you received the RFP for generators, can you characterize your 
company’s financial condition—considering cash flow, profitability, market share, 
revenue, and owner’s equity? Would you rate your company’s financial condition 
as: very poor, poor, somewhat poor, neither poor nor strong, somewhat strong, 
strong, or very strong?  
26. Did your firm’s financial condition impact your decision to compete in the e-RA? 
Did the Kuwaiti economic condition impact your decision to compete in any way? 
If so, how? 
27. Do you believe that by not using an e-RA, the USAF probably overpays for some 
supplies/services? 
28. In general, do you believe the USAF gets as good a price when not using an e-
RA? Do you believe the USAF gets an overall good value on its purchases when 
not using an e-RA? Do you believe the USAF gets a fair and reasonable price 
when not using an e-RA? Why or why not?  
29. Do you believe that using an e-RA, in concert with a technical proposal 
evaluation, was appropriate for buying the generators? Why or why not?  
30. Do you believe that using an e-RA without requesting and evaluating any 
technical proposals for the generators would have been prudent (i.e., selecting the 
“winner” solely on price)? Why or why not?  
31. In general, do you see e-RAs more as an opportunity or as a threat? Would you 
use them to purchase supplies or services for your firm? Do you think your 
competitors would use e-RAs?  
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32. Did you believe the specifications/statement of work (as amended) was very clear 
(unambiguous) and thorough?  
33. Did you believe the solicitation (RFP) clearly stated the basis for contract award?  
34. Do you believe the solicitation completely and clearly stated the requirements for 
proposal submissions?  
35. Do you believe the solicitation clearly explained the e-RA bidding process? How 
could it have been made clearer? 
36. Prior to the bidding event, what did you perceive to be the greatest risks to your 
company in participating in the e-RA?  
37. Had you won the e-RA bid, would you have “talked it up” with your peers, 
friends, business associates, or family? If so, why? 
38. Do you think that by winning the e-RA bid, your firm’s reputation might have 
been improved? Your personal reputation might have improved? If so, why? 
39. If you had won, would you have marketed this to other customers, competitors, or 
suppliers? If so, why? 
40. Did you believe your firm could earn some clout by winning the USAF’s e-RA 
tender? If so, why? 
41. To what extent did you participate in the e-RA because it was something new, and 
you wanted to experience it or learn about it?  
42. In general, how would you characterize your firm’s relationship with the USAF? 
Choose one of the following: strictly transactional, a series of discrete 
transactions/contracts, a long-term relationship with some mutual dependence, a 
long-term partnership with mutual and total dependence, or a strategic alliance?  
43. Prior to the RFP for the generators, had you done business/contracted directly 
with the 386 ECONS? If not, did you participate in order to get in the door (i.e., 
the prospect of additional future business)? 
44. When you bid for the generators, how badly did you or your chosen 
subcontractor/supplier need to sell off inventory?  
45. When you decided to submit a proposal in response to the RFP, how would you 
characterize your competitive positioning/competitive advantage? Much stronger 
than the competition? Weaker? Same?  
46. When you decided to submit a proposal in response to the RFP, please describe 
what you thought were your chances of ultimately winning the tender/contract? 
47. In preparation for the e-RA, did you have any dialogue with an e-RA distributor 
or manufacturer? If so, what was the nature of the discussions?  
48. Did any generator supplier (distributor or manufacturer) influence you to 
participate in the e-RA?  
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49. How badly did your firm need to win the tender in order to gain the revenue 
and/or profits from the sale?  
50. Similarly, how badly did your firm want to win the tender in order to gain the 
revenue and/or profits from the sale?  
51. Prior to submitting a proposal, did you believe the CO would do what she said she 
would in the RFP? Did you believe the CO would follow the evaluation process 
stated in the RFP? Do you feel the CO followed the procedure stated in the RFP? 
Do you believe the evaluation process was fair? Do you believe the evaluation 
process was biased toward any particular bidder? 
52. By using the e-RA, did you think Maj. Gambrel was taking advantage of your 
firm? Behaving opportunistically? Trying to achieve a lower price for the USAF’s 
while deliberately and knowingly harming your firm?  
The bidding event: 
53. During the bidding event, how did you manage the bidding? How did you 
communicate with your suppliers to react in real-time to competing price drops?  
54. Did you remain in contact with your supplier(s) during the bidding event ?  
55. Who did your bidding? Was there collaboration prior to each bid or was the 
decision autonomous?  
56. During the bidding event, did you obtain further price concessions from your 
supplier?  
57. Did you suspect any nefarious behavior by the USAF? (For example, some 
suppliers are suspicious that the buyer will create “phantom bidders” to 
fraudulently act as one of the bidding suppliers in order to bid the price down 
lower.) Did you suspect the USAF of partaking in such behavior? Why or why 
not?  
Business Culture: 
58. Prior to the generator’s procurement, had you, or your company ever participated 
in a reverse auction in the Middle East? How was it similar or different to your 
USAF e-RA experience?  
59. Is e-RA a sourcing tool used in the Middle East? If not, why do you think this is 
so? Why should Middle Eastern companies use e-RAs? Why do you believe it 
has/has not been widely adopted in the Middle East?  
60. In the Middle East, how would you characterize business transactions and pricing 
(e.g., transparent, open, honest, absence of deceit, absence of withholding 
information, some deceit, some withholding of information)?  
61. In the Middle East, is it common for competing suppliers to discuss business 
opportunities prior to the tender? If so, do they disclose or share bidding 
strategies? Do they disclose teaming arrangements? Do they share prices prior to 
the tender?  
 134 
62. If some “sharing” of information among competing suppliers occurs (as 
referenced in Question #59 above), do you think the buyer’s use of e-RAs would 
reduce, limit, or prevent such pre-bid discussions? If yes, how would an e-RA 
curtail pre-bid communication? 
63. How does your company feel about e-Commerce? Any barriers in the Middle 
East?  
64. Is friendship or a personal relationship important in your business strategy? Is it 
important to have a friendly relationship? 
65. In your opinion, could religion impact e-RA use?  
Outcome(s): 
66. Overall, was the E-RA a positive or negative experience? Why?  
67. At project completion (all units delivered and installed), did your firm perform to 
the USAF’s expectation? Do you believe the USAF is pleased with your 
company’s performance? On a scale of 1—10, with 10 being completely satisfied 
and 1 being completely dissatisfied, how do you believe the USAF would rate 
your company’s performance on the generator project?  
68. Do you believe that the USAF’s use of an e-RA impacted your relationship with 
the USAF in any way? If so, how?  
69. During the bidding event, at the time you bid your lowest bid (final bid) did you 
anticipate being able to make a profit on the project? If so, how much %? _____% 
(voluntary disclosure if you’re comfortable)  
70. Do you anticipate bidding in an E-RA in the future if your client/customer 
requests or requires it and if the business is otherwise sufficiently attractive? Does 
it depend on who the company is? If so, why? 
71. What did you like the least (resent the most) about the entire experience? 
72. If you won the contract, did you deliberately alter the level of quality of your 
company’s performance in order to recoup profit? If you did not win the contract, 
is this a practice that you would have considered?  
73. Do you feel that your commitment to the USAF is altered in any way by the 
USAF’s use of an e-RA? If so, why? 
74. Do you feel that your loyalty to the USAF is altered in any way by the USAF’s 
use of an e-RA? If so, why?  
75. Do you believe the bidding event made the transaction appear more transparent 
(open, honest, trustworthy)?  
76. Was technology an issue for you? Do you think it was for your competitors or 
would be if incorporated into the Kuwait commercial marketplace? 
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77. Do you think this e-RA bidding event altered the market—at least for this 
transaction? Hence, did the suppliers who customarily bid on generator projects in 
Kuwait change for this tender?  
78. If you won the e-RA, do you believe this resulted in increased clout or an 
enhanced reputation for you or your firm? If so, how? 
Demographics 
 
The purpose for the information requested below is to provide a context of the experience 
level and background of the company/individuals interviewed. Providing background 
information of research subjects helps establish credibility and ultimately strengthens 
research findings.  
 
Company/individual names will not be disclosed in any publication resulting from this 
interview without your expressed written consent.  
 






Is your company publicly traded or private? _____________________________  
How many years has your company been doing business with the USAF? _______ 
How many years have you personally been doing business with the USAF—regardless of 
which company you work for? ________ 
What is your company’s approximate annual revenue (in KWD)? ___________KWD 
Approximately how many people does your company employ full time? _________ 
In what country is your company headquartered? ___________________ 
In what country is your office? ___________ 
In how many e-RAs has your company competed? _________ 
In how many e-RAs have you personally been involved—regardless of which company 
you work for? _________ 
What is your position/duty title? ____________________________________________ 
What is your role in your company? _________________________________________ 
For how many years have you been involved in construction tenders? _________ 
For how many years have you been involved in tenders involving generators? ________ 
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APPENDIX C. WASTA FOLLOW-UP SURVEY/QUESTIONNAIRE 
e-RA Research: Follow-on questions. 
 
Part of the research effort is to explore any effects of national culture on e-RA use. 
In other words, does national culture in any way change any aspect of e-RA use, such as 
e-RA outcomes, e-RA usefulness, and the process of preparing to compete and the 
process of competing in e-RAs?  
From our initial interviews, the concepts of fairness, transparency, trust in the 
procurement process and trust in the buying organization emerged as a dominant themes. 
In order to complete the research, we need to understand how fairness and e-RA use 
might be related; thus, we have a few additional questions. 
Several of our informants suggested a lack of fairness in the Middle East due to 
personal relationships. Our questions will explore this idea. 
1. What is Wasta? 
2. How does Wasta affect business deals? 
3. Does Wasta mean having influence? [Y/N] 
4. Does Wasta mean having connections? [Y/N] 
5. Does Wasta mean having power (the ability to get someone to do 
something they otherwise would not have done)? [Y/N] 
6. Does Wasta mean favoritism? [Y/N] 
7. Is there a cultural norm of Wasta in the Middle East business 
environment? [Y/N] 
8. If so, is the norm of Wasta due to solidarity, mutuality, loyalty, and/or 
allegiance? 
9. Are these norms of solidarity, mutuality, loyalty, and allegiance due to 
family ties? 
10. Do family ties affect business relationships (e.g., which company wins a 
contract)? 
11. If you have high status, do you have Wasta? [Y/N] 
12. If you have a good reputation, do you have Wasta? [Y/N] 
13. If you are respected, do you have Wasta? [Y/N] 
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14. How important to your business is having Wasta?  
15. Can your business thrive without having Wasta? 
16. Is Wasta attributed to an individual or a business—or both? In other words, 
can a business have Wasta, or is it only resident in a person? 
17. Did your choice of a generator supplier have anything to do with Wasta 
(connections? Influence? Power? Favoritism? Status? Allegiance? 
Reciprocating obligation? Respect? Reputation)? [circle each that applies] 
18. Did the generator supplier’s choice of your firm have anything to do with 
Wasta (connections? Influence? Power? Favoritism? Status? Allegiance, 
Reciprocating obligation? Respect? Reputation)? [circle each that applies] 
19. By competing in the e-RA (i.e., by learning and experiencing the new e-
RA procurement process), did you or your firm gain any Wasta 
(connections, influence, power, status, respect, or enhanced reputation)?  
20. If yes above, does that newly-obtained Wasta increase your satisfaction? 
[Y/N] 
21. Prior to the e-RA, did you think it would be useful for your firm to have 
the experience and knowledge of how an e-RA works—knowledge and 
experience that other firms in Kuwait don’t have?  
22. Could that unique and rare experience and knowledge of e-RAs give you 
or your firm connections, influence, power, status, respect, or enhance 
your reputation? 
23. The Middle East business climate has been characterized by: favoritism, 
some distrust, and sometimes corruption. Do you think this business 
climate necessitates that you have Wasta in order maximize your chances 
to be successful? 
24. In your opinion, does Wasta decrease fairness?  
25. From our interviews, participants like the e-RA because it is transparent—
you can see who bid what; thus, you have more information about the 
contract award decision. Do you agree that the transparency builds trust in 
the procurement process?  
26. Does that transparency build trust in the buying organization? 
27. Our initial interviews suggest the following relationship. We want to 
confirm them, and give you the opportunity to elaborate if you want to. 
• Does e-RA use increase your perception of fairness in the 
procurement process? (Note: fairness means every bidder has an 
equal opportunity to win) 
• Does e-RA use increase your perception of transparency in the 
procurement process? (Note: transparency means you know what 
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the selection rules and procedure will be; they are open and the 
buyer is not hiding anything) 
• Informants told us that they would participate in another e-RA with 
the USAF. Whether or not you won the tender, do you believe the 
transparency and/or fairness of the e-RA process increased your 
satisfaction with the tender process?  
28. In your opinion, in tenders with the U.S. Government, can the 
transparency and fairness of e-RAs in any way substitute for Wasta 
(influence and work-arounds) in achieving desired outcomes (fair 
competition, odds of winning a tender, or bidder satisfaction)?  
29. In general, does the use of an e-RA increase your perception of 
procurement integrity? 
30. Do you believe Wasta can be both good (positive outcomes) and bad 
(negative outcomes) ? 
31. Can you think of examples of how Wasta can be “good?” (positive 
outcomes)  
32. If you were contracting with the USAF, how might you use Wasta to 
benefit both parties—your company and the USAF? 
33. Classify the following acts as good Wasta or bad Wasta: 
• Using Wasta to save time in a bureaucratic government process 
(e.g., customs clearance; obtaining base passes from KMOD) 
[good/bad] 
• Using Wasta in collusion in an attempt to win a contract 
[good/bad] 
• Using Wasta in corruption (e.g., bribing a procurement official) 
[good/bad] 
• Using Wasta to help a family member obtain a job—if it created 
unfairness to another job candidate [good/bad] 
• Using Wasta to help a family member obtain a job—if it did not 
create unfairness to another job candidate [good/bad] 
• Gaining respect [good/bad] 
• Gaining prestige [good/bad] 
• Gaining status [good/bad] 
• Improving your firms’ reputation [good/bad] 
• Repaying a favor to a friend or family member—if it created 
unfairness to someone else [good/bad] 
• Repaying a favor to a friend or family member—if it did not create 
unfairness to someone else [good/bad] 
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• Using Wasta to secure admission to a top university where your 
selection might prevent a more qualified candidate from being 
admitted [good/bad] 
• Using Wasta to circumvent the law [good/bad] 
• Using Wasta to get a supplier to agree to team with you to compete 
in a tender [good/bad] 
• Using connections or influence to obtain the most talented labor to 
perform a contract. [good/bad] 
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APPENDIX D. FREQUENCY OF CODES 




Author Creation Date 
e-RA provider coordination with Offerors 7 0 Adam 9/23/2009 2:12: 
e-RA Provider offering Market Research 12 0 Adam 9/23/2009 2:11: 
Buyer coordination with e-RA Provider 23 0 Adam 9/23/2009 2:10: 
e-RA Provider Membership Agreement 8 0 Adam 9/21/2009 1:45: 
Arab Business Climate 34 0 Mike Collins 9/3/2009 10:32 
distrust 8 0 Adam 9/21/2009 12:52 
Corruption 21 0 Mike Collins 7/23/2009 2:14: 
Collusion 39 0 Mike Collins 7/9/2009 12:06 
Allegiance or Loyalty to family or friends 7 0 Adam 10/15/2009 11:35 
Bad Wasta 26 0 Adam 10/15/2009 11:49 
Connections 8 0 Adam 10/8/2009 12:42 
Favoritism 8 0 Adam 9/20/2009 11:06 
Good Wasta 16 0 Adam 10/15/2009 11:49 
Influence 8 0 Adam 10/8/2009 12:41 
Reputation 7 0 Adam 10/8/2009 12:53 
Status 6 0 Adam 10/8/2009 12:47 
Offeror's reputation 18 0 Mike Collins 8/21/2009 1:06: 
Cultural Disposition to Bargain 10 0 Mike Collins 8/21/2009 4:30: 
Subcontractor Satisfaction 6 0 Mike Collins 8/27/2009 5:31: 
Change Market Dynamics 13 0 Mike Collins 8/27/2009 12:38 
Standard Business with Industry 6 0 Mike Collins 8/27/2009 10:43 
Supplier Opportunism 10 0 Mike Collins 8/21/2009 4:51: 
Specifiability 25 0 Mike Collins 7/23/2009 1:19: 
E-RA Appropriateness 28 0 Mike Collins 8/21/2009 3:04: 
Adequate market research 17 0 Mike Collins 8/28/2009 3:53: 
Contractor e-RA success 5 0 Mike Collins 8/21/2009 1:56: 
Buyer preparation 32 0 Mike Collins 8/21/2009 11:20 
Buyer Savings 14 0 Mike Collins 8/21/2009 11:14 
Offeror pre-E-RA preparation 15 0 Mike Collins 8/21/2009 11:05 
Communication 18 0 Mike Collins 8/22/2009 11:04 
Quality of RFP 18 0 Mike Collins 8/21/2009 2:22: 
Formal Rules and Procedural Fairness 72 0 Mike Collins 7/9/2009 12:18 
Justice 5 0 Owner 7/30/2009 10:46 
Trust in Process (1) 28 0 Mike Collins 7/9/2009 11:42 
Trust in e-RA Service Provider 26 0 Mike Collins 7/9/2009 11:41 
Trust in the USAF/Buyer 36 0 Mike Collins 7/9/2009 11:42 
Trust in CCO/Individual Buyer 14 0 Mike Collins 7/9/2009 11:42 
Bidding Strategy 14 0 Mike Collins 8/21/2009 3:17: 
LPTA source selection method 11 0 Mike Collins 8/21/2009 2:31: 
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Author Creation Date 
Subcontractor Inventory 5 0 Mike Collins 8/21/2009 2:07: 
Attractiveness 9 0 Mike Collins 8/21/2009 1:38: 
Excess Inventory 5 0 Mike Collins 8/21/2009 2:20: 
Purchase Volume 28 0 Mike Collins 8/21/2009 11:19 
Competition 11 0 Mike Collins 8/21/2009 1:06: 
Award Price 11 0 Mike Collins 8/21/2009 11:18 
Subcontractor Margin 5 0 Mike Collins 8/21/2009 11:16 
Offeror's Margin 19 0 Mike Collins 8/21/2009 11:12 
Contractor Management 6 0 Mike Collins 8/22/2009 11:02 
Contractor Performance 19 0 Mike Collins 8/22/2009 10:47 
Subcontractor Price 10 0 Mike Collins 8/21/2009 11:06 
Satisfaction 5 0 Mike Collins 7/9/2009 12:40 
Buyer Satisfaction 14 0 Mike Collins 8/21/2009 11:14 
Offeror Satisfaction 42 0 Mike Collins 8/21/2009 11:13 
Change in Bidding Strategy 52 0 Mike Collins 7/23/2009 1:30: 
Subcontractor Reach back to Manufacturer 5 0 Mike Collins 8/21/2009 2:06: 
Offeror bargaining with suppliers 19 0 Mike Collins 8/21/2009 10:52 
Need for e-RA Training 12 0 Mike Collins 7/9/2009 12:31 
Hands on e-RA Training 7 0 Mike Collins 8/21/2009 4:12: 
Need for DoD e-RA Expertise 8 0 Adam 9/23/2009 2:14: 
Poor Gov't cost estimating 6 0 Mike Collins 8/21/2009 4:41: 
Undeveloped local market 12 0 Mike Collins 7/23/2009 1:42: 
Need for DoD e-RA Policy / Leadership 16 0 Mike Collins 7/9/2009 12:31 
Gov't overpaying for goods and services 20 0 Mike Collins 8/21/2009 4:36: 
Need for Training 7 0 Adam 9/20/2009 11:49 
Technology 9 0 Owner 7/30/2009 10:43 
Education 9 0 Owner 7/30/2009 10:39 
Profit Margins 10 0 Mike Collins 7/23/2009 1:22: 
Offeror Opportunism 8 0 Mike Collins 7/9/2009 12:06 
Attitude toward Technology 7 0 Mike Collins 7/30/2009 5:22: 
Perceived Usefulness 5 0 Mike Collins 7/9/2009 12:23 
Learn novel Acquisition Tool 9 0 Mike Collins 8/21/2009 1:06: 
Innovative Acquisition Process 14 0 Mike Collins 7/30/2009 5:12: 
Gain Competitive Advantage 8 0 Mike Collins 8/21/2009 10:49 
Reduced Lead Time 5 0 Mike Collins 7/9/2009 11:55 
Transparency 63 0 Mike Collins 7/9/2009 12:26 
Increase Efficiency / Effectiveness for Future Business 7 0 Mike Collins 7/9/2009 11:56 
Willingness to Innovate 14 0 Mike Collins 7/9/2009 12:28 
Gain trust with Buyer / Seller Relationship 10 0 Mike Collins 7/9/2009 11:55 
Access to New Buyers 11 0 Mike Collins 7/9/2009 11:52 
Gain Market Intelligence 9 0 Mike Collins 7/9/2009 11:51 
Increase Sales / Revenue 10 0 Mike Collins 7/9/2009 11:56 
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Author Creation Date 
Relational Exchange 11 0 Mike Collins 7/30/2009 4:33: 
Flexibility 15 0 Mike Collins 9/3/2009 10:14 
Cooperation 8 0 Mike Collins 8/21/2009 11:08 
Relationship Building (1) 30 0 Mike Collins 7/9/2009 12:11 
Collaboration 6 0 Mike Collins 7/9/2009 12:10 
Commitment 19 0 Mike Collins 7/9/2009 12:08 
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APPENDIX E. LIST OF DATA ATTRIBUTES 
Textgroup Textname Creation Date # of coded segments 
# of coded 
memos Author Bytes
Correspondence 
E-mail traffic w/ contractor on 28 Sept 
(wasta) 9/30/2009 12:36 3 1 RS1 3478 
Correspondence Company B—no wasta e-mail 22 Sept 09 9/22/2009 4:21 1 1 RS1 818 
Correspondence CCO and Sorcity CEO e-mails 4 Mar 08 9/20/2009 9:29 59 6 RS1 27793
Correspondence 
Educating the customer e-mail 
(Commander) 9/20/2009 9:29 5 1 
RS1 
1966 
Correspondence ASG-KU 1 Jan 06 Ltr 9/20/2009 9:29 0 0 RS1 13 
Correspondence 4 Mar Collusion e-mail from CCO 9/20/2009 9:27 13 3 RS1 6024 
Correspondence 10 Feb Bollard e-mail (rqmnts) 9/20/2009 9:27 6 0 RS1 4584 
Correspondence 
CC e-mail to ECES re brand name on 19 
Jan 9/20/2009 9:29 17 0 
RS1 
5321 
Correspondence Generators JA—Brand Name Restriction 9/20/2009 9:29 7 0 RS1 5748 
Correspondence CC e-mail to GTE—training 9/20/2009 9:29 1 1 RS1 2038 
Correspondence CC to Sorcity CEO on 19 Jan- intro 9/20/2009 9:29 2 1 RS1 535 
Correspondence 
Sorcity and CC on MR and agreement 23 
Jan 9/20/2009 9:29 11 0 
RS1 
4073 
Correspondence e-RA announcement 8/21/2009 10:36 2 1 RS2 1142 
Correspondence 18 Aug E-mail from Sorcity CEO 8/21/2009 10:36 10 3 RS2 1291 
Correspondence CECOM emails re trade off tool 4 Sept 09 9/20/2009 9:29 0 3 RS1 7702 
Archival Data ECONS Slides—24 Jan 08 9/20/2009 9:29 0 0 RS1 1406 
Archival Data Sorcity Membership Agreement—Jan 08 9/20/2009 9:27 0 0 RS1 29897
Archival Data Innovative idea saves nearly 9/20/2009 9:29 0 0 RS1 3459 
Archival Data Reverse Auction Basics to contractors 9/20/2009 9:29 0 0 RS1 1349 
Archival Data Technical Evaluation 8/21/2009 10:36 0 0 RS2 12587
Archival Data Solicitation 8/21/2009 10:36 1 0 RS2 124874
Archival Data SASS 8/21/2009 10:36 0 0 RS2 5087 
Archival Data PCM 8/21/2009 10:36 0 0 RS2 6447 
Archival Data P00001 8/21/2009 10:36 0 0 RS2 4214 
Archival Data D and F 8/21/2009 10:36 0 0 RS2 925 
Archival Data Contract 8/21/2009 10:36 0 0 RS2 55700
Archival Data CENTAF Solicitation Clearance Request 8/21/2009 10:36 0 0 RS2 976 
Archival Data A00003 8/21/2009 10:36 0 0 RS2 9166 
Archival Data A00002 8/21/2009 10:36 0 0 RS2 56610
Archival Data A00001 Narrative 8/21/2009 10:36 0 0 RS2 819 
Archival Data 
386 ECONS Response to CAOC Sol 




386 ECONS Response to CAOC Contract 




386 ECONS Response to A7K review 




Manager C--Wasta Questionnaire 




Manager B—Wasta Questionnaire 24 
Sept 09 9/24/2009 9:37 50 12 
RS1 
6442 
Field Notes Manager A—FN & Questionnaire Sep 09 9/22/2009 5:24 51 9 RS1 9704 
Field Notes Manager A—Field Notes (only) 9/20/2009 10:04 0 0 RS1 2920 
Field Notes Manager B—Interview—Field Notes 7/14/2009 9:15 46 12 RS2 3674 
Field Notes Manager D—Interview—Field Notes 7/14/2009 8:50 64 12 RS2 4493 
Field Notes Manager C—Field Notes 7/14/2009 2:46 92 12 RS2 6727 
Field Notes FedBid Interview—Field Notes 7/10/2009 8:55 15 1 RS2 1470 
Field Notes AFCENT Interview—Notes 7/10/2009 8:31 18 1 RS2 1499 
Interviews Manager C--Wasta Interview 6 Sept 09 10/8/2009 11:36 52 6 RS1 27297
Interviews Revised Manager A—Interview 10/7/2009 8:30 63 26 RS1 37237
Interviews Manager B--Follow-up Interview 10/6/2009 3:35 43 16 RS1 23323
Interviews 
Manager B--Response to initial 
questionnaire 8/28/2009 2:02 32 2 RS2 16148
Interviews FedBid Interview--Revised, redline 7/9/2009 11:31 0 0 RS2 35578
Interviews Logistics A—Interview 7/9/2009 11:31 59 2 RS2 38299
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Textgroup Textname Creation Date # of coded segments 
# of coded 
memos Author Bytes
Interviews Logistic B—Interview  7/9/2009 11:31 42 0 RS2 19865
Interviews Manager D—Interview  7/9/2009 11:31 193 11 RS2 43756
Interviews Manager E—Interview 7/9/2009 11:31 86 7 RS2 34406
Interviews 
Coyne-Collins Manager B interview 
(revised) 7/9/2009 11:31 78 4 
RS2 
52057
Interviews CCO—Interview 7/9/2009 11:31 102 3 RS2 40643
Interviews Manager C—Interview 7/9/2009 11:31 228 10 RS2 135169
Interviews Sorcity Interview 26 Mar 09 7/9/2009 11:31 66 7 RS2 63165
Interviews AFCENT Interview 7/9/2009 11:31 64 1 RS2 16164
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APPENDIX F. SAMPLE CONTINGENCY: INSTRUCTIONS TO 
OFFERORS  
(Streamlined LPTA under FAR Part 13) 
 
ADDENDUM TO FAR 52.212-1 
 
Instructions to Offerors: 
 
L-5 REVERSE AUCTION (RA) 
 
a) The U.S. Air Force has retained fill in provider name, to assist in this Internet-based 
Pricing Proposal Event—termed a reverse auction (RA). Fill in provider name is an 
online bid service that serves over XXX clients who make purchases like this. Those 
offerors who wish to submit responses to the solicitation shall register with fill in in 
provider name and contact information and become a member.  
b) Registered suppliers who are invited to participate in the RA will be notified by 
Sorcity.com prior to the activation of the event and given a code in order to place bids 
and provide pricing proposals using a secure Internet-based tool by Sorcity.com.  
c) Offerors can have access to this tool from anywhere in the world as long as they have 
access to the Internet using Internet Explorer. Offerors will be given a website address, 
and a secure User ID and a password they select when they register. 
d) For further information or clarification about this event and fill in provider name, 
direct all communication to the Contracting Officer. 
e) Queries Concerning Solicitation. All questions regarding the technical aspects (system 
software) of the RA must be directed to fill in provider name using either the above 
Email address or by posting questions through the provider’s web hosted event. All 
questions regarding the content of the solicitation will be answered by the USAF 
Contracting Officer insert name and e-mail address and provided to all offerors. Any 
solicitation amendments will be provided electronically to participating offerors. 
f) Key Dates. The following dates are to be determined, but this outline should give 
offerors an idea of what to expect in the solicitation process. The date of the RA bidding 
event will be published via amendment to the RFQ; this amendment will only be issued 
to those determined technically acceptable.  
INITIAL DATE: Send out the Solicitation posting to offerors via email. The initial date is 
fill in date.  
QUALIFICATION DATE: All offerors must complete the registration process by this date, 
fill in date. 
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INVITATION DATE: All registered and qualified offerors will be sent an email requesting 
their participation in the reverse auction for this solicitation in this manner both USAF/e-
RA Provider notifies offerors they have been invited to participate in the Internet-Based 
Reverse Auction Event. Each offeror will be given a specific link and Private Access 
Code to the event. Only through this invitation may an offeror compete for this 
requirement. The offeror agrees to keep this Private Access Code confidential.   
REVERSE AUCTION EVENT DATE: The listing of the date during which time the 
offerors may make pricing proposals on provider’s website. Following the ending of the 
Reverse Auction Event, all qualified offerors must send by electronic media the schedule 
of supplies/services, page 2-3 of this solicitation, within 2 hours of the ending of the 
event. This date is fill in date. 
AWARD DATE: The date by which it is anticipated that the Contracting Officer will make 
an award to the Offeror who is most responsive to the RFQ and provides the best value to 
the Government under this RFQ.   
g) Submission of Pricing  
 1. Once the e-RA bidding event commences on fill in date, offerors shall only submit 
pricing only through the event at fill in providers web site. Offerors’ initial bid in the RA 
bidding event shall be the total price offered in the Schedule of Supplies or Services, page 
2—3 of this solicitation.  
 2. This electronic Internet-based pricing proposal (e-RA) will consist of one lot entitled 
“Purchase/Install Generators.” In this lot, offerors shall provide price proposals to satisfy 
all requirements outlined in this RFQ and its attached Statement of Work dated fill in 
date. All prices quoted during the bidding event (e-RA) shall be in USD. If converting fill 
in local currency to USD, please use the exchange rate of XXX local currency per USD. 
 3. At the completion of the Internet-based Pricing Proposal Event, Offerors shall submit 
the Schedule of Supplies/Services, the completed pages 2 and 3 of this solicitation, if the 
unit prices have adjusted from the initial offer due date of fill in date. The Total Price in 
the offeror’s Schedule of Supplies/Services, completed schedule, page 2 and 3 of this 
solicitation, shall match the lowest pricing proposal that offerors have entered during the 
online pricing proposal event (RA).  
 4. Your completed Schedule of Supplies/Services, pages 2 and 3 of this solicitation, is 
due via email WITHIN TWO (2) HOURS after the Internet-based Pricing Proposal Event 
(RA) to the U.S. Air Force Contracting Officer and must be sent to fill in provider name 
Name. You are also required to print out and sign the first page of the Schedule of 
Supplies/Services, completed pages 2—3 of this solicitation, and scan/email a hard copy 
to the Contracting Officer.  
 5. The successful offeror shall pay a Seller’s fee to fill in provider name. Offerors must 
enter into a membership agreement with fill in provider name prior to the RA bidding 
event. The Seller’s fee will be stated in the membership agreement. The Seller’s fee will 
be the same for all offerors.  
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APPENDIX G. SAMPLE CONTINGENCY : EVALUATION 
FACTORS FOR AWARD 
(Streamlined LPTA Under FAR Part 13) 
 
ADDENDUM TO 
52.212-2 —Evaluation —Commercial Items (Jan 1999) 
 
The Government will award a contract resulting from this solicitation to the responsible 
offeror whose offer conforming to the solicitation will be most advantageous to the 
Government, price and other factors considered.  
(b) A written notice of award or acceptance of an offer, mailed or otherwise furnished to 
the successful offeror within the time for acceptance specified in the offer, shall result in 
a binding contract without further action by either party. Before the offer’s specified 
expiration time, the Government may accept an offer (or part of an offer), whether or not 
there are negotiations after its receipt, unless a written notice of withdrawal is received 
before award. 
 
M-1 BASIS FOR AWARD 
 
1. This source selection will be conducted using simplified acquisition procedures (as 
specified herein) contained in Subpart 13.5 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). 
The approach is a streamlined Lowest Price Technically Acceptable (LPTA) source 
selection. Award will be made to the Offeror who is deemed responsible and responsive 
that reflects a complete understanding of the specifications and drawings for the Request 
for Quotation and is judged to represent the Best Value to the Government based on 
selection of the technically acceptable offer with the lowest evaluated price. The 
Government reserves the right to refrain from awarding to any offeror in the event that all 
offerors progressing beyond the technically acceptable evaluation are determined to have 
offered pricing that is not considered reasonable or complete. The Best Value is 
represented by the lowest priced technically acceptable offer. To arrive at a best value 
decision, the Source Selection Authority (SSA) will integrate the source selection team’s 
evaluations of the factors and subfactors described in the paragraphs that follow. The 
factors and subfactors are the uniform baseline against which each offeror’s proposal is 
compared to determine the confidence the government has that the offeror will be able to 
satisfactorily accomplish all work required. They establish the level an offeror’s proposal 
must meet in any area, factor, subfactor, or element in order to be judged acceptable. To 
be eligible for award, a proposal must meet all technical requirements, conform to all 




2. The proposals will be evaluated on the basis of the evaluation factors listed below. The 
technical area will be evaluated on an “acceptable” or “unacceptable” basis. Only those 
contractors determined to be technically acceptable will be evaluated on price. The 
following areas will be evaluated: 
 (a)  Technical  
  (1)—Technical Approach 
  (2)—Management/Technical Support 
  (3)—Contractor’s Quality Control 
  (4)—Project Schedule 
  (5)—Past Performance 
 (b)  Price 
  - Total price reasonableness, and completeness.  
 
M-1(a) TECHNICAL EVALUATION 
The technical area will be evaluated on a pass or fail basis. If the proposal received is 
determined to be unacceptable, the offeror will be excluded from competition, and they 
will not progress to the next round of evaluations. Each proposal achieving an acceptable 
rating will enter the second tier of evaluations—Price. The Technical Evaluation Team 
will rate the technical proposals according to the chart listed: 
 
DEFINITION RATING 
Passes (or meets) minimum standard requirements Acceptable 




(1) Technical Approach: A technical description of the items being offered in sufficient 
detail to evaluate compliance with the requirements in the solicitation. This should 
include product literature, or other documents, if necessary. The offeror shall 
affirmatively state the country in which the equipment was manufactured. Products 
proposed shall be either Cummins/Onan, Caterpillar/Olympian, Kohler, F.G. Wilson, or 
Marapco brands. All 29 generators offered shall be the same brand. The Government will 
not “cherry-pick” brands. Offerors must provide the manufacturer’s technical information 
of equipment offered and return it with their offer. Terms of any express warranty will be 
evaluated in the technical acceptability.  
(2) Key Project Management/Technical Support: The Contractor will be required to 
provide their approach to hiring qualified key project and support staff. The standard is 
met when the proposal:  
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(i)  Provides an organizational diagram showing clear, logical lines of 
authority from the Project Manager to Subcontracting Management, 
including Site Superintendence and Quality Control.  
(ii)  Identifies the dedicated on-site staff by job title. 
(iii)  Provides a brief job description and the qualifications required of each 
staff member (e.g. any education, training, professional qualifications, 
licenses, and experience relative to the tasks he/she will perform if 
awarded the contract). The Contractor performing the work shall be 
qualified and experienced in generator installation, generator facilities 
construction, diesel generator installation and testing, synchronization 
systems testing and commissioning.  
(iv)  Identifies the relationships between and authority delegated to 
management personnel. 
(v)  Identifies the level of decision-making authority delegated to staff 
members (as a minimum, Program Manager shall have on-site decision 
making authority). 
(3) Contractor Quality Control (CQC): The contractor will be required to provide an 
overview of their approach to quality control. The standard is met when the proposal: 
(i)  Reflects how quality problems will be logically, effectively, and 
expediently documented and resolved.  
(ii)  Adequately identifies how trend analysis will be accomplished to identify 
poor performing subcontractors, including appropriate corrective action, 
management tools, methods, and documentation.  
(iii)  Identifies experienced, dedicated quality control personnel (with no 
overlapping duties and responsibilities that would supersede this role) and 
the extent of their authority. 
(iv)  Identifies how often work will be inspected (frequency of at least once per 
day per job). 
(v)  Meets and fulfills all content requirements of the Technical Specifications. 
(4) Project Schedule: The offeror is required to provide an AF Form 3064, Construction 
Progress Schedule that is complete, proper and accurate in strict adherence to the 
“Instructions to Contractors” on the reverse of the AF Form 3064. The standard is met if 
the contractor completes the form properly, properly breaks out appropriate major 
elements of work, describes work elements in sufficient detail, accurately reflects a 
reasonable timeline (task duration) that satisfies the required delivery time per the Scope 
of Work para. 1.6.3, logically sequences major work elements reflecting a sound project 
approach and understanding of major project tasks, work element percentages of work 
values are accurate, reasonable and balanced, and overall project duration is within the 
specified maximum performance period or sooner.  
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(5) Past Performance: The offeror’s past performance will be evaluated on an 
acceptable/unacceptable basis. Past performance information must be recent (within 
previous 3 years) and relevant. Relevant experience will be limited to performance of 
projects similar in size, scope, and complexity to those under this RFQ. In order to be 
eligible for award an offeror must have a satisfactory performance record. For any 
adverse past performance information collected, the contractor will be given the 
opportunity to explain the circumstances for clarification.  
 
M-1(b) PRICE 
Total Price: This criterion evaluates the overall price to the Government and determines 
if the proposed price is reasonable and complete. The price proposal will be evaluated to 
determine the offeror's understanding of contract requirements as expressed by the 
solicitation. Any inconsistencies between proposed performance and price must clearly 
be justified. For example, if unique and innovative approaches are the basis for an 
abnormally low proposed price, the nature of these approaches and their impact to the 
proposed price, must be completely documented. The burden of credibility of price rests 
solely with the offeror. The following evaluation criteria shall apply: 
Reasonableness: The offeror's proposal will be reviewed to determine if the proposed 
price is reasonable. The evaluated price will be the offeror’s final bid price in the RA 
bidding event. Price analysis techniques may include: (1) comparison of proposed 
prices received in response to the solicitation, (2) comparison of previously paid 
prices for the same or similar item and (3) comparison of proposed prices with the 
independent Government cost estimate. 
Completeness: Price Proposals will be evaluated to determine whether the offeror 
provided sufficient data as required by the solicitation and the Contracting Officer 
during the evaluation. 
The lowest priced technically acceptable offer whose price is determined to be reasonable 
and complete, based on the above criteria, will be determined the best value to the 
Government for award.  
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APPENDIX H. CECOM TWO-STEP SECTION L (SAMPLE) 




The United States Electronics and Communications Command (CECOM) will conduct a 
limited competition (NOTE: THIS IS A TWO-STEP REVERSE AUCTION ONLY. 
THOSE CONTRACTORS IN THE COMPETITIVE RANGE WILL BE INVITED TO 
PARTICIPATE IN THE anonymous, on-line reverse auction for the requirements 
specified in Section B of this solicitation. The web address to gain access to the auction is 
http://usave.monmouth.army.mil. The specific time for this reverse auction will be TBD 
at TBD AM, Eastern Standard Time. Delivery will be in accordance with the specified 
delivery schedule in Section B of this solicitation. The contractors shall sign and return 
this agreement to the Contracting Officer at CECOM to receive a user name and 
password for the reverse auction by COB, TBD . Point of contact for this requirement is 
Contract Specialist ____________ and can be reached at ____________ or via email 
______________. The Bidders agree to meet each requirement specified and only offer 
items that meet these requirements. 
During the reverse auction, Bidders/Offerors may revise their initial pricing bid through 
submission of electronic offers. Bidders, however, are not required to revise their initial 
pricing bid during the reverse auction. By participating in this reverse auction you grant 
the Government the right to disclose your price, however, your name will be kept 
anonymous. The Contracting Officer also reverses the right to suspend or cancel the 
reverse auction at any time. If the Contracting Officer cancels the reverse auction, the 
solicitation may be processed following normal Sealed Bid procedures. 
It is anticipated that a Firm Fixed Price, (5) FIVE YEAR, INDEFINITE DELIVERY, 
INDEFINITE QUANTITY (IDIQ) Contract will be executed for this requirement. 
THOSE Bidders/Offerors IN THE COMPETITIVE RANGE must propose on the full 
quantity only. The price entered on the web site during the reverse auction shall be the 
TOTAL PRICE FOR ALL SLINS. TOTAL PRICE = (0001AA + 0002AA + 0003AA + 
0004AA + 0005AA + 0006AA + 0006AB + 0006AC). A Bidder shall not be permitted to 
submit any revised pricing other than the final price submitted during the reverse auction. 
Once the reverse auction is complete, the contractors shall submit a signed copy of their 
final bid price to the point of contact above. (NOTE: AT THIS TIME THE APPARENT 
LOW BIDDER WILL SUPPLY THE PRICE BREAKDOWN FOR SLINS(0001AA + 
0002AA + 0003AA + 0004AA + 0005AA + 0006AA + 0006AB + 0006AC). The 
Representations and certifications Section K of the solicitation must also be filled in and 
returned to the Contracting Officer. BIDDERS/OFFERORS HAVE UNTIL 24 HOURS 
FROM THE TIME THE REVERSE AUCTION ENDS TO SUBMIT A COMPLETE 
BREAKOUT OF SLINS PRICES. **CAUTION: UNBALANCED BIDS WILL CAUSE 
BIDDERS/OFFEORS TO BE ELIMINATED/FOUND NONRESPONSIVE (SEE FAR 
14.404-2(g), 14.405.)**  
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The reverse auction will be conducted on __TBD (Date)___ at __TBD (Time)__. Time of 
the event is Eastern Standard Time. The Starting Price and Bid Decrement for this 
requirement will be ____TBD_______. If a Bid is submitted within the last five minutes, 
as indicated by the Army web site server clock, of the time period specified for the 
reverse auction, the final bid will be the determining factor in closing the reverse auction. 
When no bids are submitted during the extension period then the auction will close. A 
Bid during the reverse auction must differ from the market-leading offer by at least the 
decrement stated above. 
By participating in the reverse auction, contractors certify they will not knowingly 
disclose their price to any other bidder except anonymously during the reverse auction. 
the contractors further certify that anonymous disclosure of its price during the reverse 
auction shall not be for the purposed of restricting competition.  
 
BASIS FOR AWARD: 
 
At the conclusion of the reverse auction, the Government intends to make an award to the 
Contractor who submits the lowest price, and is deemed acceptable and responsible by 
the Contracting Officer. The Bidders must bid on the full quantity identified on Line Item 
0001AA, 0002AA, 0003AA, 0004AA, 0005AA, 0006AA, 0006AB AND 0006AC. The 
Contracting Officer reverses the right to make no award under this procedure. 
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APPENDIX I. TOP 50 PSC/FSC CATEGORIES 
TOP 50 PRODUCT AND SERVICE CODES (PSC)
* Results are based on accepted FedBid Buys as of September 30, 2009
7030 -- IT Softw are
7035 -- IT Support Equipment
7050 -- IT Components
7010 -- IT System Configuration
7045 -- IT Supplies
7025 -- IT Input/Output and Storage Devices
7021 -- IT Central Processing Unit (CPU, Computer), Digital
7110 -- Off ice Furniture
2330 -- Trailers
7042 -- IT Mini and Micro Computer Control Devices
5820 -- Radio and Television Communication Equipment, Except Airborne
1367 -- Tactical Sets, Kits, and Outfits
6640 -- Laboratory Equipment and Supplies
7510 -- Off ice Supplies
8465 -- Individual Equipment
6350 -- Miscellaneous Alarm, Signal, and Security Detection Systems
4130 -- Refrigeration and Air Conditioning Components
5855 -- Night Vision Equipment, Emitted and Reflected Radiation
6630 -- Chemical Analysis Instruments
5805 -- Telephone and Telegraph Equipment
5810 -- Communications Security Equipment and Components
2320 -- Trucks and Truck Tractors, Wheeled
6515 -- Medical and Surgical Instruments, Equipment, and Supplies
5410 -- Prefabricated and Portable Buildings
5836 -- Video Recording and Reproducing Equipment
7125 -- Cabinets, Lockers, Bins, and Shelving
7020 -- IT Central Processing Unit (CPU, Computer), Analog
6665 -- Hazard-Detecting Instruments and Apparatus
5895 -- Miscellaneous Communication Equipment
9999 -- Miscellaneous Items
5450 -- Miscellaneous Prefabricated Structures
D399 -- Other IT and Telecommunications Services (includes data storage on tapes, compact disks, etc.)
3930 -- Warehouse Trucks and Tractors, Self-Propelled
4210 -- Fire Fighting Equipment
7490 -- Miscellaneous Office Machines
8145 -- Specialized Shipping and Storage Containers
4240 -- Safety and Rescue Equipment
3805 -- Earth Moving and Excavating Equipment
8470 -- Armor, Personal
7460 -- Visible Record Equipment
2310 -- Passenger Motor Vehicles
8340 -- Tents and Tarpaulins
5830 -- Intercommunication and Public Address Systems, Except Airborne
6910 -- Training Aids
2340 -- Motorcycles, Motor Scooters, and Bicycles
7810 -- Athletic and Sporting Equipment
7195 -- Miscellaneous Furniture and Fixtures
2590 -- Miscellaneous Vehicular Components
J070 -- Maintenance, Repair, and Rebuilding of Information Technology (IT) Equipment (Including Firmw are)
8415 -- Clothing, Special Purpose  
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APPENDIX J. SAP PRICE-ONLY MODEL 
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